City of Treasure Island v. Tahitian Treasure Island, LLC ( 2017 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CITY OF TREASURE ISLAND, a )
municipality within Pinellas County, )
Florida, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D14-5406
)
TAHITIAN TREASURE ISLAND, LLC, a )
Florida limited liability company; PAGE )
TERRACE MOTEL, INC., a Florida )
corporation; CAIDAN ENTERPRISES, )
LLC, a Florida limited liability company; )
DAVID KING; ARTHUR CZYSZCZON; )
and KEVIN McINERNEY, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Opinion filed October 27, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas
County; Pamela A.M. Campbell and Jack
Day, Judges.
Kevin S. Hennessey and Jennifer R.
Cowan of Lewis, Longman, & Walker,
P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant.
Courtney L. Fernald and Leonard S.
Englander of Englander Fischer, St.
Petersburg, and Martha Collins of
Collins Law Group, Tampa, for
Appellees.
SALARIO, Judge.
The City of Treasure Island appeals from a final summary judgment in
favor of Tahitian Treasure Island, LLC; Page Terrace Motel, Inc.; Caidan Enterprises,
LLC; David King; Arthur Czyszczon; and Kevin McInerney (collectively, the Hoteliers).
The dispute centers on claims by the Hoteliers that the City allows and hosts driving and
parking on Treasure Island Beach in connection with festivals and public events in
violation of section 161.58(2), Florida Statutes (2014), which prohibits "[v]ehicular traffic"
on "coastal beaches" in Florida. The trial court agreed with the Hoteliers, declared that
the "City's activities of hosting and allowing vehicular parking and driving on Treasure
Island Beach" violate section 161.58(2), and permanently enjoined the City from hosting
or allowing any parking and driving on Treasure Island Beach.
As we explain below, we find no error in the trial court's decision that the
manner in which the City hosts public parking at the events that are the subject of the
Hoteliers' complaint involves vehicular traffic on a coastal beach and is therefore
prohibited by section 161.58(2). However, the trial court also declared illegal and
enjoined other conduct that either does not constitute vehicular traffic (e.g., the
movement of vehicles across the beach for purposes of event set-up) or is outside the
scope of the Hoteliers' complaint and the summary judgment record. That was error.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The Parties, The Dispute, And The Summary Judgment
The City is a beach community located on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.
The Hoteliers are the owners of three beachfront hotels in the City. Their properties are
located upland of the central beach area of Treasure Island Beach. The area is central
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because it is located in the middle of Treasure Island and is beach because it fronts the
shoreline along the Gulf. The central beach area is uncommonly wide for a Gulf Beach,
stretching 800 to 900 feet from the water's edge to a City-owned, paved walkway that
meanders around dunes at the landward side of the beach.
The City uses a large, sandy expanse in the middle of the central beach
area to host several civic events each year, either on its own or by allowing certain
organizations to do so. They range from carnivals to music festivals to car and truck
shows to fireworks displays. These events often involve the construction of temporary
structures—e.g., a tent, a carnival ride, or a stage—that are removed when the event
has ended. The events have happened as often as thirty times a year.
To accommodate the attendees, the City makes temporary public parking
areas available for the events. These public parking areas are located on a sandy
region of the beach. The public can access them by driving along sandy, unpaved
access paths that run from a paved lot near the walkway between the dunes, onto the
beach, and into the temporary lots. The City collects a fee for the use of the beach
parking areas. The number of cars taking advantage of the City-hosted beach parking
varies from event to event, but on our record, it appears to have involved as many as
130 cars in the beach parking areas at past events.
In addition to public parking, the City also allows vehicles performing
functions related to the events it hosts to drive and park on the beach. A vendor selling
food and drink might drive a food truck onto the beach and park it there for that purpose.
Similarly, a truck hauling a carnival attraction might drive over the beach and then park
there for purposes of placing the attraction for the event and later removing the
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attraction after the event has ended. This activity is authorized by the City's ordinance
that prohibits parking and driving on the beach, subject to certain exceptions, which
include "participants and support staff for set-up and break-down of special events."
See Treasure Island, Fla., Code of Ordinances of the City of Treasure Island, Fla. ch.
58, art. II, § 58.38(4) (1985).
Believing that driving and parking on the beach in connection with these
events violates state law—including section 161.58(2)'s prohibition of vehicular traffic on
coastal beaches—the Hoteliers sued the City in circuit court. Their amended complaint
asserted three counts: Count I sought an injunction to prohibit the driving and parking
on the beach and to require the City to strike that provision of its ordinance allowing it;
Count II sought a judgment declaring that the driving and parking on the beach violates
section 161.58(2); and Count III sought a judgment declaring that the City had violated a
decree in earlier, related litigation between the City and the Treasure Island Motel
Association.
The issues the City raises on appeal were decided on multiple motions for
summary judgment filed by both the plaintiffs and the defendant. That led to some
convoluted proceedings, but the procedural play-by-play is not relevant to the issues we
decide. The bottom line is that the Hoteliers voluntarily dismissed Count III, and the
parties proceeded to a decision on Counts I and II based on undisputed facts. The
Hoteliers argued that the beach parking and driving involved in the civic events on
Treasure Island Beach violate section 161.58(2) because (1) the events occur on
coastal beaches within the meaning of the statute and (2) the movement and parking at
those events constitutes vehicular traffic that is prohibited within the meaning of the
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statute. The City disputed both points, arguing that (1) the portion of Treasure Island
Beach on which its events are held is not a "coastal beach" under section 161.58
because it is not technically a "beach" as that term is defined within chapter 161 and
that even if it is a coastal beach, (2) the statute's term "[v]ehicular traffic" contemplates
the movement of vehicles as though it were occurring along a public street or highway
and is limited to "Daytona Beach-style driving," a characterization the City says cannot
be applied to the movement and parking of vehicles at the events that are the subject of
the Hoteliers' complaint.
The trial court denied the City's motions for summary judgment and
granted the Hoteliers' motions. It entered a judgment that declared "that the City's
activities of hosting and allowing vehicular parking and driving on Treasure Island
Beach are in violation of Fla. Stat. § 161.58" and that the City Ordinance "is null and
void to the extent that it conflicts with Fla. Stat. § 161.58 and purports to allow vehicular
parking and driving on Treasure Island Beach." Based on its summary judgment
determination that the City's activities violate section 161.58, the trial court's judgment
further permanently enjoined the City "from hosting or allowing vehicular parking and
driving on Treasure Island Beach." The City timely appealed.
The Issues On Appeal
There is one significant argument that the City raised in the trial court that
it has not raised on appeal—that the events at issue do not occur on a "coastal beach"
within the meaning of section 161.58(2). Accordingly, we assume for purposes of this
opinion that they do occur on a coastal beach and express no judgment on that legal
question. The City does, however, argue that the driving and parking of vehicles in
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connection with the subject events do not constitute "[v]ehicular traffic" as used in the
statute and, further, that the relief the trial court ordered is overbroad. We address
those issues below.1
Beach And Shore Regulation And The Activities The City Hosts
Understanding the City's arguments requires understanding the statutory
context in which section 161.58 resides—chapter 161, which governs beach and shore
preservation—and how the activities involved in this case relate to it. Two parts of
chapter 161 are implicated here: part I governs construction and other activity seaward
of a coastal construction control line, and part III adds protections for parts of coastal
areas deemed especially sensitive.
Coastal construction control line permitting under part I. First adopted in
1965, part I—which, taken together with part II, is called the Dennis L. Jones Beach and
Shore Preservation Act—limits construction and physical activity in coastal areas,
regulates how that construction and activity can occur, and provides enforcement
mechanisms for violations. In the 1970s, the legislature added provisions to part I to
regulate construction seaward of a "coastal construction control line" to be established
by the Department of Environmental Protection. See generally § 161.053, Fla. Stat.
(1971). The legislature's stated purpose in adopting these provisions was to protect
beaches and coastal barrier dunes from imprudent construction. § 161.053(1)(a).
1
We reject without comment the City's remaining appellate arguments. In
addition, we note that the Hoteliers did not plead a violation of section 161.58(1)
concerning vehicular traffic on the dunes and native stabilizing vegetation of the dune
system of coastal beaches in their complaint. Accordingly, we express no opinion on
whether or to what extent that subsection is implicated by the facts here.
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In current form, these statutory provisions require the department to
establish coastal construction control lines on a county-by-county basis along the coasts
of the state. § 161.053(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). In general, those control lines are to "be
established so as to define that portion of the beach-dune system which is subject to
severe fluctuations based on 100-year storm surge, storm waves, or other predictable
weather conditions." Id.; see also § 161.053(2)(a) (describing process required for
establishing coastal construction control lines). Once a control line is established, it is
unlawful to "construct any structure whatsoever seaward thereof; make any excavation,
remove any beach material, or otherwise alter existing ground elevations; [or] drive any
vehicle on, over, or across any sand dune" unless one has a permit issued by the
department. § 161.053(2)(a). A coastal construction control line permit can be issued
only if certain statutory criteria related to the effect of the proposed activity on the land
seaward of the control line are established. See § 161.053(2)(a), (4)(a).
The department has established a control line for Pinellas County that
runs through Treasure Island. The beach events the City hosts occur seaward of that
line. Before hosting those events, therefore, the City has applied for and obtained
coastal construction control line permits from the department. Prior to January 2014, it
received field permits—which are issued for minor structures and activities—for all but
two of its events. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.008(10) (2014). Those field permits
approved the events specified on a site plan submitted by the City and authorized the
City to conduct them.
For the two events that did not receive field permits and for every event
the City has hosted since January 2014, the department has required that the City
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obtain individual coastal construction control line permits. The City has filed permit
applications on a form provided by the department in accord with regulations
promulgated by the department. See generally id. R. 62B-33.008. Those applications
describe the event and activities to take place and include a site plan. The department
has approved each of the City's applications, subject to general conditions included in
every permit and sometimes special conditions specific to the event being permitted.
As an example, the City applied for a permit for "The Greatest Show on
Surf" to be held in March 2014. The application for the permit described the event as
including "carnival rides, food & non-food vendors, stage for live entertainment, and
parking on the beach." It specified the dates of the event, as well as the dates for set up
and break down, and included a site plan. After reviewing the application, the
department advised the City that its permit application was approved and then issued a
notice to proceed stating that the City "is authorized to arrange carnival rides, food and
non-food vendors, stage live entertainments and parking." The event was permitted to
be held on the nonvegetated beach and to be located 290 feet seaward of the coastal
construction control line. It was subject to the general conditions, among others, that
"[c]onstruction traffic shall not occur . . . on vegetated areas seaward of the coastal
construction control line unless specifically authorized by the permit."
Part III and the regulation of vehicular traffic on coastal beaches. In 1985,
the legislature added part III to chapter 161, which is known as the Coastal Zone
Protection Act of 1985. § 161.52, Fla. Stat. (1985). In passing it, the legislature
recognized that coastal areas serve important aesthetic, ecological, and public health,
safety, and welfare functions and have become subject to increasing growth pressures.
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See generally § 161.53(1)-(5). Its stated intent is "that the most sensitive portion of the
coastal area shall be managed through the imposition of strict construction standards in
order to minimize damage to the natural environment, private property, and life."
§ 161.53(5), Fla. Stat. (2014).
Part III serves that objective by establishing minimum standards governing
the location of construction in coastal areas and mandating that any such construction
produce the "minimum adverse impact" on the "beach" and "dune system." See
§ 161.55(1). Part III provides that these minimum construction standards do not "limit or
abrogate the right and power of the department to require permits or to adopt and
enforce standards pursuant to [part I] for construction seaward of the coastal
construction control line that are as restrictive as, or more restrictive than" the minimum
construction standards in part III. § 161.56(1). It also provides for enforcement of those
minimum standards and requires sellers of coastal properties subject to part III to make
disclosure to buyers of the regulations governing them. See §§ 161.56(2), .57.
Part III also contains the provision at issue here—section 161.58. That
statute provides as follows:
(1) Vehicular traffic, except that which is necessary for
cleanup, repair, or public safety, and except for traffic upon
authorized local or state dune crossovers, is prohibited on
the dunes or native stabilizing vegetation of the dune system
of coastal beaches. Except as otherwise provided in this
section, any person driving any vehicle on, over, or across
any dune or native stabilizing vegetation of the dune system
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) Vehicular traffic, except that which is necessary for
cleanup, repair, or public safety, or for the purpose of
maintaining existing licensed and permitted traditional
commercial fishing activities or existing authorized public
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accessways, is prohibited on coastal beaches except where
a local government with jurisdiction over a coastal beach or
portions of a coastal beach has:
(a) Authorized such traffic, by at least a three-fifths vote of its
governing body, on all or portions of the beaches under its
jurisdiction prior to the effective date of this act; and
(b) Determined, by October 1, 1989, in accordance with the
rules of the department, that less than 50 percent of the
peak user demand for off-beach parking is available. . . .
(3) A local government authorizing such vehicular traffic on
all or portions of its beaches pursuant to subsection (2) may
later prohibit, by a vote of at least three-fifths of its governing
body, such vehicular traffic on all or portions of the beaches
under its jurisdiction. Any such local government shall be
authorized by a three-fifths vote of its governing body to
charge a reasonable fee for vehicular traffic access. The
revenues from any such fees shall be used only for beach
maintenance; beach-related traffic management and
parking; beach-related law enforcement and liability
insurance; or beach-related sanitation, lifeguard, or other
staff purposes. Except where authorized by the local
government, any person driving any vehicle on, over, or
across the beach shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s.
775.083.
(Emphasis added.) As we describe in greater detail below, the Hoteliers' assertion that
the beach driving and parking taking place in connection with the City-sponsored
activities at issue requires that we consider whether activities permitted by the
department under part I are restricted by prohibition on vehicular traffic in part III.
The Movement Of Vehicles Incident To Department-Permitted Construction
And Activities Does Not Involve Vehicular Traffic; The Movement Of
Vehicles Incident To City-Operated Public Parking Areas Does
The final judgment invalidates and prohibits any "vehicular parking and
driving" on Treasure Island Beach, except as authorized by section 161.58. That
implies a definition of "vehicular traffic" that reaches any movement of vehicles across
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Treasure Island Beach. The City, however, contends that the term "[v]ehicular traffic"
as used in section 161.58 refers only to "Daytona Beach-style driving" and that the
City's events and the associated public parking do not involve that kind of activity.2 The
City does not define its term "Daytona Beach-style driving," but its argument implies a
condition in which a local government allows the public to use the beach as a public
street, cars drive on the beach using established lanes for everyday use, and cars are
also permitted to park on the beach. We agree that the statutory term "[v]ehicular
traffic" is limited to the movement of vehicles as along a public street, but we disagree
that it is also limited to the unique features of Daytona Beach-style driving.
In interpreting a statute, we look first to "the plain meaning of the actual
language" contained in the statutory text. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch,
107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013). If that language is unambiguous, there is no need for
further construction; the plain meaning of the statute controls. See Holly v. Auld, 450
So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we turn
to rules of statutory construction to determine its meaning. English v. State, 191 So. 3d
448, 450 (Fla. 2016). We regard statutory language as ambiguous when it is
reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. See License Acquisitions, LLC
v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1146 (Fla. 2014).
We begin by noting that the term "[v]ehicular traffic" is not statutorily
defined and that nothing in section 161.58 or the related statutes indicates that it carries
particular, specialized meaning. We must therefore try to give the term the meaning it
2
These are questions of statutory construction resolved by way of motions
for summary judgment. Our review is de novo. See Dep't of Transp. v. United Capital
Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d 126, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
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has in ordinary, everyday discourse. See Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d
1146, 1154 (Fla. 2000); Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 191
So. 3d 516, 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). For our purposes, the word "vehicular" is plain
enough: It means involving vehicles. Here we are talking about cars and trucks, and
everyone in this case agrees that those are types of vehicles. The interpretive problem
we must address hinges on the word "traffic."
Sources that convey the ordinary meaning of the term "traffic" support
both the notion that as used in section 161.58, traffic involves any movement of vehicles
in an area and the notion that traffic means the movement of vehicles as along a street
or highway. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1986) (defining
"traffic" variously as "the circulation (as of vehicles or pedestrians) through an area" and
"the flow of vehicles, pedestrians, ships, or planes (as along a street or sidewalk or sea
lane)); Traffic, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (defining "traffic" as "the passing to
and fro of persons, animals, vehicles, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as
along a street, highway, etc."); see also Dictionary.com, Dictionary.com Unabridged,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/traffic (last visited Oct. 25, 2017) (defining "traffic" as
"the movement of vehicles, ships, persons, etc., in an area, along a street, through an
air lane, over a water route, etc."). To the extent the term "traffic" refers to movement
as along a street or highway, those sources also support the notion that it refers to the
movement of vehicles as along a way that is open for use by the public. See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1069, 2259 (1986) (defining "street" as "a public
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thoroughfare" or "the strip of a public thoroughfare reserved for vehicular traffic" and
defining "highway" as "a road or way . . . that is open to public use").3
In terms of ordinary meaning, then, the term "vehicular traffic" could
reasonably be understood to mean any movement of vehicles or the movement of
vehicles as along a public thoroughfare. Both meanings are facially consistent with the
purpose of section 161.58 conveyed by its text—the protection of the beach, dunes, and
stabilizing vegetation from harm caused by vehicles—and nothing in that text indicates
which meaning was the one adopted by the legislature. The statute is therefore
ambiguous, and we must turn to rules of statutory construction to resolve which of these
two interpretations of the term is the one the legislature meant.
We are confident that vehicular traffic denotes the movement of vehicles
as though it were happening along a public street or highway. We reach that conclusion
because the alternative—the interpretation that vehicular traffic reaches any movement
of vehicles—would put section 161.58's regulation of vehicular traffic on coastal
beaches in substantial conflict with the authority granted the department in part I to
authorize by permit construction and other activity on those same beaches.
As we have described, part I of chapter 161 was the first-adopted set of
statutes bearing on beach and shore protection, and it prohibited construction and other
activities seaward of the coastal construction control line without a permit, which it in
3
We recognize that dictionaries are only one permissible indicator of the
ordinary meaning of a term. See Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).
Here, we have no reason to believe that the term "traffic" bears some other relevant
ordinary meaning that is not revealed by these dictionary definitions. See, e.g.,
§ 316.003(57), Fla. Stat. (2014) (similarly defining the word "traffic" within the chapters
on motor vehicles).
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turn authorized the department to grant. See § 161.053(2)(a), (4)(a). Thus, if the City
wants to host a carnival on Treasure Island Beach, it must apply for a permit authorizing
those activities and any construction they involve, and the department enjoys the
statutory authority to grant that permit if it makes the required determinations.
Section 161.58 was enacted years after part I as one section of part III
and operates, among other things, as a limit on the department's permitting authority.
Whatever construction and activities the department might be authorized to permit
seaward of the coastal construction control line in part I, it cannot permit vehicular traffic
on the dunes and native stabilizing vegetation of coastal beaches or the coastal
beaches themselves because section 161.58 bans those activities subject to a handful
of exceptions. Because the legislature did not include "as permitted by the department"
as an exception to section 161.58's prohibitions on vehicular traffic on the beaches and
dunes, we must conclude that the statute contains no such exception. See Hayes v.
State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999) ("We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that
were not placed there by the [l]egislature.").
Interpreting section 161.58's prohibitions on vehicular traffic to reach any
movement of vehicles on the dunes or beach, however, would effectively repeal much
of the statutory authority granted to the department in part I to permit construction and
other activities seaward of the coastal construction control line. The department's
authority to permit construction and activity on beaches and dunes seaward of the
control line necessarily includes the authority to permit the movement of vehicles
necessary to enable that construction or activity because "[a] statutory grant of power or
right carries with it by implication everything necessary to carry out the power or right
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and make it effectual and complete." Brock v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Collier Cty., 21
So. 3d 844, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
220 So. 2d 905, 908 (Fla. 1969)); see also McNeill v. Pace, 68 So. 177, 178 (Fla. 1915)
("Statutory powers expressly conferred carry with them by implication of law all
consistent powers that are necessary to the effectual execution of the powers expressly
conferred.").
This makes perfect sense. The department's authority to permit a carnival
on the beach seaward of the control line, for example, is meaningless if it does not also
include the power to allow vehicles to move onto that area of the beach for purposes of
carrying tents and rides, moving equipment, providing concessions, and all other things
that go into hosting a carnival. If the term "[v]ehicular traffic" in section 161.58 reaches
any movement of vehicles, however, the department's authority to permit construction
seaward of the control line will be substantially eliminated.
Established principles of statutory construction counsel strongly against
that result. "[I]t is an accepted maxim of statutory construction that a law should be
construed together and in harmony with any other statute relating to the same purpose,
even though the statutes were not enacted at the same time." Wakulla Cty. v. Davis,
395 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1981); see also McDougall v. Van House, 801 So. 2d 118,
121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). For that reason, "[c]ourts should avoid a construction which
places in conflict statutes which cover the same general field." City of Boca Raton v.
Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1282 (Fla. 1983); McDougall, 801 So. 2d at 121.
Relatedly, it is also "presumed that statutes are passed with the
knowledge of existing statutes, so courts must favor a construction that gives effect to
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both statutes rather than construe one statute as being meaningless or repealed by
implication." Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003). Thus, "[w]hile it is true
that a prior Act may be repealed in part, or in toto by implication through the passage of
a subsequent Act, such repeals are not favored and there must be a positive
repugnancy between the two or a clear intent to repeal must be apparent." Wade v.
Janney, 7 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 1942) (citation omitted); see also Alvarez v. Bd. of Trs.
of City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in City of Tampa, 580 So. 2d 151,
153 (Fla. 1991).
Here, we are presented with two enactments related to the same subject
matter—the protection of Florida's coastal areas. Some conflict between the two may
be inevitable because section 161.58 prohibits vehicular traffic on coastal beaches and
the dunes and native stabilizing vegetation regardless of how far the department's
coastal construction permitting authority might reach. But construing the term "vehicular
traffic" to mean the movement of vehicles as along a public road or highway, as
opposed to merely any movement of vehicles, is both consistent with the ordinary
meaning of the term "traffic" and limits the conflict between part I and section 161.58 to
a minimum. It gives meaningful effect to both statutes and allows both to exist
harmoniously to the maximum extent possible consistent with the ordinary meaning of
the term "vehicular traffic."
This interpretation also makes sense of section 161.58 within the overall
context of part III of chapter 161. See Cepcot Corp. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation,
658 So. 2d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ("A statute should be construed in its
entirety and within the context provided by the related statutes within the same act.").
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Part III establishes minimum standards for certain coastal construction and provides
that nothing in those standards—including section 161.58's prohibition on vehicular
traffic—provides for the department to continue to issue coastal construction control line
permits on terms as or more restrictive than those minimum standards. Thus, the Act
allows construction seaward of the coastal construction line, and it preserves the
department's permitting authority under part I so long as it is exercised in a manner
consistent with the minimum standards the act establishes. When it passed section
161.58, therefore, the legislature was aware that coastal construction would continue
and that the department would retain its permitting authority. An understanding of the
term "vehicular traffic" that would ban all movement of vehicles on the dunes and
beach—even movement of vehicles necessary to the construction part III itself allows—
is inconsistent with the other provisions of part III. Instead, vehicular traffic should be
understood as referring to the movement of vehicles as along a public street or
highway.
Applying that understanding, the trial court erred in declaring that any
"vehicular parking and driving" on Treasure Island Beach violates section 161.58, in
declaring that the City's ordinance governing driving and parking on the beach is invalid,
and in enjoining any parking or driving on the beach. It is clear beyond dispute that
many aspects of the events the City hosts involve "vehicular parking and driving" on the
beach that is limited to a defined category of people far narrower than the public, that is
limited to the pursuit of activities permitted by the department, and that cannot be said
to involve the use of the beach as though it were a public thoroughfare. The driving of
vehicles across the beach to move and set up a stage for a concert, the driving and
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parking of a food truck to provide food and drink at an event, or the driving of a vehicle
to haul away a carnival tent are all examples of "vehicular parking and driving" that do
not involve the use of a beach as a public highway. To the extent the trial court's ban
on "vehicular parking and driving" reaches these kinds of activities, it must be reversed.
The City's operation of public parking areas presents a different matter.
We agree with the City that parking a vehicle—leaving it stationary for a period of time—
does not alone constitute vehicular traffic because parking in and of itself does not
involve the movement of a vehicle. However, access to the parking areas the City
operates is along two paths that cross the dunes and beach and that are open to the
public for purposes of reaching the beach parking areas and are regulated as though
they were public ways. That activity does involve the use of a portion of beach as
though it were a public street—members of the public drive across it for purposes of
getting from point A to point B on the beach—and thus does involve vehicular traffic.
The City argues that section 161.58 was intended only to reach "Daytona
Beach-style driving," a characterization it says does not apply to cars driving over
access paths to use parking areas. Limiting the scope of vehicular traffic to Daytona
Beach-style driving is not a reasonable construction of section 161.58. There are a
number of atypical aspects to Daytona Beach-style driving—for example, the large
number of cars, the regularity of the use of the beach as a roadway, the existence of
established lanes of traffic, and routinized enforcement. Yet, there is nothing in the text
of section 161.58, the ordinary meaning of the term "vehicular traffic," or the context of
the Coastal Zone Protection Act to support the notion that the vehicular traffic prohibited
by the statute exists only when one or more of the conditions descriptive of Daytona
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Beach-style driving exists. On the contrary, the purpose that the text of the section
161.58 quite plainly evinces (a purpose to avoid harm to dunes and beaches as a
consequence of vehicles being driven over them) implies that we should not narrow the
scope of its term "[v]ehicular traffic" from the scope that its ordinary meaning (the
movement of vehicles as though the beach or a portion of it was a public street)
establishes.4
Additionally, when read in the context of section 161.58 as a whole, as we
must when interpreting a statute, the City's proposed limitation on the scope of the term
"[v]ehicular traffic" does not make sense. See Ratliff v. State, 56 So. 3d 918, 919 (Fla.
2d DCA 2011) ("Further, each statute 'must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed
to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship
between its parts.' " (quoting Lamar Outdoor Advert.-Lakeland v. Dep't of Transp., 17
4
The City argues that the legislature must have meant vehicular traffic to
mean "Daytona Beach-style driving" because a supreme court decision shortly before
section 161.58 was adopted described Daytona Beach-style driving using the term
"vehicular traffic." But the context there—a tort claim against the City of Daytona Beach
by an injured sunbather—was so different that it would be speculation to say that the
legislature plucked the term "vehicular traffic" from that case and intended it to have that
and only that meaning. See Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.
1983) ("While the fact of vehicular traffic on the beach was widely-known, it was not
readily apparent to sunbathers . . . that this lethal mixture of cars and reclining persons
was inadequately supervised."). The City also points to a staff analysis underlying the
Coastal Zone Protection Act that noted in one place that section 161.58 sought a
"tightening of criteria allowing driving on the beach" and in another that beach driving
was allowed in certain northeast Florida counties. See Fla. H.R. Comm. Nat. Res., HB
118 (1988) Staff Analysis 2 (July 1, 1988). We do not need to resort to staff analyses to
reach our conclusion here. See Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 2008)
(questioning utility of staff analyses for this purpose). Even if we were to rely on this
staff analysis to determine the meaning of a statutory term, the language to which the
City points does not command an inference that the legislature intended to limit the
scope of the term "vehicular traffic" to Daytona Beach-style driving.
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So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009))). The statute both prohibits vehicular traffic on
coastal beaches and dunes and native stabilizing vegetation and subjects to
prosecution for a second-degree misdemeanor "any person driving any vehicle on, over,
or across" them. § 161.58(1), (2), (3). Given their placement in the same statute
regulating the same activity, we should interpret the statutory prohibition on vehicular
traffic as being coterminous with these criminal enforcement mechanisms. Cf. Payne v.
State, 873 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ("In construing two subsections of the
same statute, we read the subsections in pari materia.").
When vehicular traffic is understood as moving a vehicle on the beach or
a portion thereof as though it was a public way, both the general prohibition and criminal
provisions easily make sense as a unified whole: The statute generally prohibits using
the beach as though it was a public street, and someone driving on the beach in that
manner is subject to prosecution. Limiting the term to Daytona Beach-style driving,
however, makes a muck of the criminal enforcement provisions. It is nearly impossible
to consider Daytona Beach-style driving as an offense that can be committed by an
individual driver because Daytona Beach-style driving does not connote individual
conduct; it connotes a state of affairs marked by the characteristics of the movement of
vehicles along Daytona Beach. And even if the concept could be understood to refer to
the conduct of an individual as distinguished from a state of affairs, the offense seems
just as impossible to define. Try as we might, for example, we cannot conceive of what
a jury would have to find to convict a defendant of Daytona Beach-style driving.
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For these reasons, limiting the reach of section 161.58 to Daytona Beach-
style driving is not a reasonable construction of the statute.5 As used in that statute,
"[v]ehicular traffic" means the movement of vehicles as along a public street or highway.
The Injunction Is Overbroad In Other Respects
In addition to prohibiting the movement and parking of vehicles that does
not constitute vehicular traffic within the meaning of section 161.58, the final judgment's
categorical ban on hosting or allowing any vehicular driving and parking on the beach
reaches potential activity (or, in the case of "allowing," mere inactivity) that is unrelated
to the civic events that are the subject of this litigation and that may well be legal. Such
relief is also well beyond the scope of the operative complaint, the Hoteliers' summary
judgment motions, and the summary judgment record—all of which are focused on the
legality or illegality of parking and driving on the central beach area of Treasure Island
Beach in connection with the civic events about which the Hoteliers complain. Apart
from declaring illegal and enjoining activities that do not constitute vehicular traffic, then,
the trial court also erred in awarding the Hoteliers a substantially overbroad injunction.
See, e.g., Smith v. Wiker, 192 So. 3d 603, 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[A] court should
not issue an injunction broader than necessary to protect the injured party under the
particular circumstances."); see also Brower v. Hubbard, 643 So. 2d 28, 30 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994) ("Injunctions must be specifically tailored to each case; they should not
5
Accordingly, we reject the City's argument that because section 161.58
contains penal provisions, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in its favor. See
Paul v. State, 129 So. 3d 1058, 1064 (Fla. 2013) ("This rule of lenity is a canon of last
resort and only applies if the statute remains ambiguous after consulting traditional
canons of statutory construction.").
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infringe upon conduct that does not produce the harm sought to be avoided."); Clark v.
Allied Assocs., Inc., 477 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) ("An injunctive order
should never be broader than is necessary to secure the injured party . . . relief
warranted by the circumstances of the particular case.").
Conclusion
We find no error in the trial court's determination that the City's actions in
hosting vehicular traffic across the beach for purposes of reaching the parking areas
associated with the civic events on the central beach area of Treasure Island Beach
violate section 161.58(2).6 The trial court went too far, however, to the extent it
declared any additional conduct illegal, declared the City's ordinance invalid, and
enjoined the City from "hosting or allowing" any "vehicular parking and driving on
Treasure Island Beach." We reverse the final judgment to that extent, affirm it in all
other respects, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. To the extent those proceedings are directed only toward modifying the final
judgment to conform to our holdings today, any declaratory and injunctive provisions of
that judgment should extend no further than declaring illegal and enjoining the conduct
identified by this opinion as vehicular traffic on the central beach area of Treasure Island
Beach in connection with the events that are the subject of the Hoteliers' complaint.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
KELLY and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
6
We have not considered whether there is any way in which the City could
host parking on the beach in a manner that would not involve vehicular traffic in violation
of section 161.58. Our opinion should not be understood as expressing any view on
that question.
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