ISAIAH BROOKS v. STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2019 )


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  •           DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    ISAIAH BROOKS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3448
    [March 20, 2019]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Laura Johnson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2012CF010423BXX.
    Philip J. Massa of Philip J. Massa, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T.
    Acuna, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    MAY, J.
    The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for first-degree
    murder with a firearm and robbery with a firearm. He argues the evidence
    was insufficient to establish he was the shooter, and the court should have
    granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. He also argues the trial court
    erred in admitting testimony from a detective that shifted the burden of
    proof. We disagree and affirm.
    The State charged the defendant and co-defendants with: (1) first-
    degree murder with a firearm; (2) robbery with a firearm; (3) grand theft
    auto; and (4) grand theft. The amended information alleged the defendant
    arranged a fake drug transaction during which he robbed and shot the
    victim. Four individuals were involved in the commission of the crime: the
    defendant and three co-defendants. Two of the co-defendants, Jerry and
    Robinson, testified at trial.
    Robinson testified that he, the defendant, the victim, and a fourth man
    traveled in the victim’s rental car to conduct a drug transaction. The
    defendant drove, the victim occupied the front passenger seat, and the co-
    defendant and fourth man sat in the back seat. When the victim and the
    fourth man went inside a gas station, the defendant talked about robbing
    the victim and then called another man from his phone. Robinson heard
    the defendant ask the other person if he was already there.
    When all four men were back in the car, they drove to a parking lot
    where co-defendant Jerry was waiting in his truck. When they got out of
    the car to meet Jerry, the defendant held the victim at gunpoint while Jerry
    went through the victim’s pockets and possessions. They took $100 and
    a cell phone from the victim.
    After the robbery, Robinson and Jerry returned to the truck when
    Robinson heard a gunshot. He did not see who shot the gun, but testified
    that Jerry was on the truck’s driver’s side. The defendant was the last
    person Robinson saw with the gun. Robinson and Jerry left and later met
    up with the defendant. They all returned to the Days Inn, where the
    defendant, his girlfriend, and her uncle were staying.
    Robinson went to his sister’s house the next day. When Robinson
    learned the police were investigating the shooting, his sister encouraged
    him to tell the police what happened. He gave a statement to the police
    and identified a photograph of the victim at the crime scene. Robinson
    identified Jerry, the defendant, and others present during the crime.
    Jerry testified the defendant called and asked to meet him. The
    defendant told him he had a “lick,” meaning getting money from someone,
    on a “white guy” and asked Jerry to feign a drug sale. Jerry drove the
    truck to a dead end as instructed.
    The victim and defendant walked towards Jerry’s truck, at which point
    the victim asked Jerry for pills. Jerry testified the defendant approached
    the victim from behind and hit him in the back of the head with a gun.
    When the victim asked what was happening, the defendant pointed the
    gun at the victim and told him to “give it up.” The victim reached into his
    pockets, taking out a cell phone and some money.
    The defendant walked back towards the victim’s rental car. Jerry heard
    the victim say, “just don’t shoot,” at which point, the defendant shot the
    victim.
    The defendant got in the victim’s rental car. Robinson and Jerry left in
    the truck. The defendant called Jerry later and arranged to meet at an
    apartment building where Jerry picked up the defendant. They all
    returned to the hotel.
    2
    There, Jerry asked the defendant why he shot the victim. The
    defendant did not respond. Jerry repeatedly told the defendant that “he
    should never have shot the white guy” and the defendant told him to be
    quiet, not worry, and say nothing. Jerry stayed the night at the hotel. In
    the morning, the defendant gave him $50. The defendant gave the
    cellphone to his girlfriend to sell.
    Jerry met with the police; he agreed to talk to them and to make a
    controlled call the same day. During the controlled call, the defendant
    asked Jerry what the police were saying when they came to Jerry’s house
    and whether they had a warrant. Jerry told the defendant that he
    “shouldn’t have never even did that sh__,” and identified the defendant as
    responding: “don’t even start with that little whoe sh__,” “stop acting like
    a B_____,” and “get some ba___.” The controlled call was admitted into
    evidence.
    During the detective’s testimony, the following occurred:
    [PROSECUTOR]: [W]hen you met with . . . Jerry and you
    heard that controlled phone call, . . . was there any doubt in
    your mind that [the defendant] was involved?
    [DETECTIVE]: Yes -- I'm sorry, no, there was no doubt in my
    mind.
    ....
    [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And were those responses that you
    heard coming from [the defendant], were they responses that
    would indicate he didn't know what the heck . . . Jerry was
    talking about?
    [DETECTIVE]: No, not at all; he knew what he was saying.
    [PROSECUTOR]: Did you ever hear him say on that controlled
    phone call, man I, don't even know what you are talking
    about?
    [DETECTIVE]: No, I did not.
    [PROSECUTOR]: Did you ever hear him say, look, I was there,
    but I didn't shoot the man; you shot the man. . . ? Did you
    ever him hear him say that?
    [DETECTIVE]: No, I did not.
    3
    [PROSECUTOR]: Did you hear him use language that was
    consistent with trying to shut [Jerry] up?
    [DETECTIVE]: Yes.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge. Speculation. Move
    to strike. The jury heard the tape; her opinion doesn't count.
    THE COURT: I will sustain your objection as to the officer's
    interpretation.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move to strike it.
    THE COURT: Granted.
    ....
    [PROSECUTOR]: All right. And based on what was being said
    . . . during that phone call, did this man ever respond by
    saying he didn't know what he was talking about?
    [DETECTIVE]: No.
    [PROSECUTOR]: So at that point in your mind, is he
    responding like someone who had no involvement and didn't
    know what he was talking about?
    [DETECTIVE]: No.
    [PROSECUTOR]: So in your mind, is that statement for you,
    incriminating enough?
    [DETECTIVE]: Yes.
    The defendant’s girlfriend testified that she checked into the hotel with
    the defendant, Robinson, and her uncle. The defendant told her he was
    taking the victim to get pills and drove off. The men were gone for
    approximately forty-five minutes. When they returned, the victim was not
    with them.
    She testified that they seemed nervous and frequently checked the
    window. Jerry gave her an iPhone to sell. She received $200 for the phone.
    When she saw a news story on TV about the murder, she recognized the
    victim as the man in the car with the defendant.
    4
    Without objection, she testified that she asked the defendant about
    what happened and all he said was that he didn’t do anything. He
    subsequently admitted to the robbery. He told her he did not intend to
    shoot the victim, but when the victim reached into the car, he thought he
    was reaching for a weapon and shot him.
    The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal both at the close of the
    State’s case-in-chief and at the close of the evidence. The trial court denied
    the motions. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. The
    court sentenced the defendant to life in prison with a 25-year minimum
    mandatory sentences on both counts to run concurrently.
    The defendant first argues there was no direct evidence to prove that
    he shot and killed the victim. He insists the witnesses’ testimony was
    circumstantial, and not credible because they agreed to testify against him
    for lesser sentences. He suggests the trial court erred in denying his
    motions for judgment of acquittal.
    The State responds there was direct evidence in the form of eyewitness
    testimony, the controlled call, and a confession. We agree with the State.
    The trial court correctly denied the motions for judgment of acquittal.
    We have de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment
    of acquittal. State v. Konegen, 
    18 So. 3d 697
    , 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
    The defendant is simply wrong when he suggests there was no direct
    evidence in this case. Our supreme court has held that eyewitness
    testimony can constitute direct evidence. See Smith v. State, 
    139 So. 3d 839
    , 844 (Fla. 2014). Here, there was direct evidence in the form of
    eyewitness testimony, the defendant’s confession, and his incriminating
    statements on the controlled call. The trial court correctly denied the
    defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal.
    The defendant next argues the court erred in admitting the detective’s
    testimony concerning the defendant’s failure to respond to Jerry’s
    statements during the controlled call. He suggests the State’s direct
    examination of the detective shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
    The State responds that the defendant failed to preserve the issue because
    defense counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection, and refutes
    the contention that the comments were burden shifting.
    “It is well settled that due process requires the state to prove every
    element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” Jackson v. State, 575
    
    5 So. 2d 181
    , 188 (Fla. 1991). “For that reason, it is error for a prosecutor
    to make statements that shift the burden of proof and invite the jury to
    convict the defendant for some reason other than that the State has proved
    its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gore v. State, 
    719 So. 2d 1197
    , 1200
    (Fla. 1998).
    As the State argues, the detective’s testimony about the controlled call
    was admissible and did not shift the burden of proof for two reasons. First,
    the defendant’s silence was an adoptive admission. And second, the
    detective’s testimony was relevant to rebut the defendant’s position that a
    co-defendant shot the victim.
    To establish the defendant’s silence as an admission by acquiescence,
    the court should consider the following factors:
    1. The statement must have been heard by the party claimed
    to have acquiesced.
    2. The statement must have been understood by him.
    3. The subject matter of the statement is within the knowledge
    of the person.
    4. There were no physical or emotional impediments to the
    person responding.
    5. The personal make-up of the speaker or his relationship to
    the party or event are not such as to make it unreasonable
    to expect a denial.
    6. The statement itself must be such as would, if untrue, call
    for a denial under the circumstances.
    Nelson v. State, 
    748 So. 2d 237
    , 242-43 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Privett v.
    State, 
    417 So. 2d 805
    , 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)). “The essential inquiry
    thus becomes whether a reasonable person would have denied the
    statements under the circumstances.” Id. at 243 (citation omitted).
    The State argues the requirements for admission by acquiescence are
    met because the statement was:       (1) heard by the defendant; (2)
    understood by the defendant; (3) the subject matter was within the
    defendant’s knowledge; (4) there were no known physical or emotional
    impediments to the defendant responding; (5) the relationship between
    and the defendant would not make it unreasonable to expect a denial; and
    6
    (6) the question “why did you do that” would prompt a denial under the
    circumstances—a phone call with the defendant’s friend. See id. at 242-
    43.
    The defendant argues, however, that this case is akin to Warmington v.
    State, 
    149 So. 3d 648
     (Fla. 2014). There, the detective’s testimony was
    considered a commentary on the defendant’s inability to produce evidence
    to support his position that the money was taken as a loan rather than
    theft. Id. at 656. We disagree.
    Pre-arrest silence does not carry the same protection as post-
    arrest silence . . . . Moreover, the prosecutor was not
    commenting on [the defendant’s] silence but on what [the
    defendant] actually said in the recorded conversation, i.e., his
    exhortation to [the detective] (posing as [defendant’s friend])
    not to talk, to get out of town, etc. The prosecutor’s
    comments were no more than a suggestion to the jury that
    [the defendant’s] statements were not the comments of an
    innocent man.
    Rao v. State, 
    52 So. 3d 40
    , 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (emphasis added)
    (citations omitted).
    Here, the State elicited testimony from the detective about the
    controlled call, but the call took place pre-arrest while the defendant was
    speaking with his friend. The admission of this testimony did not shift the
    burden of proof. The State also correctly argues the statements were
    admissible to refute the defense theory that the co-defendant was the
    shooter.
    As in Rao, “the prosecutor’s remarks on the [detective’s] telephone call
    made months before the arrest were not comments on silence but were
    used to contradict [the defendant’s] theory that he was not guilty and never
    admitted committing the murder. The comment was not error, let alone
    fundamental error.” 
    Id.
     Here, even if the testimony constituted error, it
    did not “go[] to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of
    action . . . .” F.B. v. State, 
    852 So. 2d 226
    , 229 (Fla. 2003) (citation
    omitted).
    The court correctly denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of
    acquittal and did not err in admitting the detective’s testimony. Even if
    the admission of the detective’s testimony had been error, that error was
    not fundamental. We therefore affirm.
    7
    Affirmed.
    GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
    *       *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3448

Filed Date: 3/20/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/20/2019