Maxwell v. State ( 2015 )

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 29, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D14-318
Lower Tribunal No. 10-23519
________________
Daniel Maxwell,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas J.
Rebull, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
ROTHENBERG, J.
The defendant, Daniel Maxwell, was tried and convicted for the second
degree murder beating death of Mark Branthoover (“the victim”). During the
investigation, the defendant made various statements to law enforcement regarding
the murder: (1) pre-Miranda1 exculpatory statements made on August 7, 2010, to
Officer Orlando Fleites, the officer who initially responded to the scene of the
homicide; (2) subsequent post-Miranda exculpatory statements to Detective Raul
Godoy on August 7, 2010, at the homicide office; and (3) post-Miranda
incriminating statements made on August 11, 2010. The defendant sought to
suppress only the post-Miranda exculpatory statements made to Detective Godoy
on August 7, 2010, and the only issue raised in this appeal is the trial court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion to suppress these statements. We affirm.
The facts relied on by the trial court are as follows. On the morning of
August 7, 2010, Officer Fleites was dispatched to a bus-way on U.S. 1 and 104th
Street in reference to a dead body. Upon Officer Fleites’ arrival, he observed the
defendant, who he knew from prior interactions, drinking a beer while seated on a
bus bench near the body. Officer Fleites asked the defendant what happened to his
friend. The defendant immediately responded that he had seen “the whole thing”
and that he was the one who had called the police. When Officer Fleites asked the
defendant what he saw, the defendant explained that he had been sleeping and was
awakened by a noise. He then saw two black males attacking the victim, at which
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
point he grabbed a stick he found on the ground and scared the attackers away.
The defendant then called 911.2
Believing the defendant was a material witness to the homicide, Officer
Fleites told the defendant that he needed to remain on the scene to speak with the
homicide investigators, who were on their way. The defendant, who said he was
tired and did not want to stay, became belligerent, irate, agitated, and disruptive.
He began screaming at Officer Fleites and tried to leave the scene. When Officer
Fleites continued to try to talk to him, the defendant walked aggressively towards
the officer with his hands balled into fists. Officer Fleites told the defendant that
he needed to calm down, explained that the homicide detectives would be there
soon, handcuffed the defendant for officer safety, and placed the defendant in the
backseat of his police car. Officer Fleites further explained that the defendant is “a
tall man,” while he is only 5’6”, and in his prior encounters with the defendant,
which were in response to reports of disorderly conduct, the defendant was not
easy to deal with. Officer Fleites told the defendant that he would remove the
defendant’s handcuffs when he calmed down, and apparently the defendant did
calm down, because shortly thereafter, when Detective Godoy arrived, the
defendant was no longer handcuffed.
2 The defendant apparently provided a subsequent conflicting version of the events
to Officer Fleites, but Officer Fleites did not provide the details of that statement
during the motion to suppress.
3
Detective Godoy testified that when he approached the defendant it was his
understanding that the defendant was a witness to the homicide. The defendant
was calm and he was not in handcuffs. When Detective Godoy began speaking
with the defendant, he noticed that the defendant had blood on his shirt and on his
forehead, which aroused his suspicions. He asked the defendant if he was hurt,
and the defendant stated that he was not, which further heightened his suspicion
because he noticed a fresh abrasion or cut on the defendant’s knuckles, which
Detective Godoy testified appeared to him as though the defendant had hit
something with his fists. Detective Godoy told the defendant that he needed to
speak with him and that he would like to conduct the interview at the homicide
office. The defendant, who was homeless, was initially concerned about the safety
of his property (he had a metal kiosk nearby which contained some of his property
and a book bag), but after Detective Godoy assured the defendant that the
uniformed officers had secured the scene and would protect his property until they
returned, the defendant agreed to go with Detective Godoy to the homicide office.
Upon arriving at the homicide office, the defendant was advised of his
Miranda rights in a printed form, and the defendant executed the rights waiver
form agreeing to speak with Detective Godoy without an attorney being present.
The defendant did not and does not contest the voluntariness of his waiver or that
he was properly advised of his rights. Thereafter, the defendant gave Detective
4
Godoy various conflicting accounts of what he allegedly witnessed in regard to the
murder, and he eventually provided a taped statement. While these statements
varied from the statements the defendant gave earlier to Officer Fleites on the
scene, these statements, like his earlier statements, were all exculpatory.
Initially, the defendant told Detective Godoy that he was awakened by loud
screams, and when he opened his eyes, he saw the victim being attacked by three
black males, not two as he had stated earlier. The defendant said he located a pipe
usually carried by the victim and used the pipe to fight off the assailants. During
the fight, the defendant was struck in the back of the head. After the assailants
fled, the defendant checked the victim, who appeared to have been badly injured,
and then the defendant went to sleep. When the defendant awoke the following
morning, he tried to wake the victim, but when the victim did not respond, the
defendant called the police because he was unable to detect a heartbeat.
After additional questioning, the defendant’s story changed again. In this
later version of the events, the defendant stated that one of the black males actually
had the pipe, and after the defendant disarmed him, the assailants ran away. The
defendant also told Detective Godoy that the victim owed some black males
money for some crack cocaine they had given the victim on credit.
The defendant was given coffee and lunch, and although the defendant’s
story continued to change, he consistently claimed that the victim had been
5
attacked by black male assailants and that the defendant fought with the assailants
and was struck in the back of the head during the fight. After Detective Godoy
interviewed the defendant, the defendant was driven back to 104th Street as
promised by Detective Godoy.
The police continued with their investigation. Several days later, on August
11, Detective Godoy asked the defendant if he would come back to the police
station, and the defendant agreed to go. After the defendant was readvised of and
again voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, Detective Godoy told the defendant
that the physical evidence was inconsistent with his account of the events. In
response, the defendant told Detective Godoy that while he was sleeping that night,
the victim began hitting his legs with a pipe. The defendant also said that when he
tried to get up, the victim hit him in the head, so the defendant tackled the victim,
the victim fell into the bushes, and the defendant punched the victim in the face
until the victim lost consciousness. After the victim lost consciousness, the
defendant picked up the pipe and struck the victim several times in the head and
then he placed the pipe in the victim’s hand. After providing this statement, the
defendant was arrested and charged with second degree murder.
The defendant does not dispute that he was properly advised of his rights per
Miranda and that he freely and voluntarily waived his rights. He does not allege
any infringement of his constitutional rights as to his first pre-Miranda, on-the-
6
scene exculpatory statements to Officer Fleites on August 7, or his final post-
Miranda inculpatory statements to Detective Godoy on August 11. His sole
argument below and on appeal is that the post-Miranda exculpatory statements he
gave to Detective Godoy at the homicide station on August 7 were tainted by his
illegal detention and/or arrest by Officer Fleites on the scene. Essentially, the
defendant contends that when Officer Fleites did not allow him to leave the scene
and placed him in handcuffs without probable cause to believe he was involved in
the victim’s murder, he was illegally arrested or detained.
We begin our analysis by recognizing that both the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution
protect people only against unreasonable searches and seizures. Based on the
totality of the circumstances, we do not find that the temporary handcuffing and
detention of the defendant by Officer Fleites was unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. See Keeton v. State, 427 So. 2d 231, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983) (“It was not unreasonable for police, responding immediately to the scene of
a felony-murder, to detain appellant, who was confronted in a closed park, adjacent
to the parking lot where the crime occurred shortly before midnight, after appellant
told police officers that he had witnessed the flight of persons fitting the
description of the alleged perpetrators.”).
The reasonableness of the defendant’s temporary restraint is, however, not
7
dispositive. That is because when Detective Godoy began speaking with the
defendant, the defendant was no longer being restrained; while speaking with the
defendant, Detective Godoy developed reasonable suspicion that the defendant
was involved in the beating death of the victim; the defendant freely and
voluntarily agreed to provide Detective Godoy with his statement at the homicide
office after being assured that his property would be safe in his absence; the
statements he provided to Detective Godoy on August 7 were made after being
fully advised of his rights (and specifically that he did not have to speak with
Detective Godoy if he did not want to); these statements were exculpatory, and
they were simply modified versions of the statements the defendant voluntarily
gave to Officer Fleites on the scene; and after providing these statements to
Detective Godoy, the defendant was returned to his neighborhood3 as promised.
When Detective Godoy arrived, the defendant had already calmed down and
was no longer in handcuffs. Detective Godoy testified that the defendant was
actually “chatty,” and he seemed eager to tell him what had happened. However,
as soon as Detective Godoy introduced himself to the defendant, Detective Godoy
noticed that the defendant had blood on his shirt, a cut on his forehead, and bruised
knuckles. But when he asked the defendant if he was injured, the defendant said
“no.” The victim had been brutally beaten to death and was covered with blood.
3The defendant was homeless. He was therefore returned to the area where he
kept his belongings.
8
Detective Godoy testified that based on the defendant’s injuries, the defendant’s
earlier demeanor (which was belligerent and aggressive), and the defendant’s
initial conflicting accounts of the events to Officer Fleites, he became suspicious.
We conclude Detective Godoy’s suspicions were reasonable, and thus, based on
his reasonable suspicion, he was legally authorized to detain the defendant for
further investigation. See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“Whenever any law
enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state . . . the officer may
temporarily detain such person . . .”); Baptise v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla.
2008) (holding that “the existence of a reasonable suspicion is based upon specific
and articulable facts, and the rational inferences that may be drawn from those
facts”); State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“[I]n
determining whether a police officer possesses reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed
in light of a police officer’s experience and background.”); Hernandez v. State, 784
So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Thus, although the defendant was no longer being restrained when Detective
Godoy began speaking to him, to the extent the defendant may not have felt free to
terminate his encounter with law enforcement (there is no evidence in the record
9
that at this point the defendant was not free to leave), Detective Godoy possessed
the reasonable suspicion necessary under the Fourth Amendment to temporarily
detain the defendant. We also note that the unrefuted evidence was that when
Detective Godoy arrived, the defendant was “chatty” and very eager to speak with
the Detective, he agreed to speak with Detective Godoy at the homicide office, and
he freely and voluntarily waived his rights in writing and provided the statements
under review.
Additionally, and importantly, Detective Godoy told the defendant he would
return the defendant to his “home,” and Detective Godoy kept his promise. The
record also reflects that after this August 7 contact with the police, the defendant
continued to assist Detective Godoy with his investigation. On a later date he
accompanied Detective Godoy to help him try to locate the individuals he had told
Detective Godoy about on August 7, and he voluntarily returned to the homicide
office on August 11 to speak further with Detective Godoy. It was only after the
August 11 statements, which the defendant does not claim were unconstitutionally
obtained, that the defendant admitted his involvement in the homicide and was
arrested. We therefore find that based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his August 7
exculpatory statements made to Detective Godoy at the homicide office.
We also find that any error in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress
10
the August 7 exculpatory statements to Detective Godoy is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. As stated earlier, the defendant does not dispute that his initial
exculpatory statements to Officer Fleites on August 7 were constitutionally
obtained. The defendant’s subsequent exculpatory statements to Detective Godoy
on August 7, after the defendant had been briefly detained, were simply varying
versions of the exculpatory statements the defendant made to Officer Fleites: that
when he was awakened by a commotion, he discovered the victim being attacked
by black male assailants, he then assisted the victim and chased the assailants
away. The statement that resulted in his arrest and conviction was the
incriminating statement he made four days later on August 11.
The recorded statement the defendant made on August 11, which the
defendant did not seek to suppress, reflects the following. While the defendant
was asleep the victim began hitting his legs with a pipe, and when he tried to get
up, the victim swung at him and hit him in the head. The defendant tackled the
victim and punched him in the face until the victim lost consciousness. The
defendant admitted that while the victim lay unconscious in the bushes where he
had fallen, the defendant picked up the pipe and struck the victim several times on
the head with the pipe because he was “really mad” at the victim. After he realized
what he had done, he placed the pipe in the victim’s hand. Based on the
defendant’s admissions that he struck the victim several times on the head with a
11
pipe after the victim was unconscious and clearly incapacitated, killing the victim,
there is no reasonable possibility that any error in admitting the August 7
exculpatory statements to Detective Godoy contributed to the jury’s verdict. See
Stein v. State, 632 So. 2d 1361, 1365 (Fla. 1994) (finding that any error in the
admission of Stein’s statements was harmless given the incriminating evidence
against him); Taylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 973 (Fla. 1992).
Affirmed.
12