State of Florida, Agency For Health Care Adm. v. Planned Parenthood of Southwest etc. , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 518 ( 2017 )


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  •                                       IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY              NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FOR HEALTH CARE                       FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    ADMINISTRATION,                       DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    Petitioner,                     CASE NO. 1D16-3317
    v.
    PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF
    SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL
    FLORIDA, INC.,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________/
    Opinion filed January 19, 2017.
    Petition for Review of Non-Final Agency Action.
    Lawrence P. Stevenson, Judge.
    Segundo J. Fernandez and Timothy P. Atkinson of Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant &
    Atkinson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Julie Gallagher of Grossman, Furlow & Bayó, LLC, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
    B.L. THOMAS, J.
    Petitioner seeks review of a non-final agency action, where the Administrative
    Law Judge ordered an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Respondent’s motion to
    impose sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees. Our scope of review for non-final
    agency action is “‘analogous to, and no broader than the right of review by common
    law certiorari.’” State v. Murciano, 
    163 So. 3d 662
    , 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (quoting
    CNL Resort Hotel, L.P. v. City of Doral, 
    991 So. 2d 417
    , 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)).
    The issue before this court is whether the challenged ruling “‘departed from the
    essential requirements of the law, thereby causing irreparable injury which cannot be
    adequately remedied on appeal following final judgment.’” 
    Id. at 665
    (quoting Belair
    v. Drew, 
    770 So. 2d 1164
    , 1166 (Fla. 2000)). We hold that it did.
    In the underlying case, Petitioner filed three administrative complaints against
    Respondent alleging violations of Respondent’s license to perform abortions.
    Respondent filed motions to dismiss Petitioner’s amended complaints, but did not raise
    the issue of attorneys’ fees or sanctions. After the motions to dismiss were denied,
    however, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed the complaints.
    After Petitioner voluntarily dismissed the case, Respondent filed a motion
    requesting attorneys’ fees under the administrative fee-shifting statute, section
    120.595(1), Florida Statutes (2016). An order to show cause was issued directing
    Respondent to explain why the motion should not be denied, as Petitioner did not meet
    the statutory definition of a non-prevailing party under Johnson v. Department of
    Corrections, 
    191 So. 3d 965
    , 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Respondent then amended its
    request for attorneys’ fees, conceding it could not prevail under section 120.595(1),
    and claimed entitlement under a different theory, section 120.569(2)(e), Florida
    2
    Statutes (2016), which provides for an award of fees as a sanction for any “pleadings,
    motions, or other papers filed [for an] improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause
    unnecessary delay, or for a frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of
    litigation.” The administrative law judge subsequently entered an order setting an
    evidentiary hearing to decide whether sanctions should be imposed.
    In deciding whether to grant review of a non-final agency action, showing
    irreparable injury is a jurisdictional hurdle that we address “before determining
    whether the [ruling] departed from the essential requirements of law.” AVCO Corp. v.
    Neff, 
    30 So. 3d 597
    , 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Because Petitioner’s filing of the notice
    of voluntary dismissal divested the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to entertain
    either of Respondent’s motions for fees or sanctions, this case should have been closed
    before Respondent filed its original motion asserting an entitlement to attorneys’ fees.
    Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 
    121 So. 3d 23
    , 32 (Fla. 2013) (recognizing that voluntary
    dismissal “serves to terminate the litigation, to instantaneously divest the court of its
    jurisdiction to enter or entertain further orders”). Accordingly, we hold that the order
    setting this matter for an evidentiary hearing would cause irreparable harm, because it
    would lead to the disclosure of irrelevant information. See Spry v. Prof’l Emp’r Plans,
    
    985 So. 2d 1187
    , 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that compliance with discovery
    order to disclose petitioner’s wholly irrelevant financial information in a workers’
    compensation claim would cause irreparable harm); cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v.
    3
    Turkanovic, 
    2016 WL 7032965
    (1st DCA Dec. 1, 2016) (granting writ of prohibition
    and quashing trial court’s order compelling deposition of bank’s corporate
    representative “in furtherance of [r]espondent’s motion seeking an award of attorney's
    fees as a sanction,” where the bank voluntarily dismissed a foreclosure complaint
    within the safe harbor provision of section 57.105(4), Florida Statutes). This court
    reasoned in Turkanovic that because the case was voluntarily dismissed before the
    homeowner filed the motion for sanctions, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order
    further discovery. Here, because Petitioner would suffer a similar irreparable injury by
    preparing for an evidentiary hearing in a case that should have been closed and
    jurisdiction relinquished, we have jurisdiction to review the petition.
    Appellate courts have broad discretion in determining whether an error rose to
    the level of an essential departure from the law. “Since it is impossible to list all
    possible legal errors serious enough to constitute a departure from the essential
    requirements of law, the district courts must be allowed a large degree of discretion so
    that they may judge each case individually.” Williams v. Oken, 
    62 So. 3d 1129
    , 1133
    (Fla. 2011).
    The order purporting to exercise jurisdiction to entertain either of Respondent’s
    motions for fees or sanctions and setting Respondent’s amended motion for an
    evidentiary hearing, after the litigation was terminated by the voluntary dismissal,
    departed from the essential requirements of the law. Cf. Town of Davie v. Santana, 98
    
    4 So. 3d 262
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that administrative law judge lacked
    jurisdiction to reopen case to impose attorneys’ fees under section 120.595(1), when it
    closed the case once the petition was dismissed and no motion for attorneys’ fees was
    pending).
    Thus, we GRANT review of this non-final agency action and QUASH the order
    below for an evidentiary hearing.
    WETHERELL and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CASE NO. 1D16-3317

Citation Numbers: 207 So. 3d 1032, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 518

Judges: Wetherell, Thomas

Filed Date: 1/19/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024