NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JUAN JOSE BARRIENTOS, JR., )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D14-5870
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
___________________________________)
Opinion filed August 16, 2019.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier
County; Ramiro Mañalich, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and
Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Christina Z. Pacheco,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
KHOUZAM, Chief Judge.
Juan Jose Barrientos, Jr., appeals his convictions and sentences for first-
degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon, arguing that the trial court erred in
declining to suppress his statements to police in their entirety. We affirm.
The record shows that on December 30, 2008, Barrientos—a juvenile at
the time—showed up at a Collier County police substation with his mother and sister to
report that there had been a death at Six L's Farm two days earlier. In the lobby of the
police station and then again after being invited into the sergeant's office, Barrientos
stated that he and his friend had been involved in a man's death. He remembered that
they had disposed of the body, but he could not recall exactly what had happened
because he suffered from blackouts. The detective "let him talk" and did not interrupt or
question him. The police did not have a record of any incidents at Six L's Farm, so they
called major crimes to respond to the scene. Because at this point the police did not
know whether a crime had in fact occurred, the detective did not give Barrientos
Miranda1 warnings. Although Barrientos was free to leave, he was not advised to that
effect.
Within approximately half an hour, a detective from major crimes arrived to
talk to Barrientos. Barrientos' mother and sister were asked to leave the room, to which
no one objected. When asked for permission to speak to Barrientos, his mother stated,
"[T]his is why I am here." Barrientos was not Mirandized. This second statement took
place from 4:08 p.m. to 4:27 p.m. and was recorded. During this interview, the
detectives still had not determined whether a crime had in fact been committed.
However, Barrientos confessed that his friend Jesus Garza planned to kill a man named
Don Berto—later identified as Roberto Avalos-Jasso—and that Barrientos had helped
him do it. Garza had supplied Barrientos with a knife and socks to cover his hands.
They agreed on a code word to signal when to kill Don Berto. The three men got into
1Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Garza's car, with Don Berto in the front passenger seat and Barrientos in the back.
Garza said the code word, and Barrientos blacked out. The next thing he remembered
was that Don Berto was on the ground outside the car bleeding from his neck.
Barrientos and Garza waited for Don Berto to die, then they grabbed his body and
disposed of it in the woods. After that, they cleaned Garza's car. They disposed of the
socks and clothes they had worn as well as the towels they had used to clean the car.
Garza cleaned the knife and put it back in his house. He also attempted to sell Don
Berto's power saw and burn his wallet. Barrientos gave the detective directions to
where they could find the body and the various pieces of evidence.
Immediately after this interview, the major crimes detective went to Six L's
Farm to investigate whether Barrientos' story was true. The detective testified that
when he exited the police station, no one was left to guard Barrientos. The detective
found the crime scene and dead body as Barrientos had described. It was at this point
the detective "knew for sure" a crime had been committed and they were looking at
more than just a "suspicious incident."
The third interview took place later the same day from 7:25 p.m. to 7:59
p.m. Barrientos was given Miranda warnings and signed a waiver. During this
interview, Barrientos stated that he did not want to change his previous statement. He
repeated essentially the same story that he had already given. Barrientos did make
additional incriminating statements as the interview continued, but these statements
were suppressed based on inappropriate comments made by the detective. Although
his motion to suppress was granted in part, Barrientos contends that both his second
and third statements should have been suppressed in their entirety.
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The Second Statement
Barrientos argues that his second statement to police should have been
suppressed because it was made under custodial interrogation without Miranda
warnings. Considering the unique circumstances surrounding this statement, however,
we conclude that Barrientos was not in custody at the time and that therefore Miranda
warnings were not yet required.
"Miranda warnings are not required for every potential suspect." State v.
Thompson,
193 So. 3d 916, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing Wright v. State,
161 So. 3d
442, 448 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)). Rather, "[t]he warnings apply only to custodial
interrogations," where an individual is both in custody and under interrogation.
Id.
"Absent one or the other, Miranda warnings are not required."
Id. (quoting Davis v.
State,
698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1997)).
For purposes of Miranda, custody includes not only formal arrest but also
"any restraint on freedom of movement [to] the degree associated with formal arrest."
Id. (quoting Ramirez v. State,
739 So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999)). In determining whether
a suspect is in custody, courts apply a reasonable person test, focusing on how a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive the situation—not on the
unarticulated plan of law enforcement.
Id. "Miranda warnings are not required simply
because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned
person is one whom the police suspect."
Id. (quoting California v. Beheler,
463 U.S.
1121, 1125 (1983)).
"If a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand that the
police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for a serious crime such as murder or
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kidnapping, that circumstance militates strongly toward the conclusion that the suspect
is in custody." State v. Pitts,
936 So. 2d 1111, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (footnotes
omitted). "A reasonable person understands that when a suspect confesses to
committing a serious criminal act, the police ordinarily will not permit the suspect to go
free."
Id. at 1134. Therefore, a confession can transform an interrogation from
noncustodial to custodial.
Id.
We consider four nonexclusive factors in evaluating whether the suspect
is in custody for purposes of Miranda: "(1) the manner in which the police summon the
suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the
extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) whether the
suspect is informed that she is free to leave."
Thompson, 193 So. 3d at 920
(quoting
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574). The ultimate inquiry is "whether, under a totality
of the circumstances, 'a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel a
restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect
would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with police.' "
Id.
(quoting Ross v. State,
45 So. 3d 403, 415 (Fla. 2010)).
Applying this test to the facts of this case, we conclude that Barrientos
was not in custody at the time he made the second statement. The record shows that
Barrientos voluntarily came to the police station to provide information about his crimes.
He was not summoned for questioning. Even though Barrientos implicated himself in
very serious criminal conduct, the police did not know whether his story was true until
they investigated Barrientos' claims. Without confirmation that a man was actually
dead, much less that he had been murdered, Barrientos could not have been
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considered a suspect in that murder. Moreover, Barrientos was not confronted with
evidence of his guilt—the police did not yet have such evidence. The interview was
short (approximately twenty minutes) and casual. Barrientos' mother gave permission
for the detectives to speak with him. The interview began mostly with Barrientos
speaking in narrative form. The detective later asked clarifying questions but did not
pressure, coerce, or intimidate Barrientos. Barrientos' freedom of movement was not
restricted. He was not handcuffed, and he was free to leave. According to the
detective, no one was left to guard Barrientos when the detective left the station to
investigate his story. Rather, Barrientos and his family agreed to wait at the station
while the detective investigated.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Barrientos' freedom of
movement was restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest at the time he
made the second statement. Because he was not in custody, Miranda warnings were
not required and the trial court properly denied Barrientos' motion to suppress as to this
statement.
The Third Statement
Barrientos argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his third
statement in its entirety because his Miranda waiver was rendered involuntary by law
enforcement's deliberate delay in giving the warning. It is important to note that most of
this statement was indeed suppressed because the court found that the detective made
improper comments.
"[W]here a defendant makes a statement after receiving a Miranda
warning which confirms an earlier voluntary statement made before Miranda warnings
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were given, the post-Miranda statement is admissible if the police officer did not engage
in a calculated two-step strategy to undermine the requirements of Miranda." Dyer v.
State,
16 So. 3d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Jump v. State,
983 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla.
1st DCA 2008); see also State v. Lebron,
979 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Fla. 3d DCA
2008);
Pitts, 936 So. 2d at 1135. "[A] suspect who has once responded to unwarned
yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and
confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings."
Dyer, 16 So. 3d at
991 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985)).
As already discussed, the detectives were not required to Mirandize
Barrientos at the time he made his second statement. There is no evidence to suggest
that the detectives strategically delayed providing Miranda warnings in order to secure a
confession. Rather, between the second and third statements the detectives took time
to investigate whether there was any truth to Barrientos' story and whether a crime had
in fact been committed. Once they realized that a crime had been committed, they
Mirandized Barrientos before proceeding with questioning. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court properly declined to suppress the beginning of the third statement.
Because the trial court did not err in denying, in part, Barrientos' motion to
suppress, we affirm.
Affirmed.
NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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