Edwin Matos v. State of Florida , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 9248 ( 2015 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    EDWIN MATOS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D13-3995
    [June 17, 2015]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Martin J. Bidwill, Judge; L.T. Case No. 02-015762
    CF10A.
    Julio E. Gil De Lamadrid, Bayamón, Puerto Rico, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina
    Jimenez-Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
    appellee.
    ON AMENDED MOTION FOR REHEARING / EN BANC CERTIFICATION
    STEVENSON, J.
    Upon consideration of defendant’s “Amended Motion for Rehearing or
    Rehearing En Banc,” we grant rehearing, withdraw our previously issued
    opinion, and substitute the following in its place. Defendant’s motion is
    denied to the extent it seeks rehearing en banc.
    Defendant challenges the summary denial of his motion seeking return
    of his 2001 Pontiac Firebird. The car was taken into the State’s custody
    after defendant crashed the vehicle in August of 2001, resulting in the
    death of two teenage girls and defendant’s conviction for two counts of
    vehicular manslaughter. See Matos v. State, 
    899 So. 2d 403
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    2005). “When the defendant seeks the return of seized property as the
    true owner, the applicable procedure is similar to the procedure for the
    consideration of a motion for postconviction relief.” Bolden v. State, 
    875 So. 2d 780
    , 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Here, the trial court relied upon the
    State’s response, but none of the grounds or record attachments
    conclusively refute the allegations of the motion and establish defendant
    is not entitled to relief. 
    Id.
     (recognizing motion may be summarily denied
    where attached portions of record conclusively refute motion’s allegations).
    First, the response and accompanying attachments fail to establish
    defendant previously sought the return of his car on the grounds that he
    is the owner of the vehicle and it is no longer of evidentiary value to the
    State. The State’s assertion that defendant is not entitled to the return of
    the car as it was an “instrumentality of the crimes” is also unavailing.
    While the car appears to fall within the definition of “contraband article,”
    see § 932.701(2)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (2014),1 there is nothing in the attached
    record suggesting the State has instituted forfeiture proceedings. See §
    932.704(4), Fla. Stat. (2014) (stating “[t]he seizing agency shall promptly
    proceed against the contraband article by filing a complaint”). Finally, in
    the absence of pending postconviction proceedings that involve the car and
    its claimed evidentiary value, the defendant’s past history of
    postconviction filings is insufficient to conclusively refute the allegations
    of defendant’s motion and establish the State’s continued need to retain
    the car some ten years after defendant’s convictions were affirmed on
    appeal. Compare Sutherland v. State, 
    860 So. 2d 505
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
    (affirming denial of motion for return of property without prejudice to
    defendant’s right to renew his motion if trial court denied a pending motion
    to vacate plea, which defendant had filed after his motion for return of
    property was denied), with Harkless v. State, 
    975 So. 2d 437
     (Fla. 2d DCA
    2007) (reversing trial court’s ruling denying motion for return of property
    on the ground that the time within which defendant could seek
    postconviction relief had not yet expired).
    Accordingly, the order summarily denying defendant’s motion for
    return of property is reversed and the matter remanded for further
    proceedings. See McKeever v. State, 
    764 So. 2d 688
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    (reversing an order of summary denial predicated upon State’s assertion
    that property would be needed as evidence if convictions were ever
    overturned, where there was no pending direct appeal or collateral
    proceedings; remanding with directions that trial court hold evidentiary
    hearing to determine if State has a continued need to retain the property).
    1A “contraband article” is defined to include “[a]ny personal property, including,
    but not limited to, any . . . vehicle of any kind . . . , which was used or was
    attempted to be used as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or
    abetting in the commission of, any felony, whether or not comprising an element
    of the felony.” § 932.701(2)(a)5. The relevant language has not been amended
    since defendant’s August 2001 crimes.
    2
    Reversed and Remanded.
    TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
    *      *   *
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4D13-3995

Citation Numbers: 190 So. 3d 115, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 9248

Judges: Stevenson, Taylor, Klin

Filed Date: 6/17/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/18/2024