Callaway v. State , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14505 ( 2016 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed September 28, 2016.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D16-1826
    Lower Tribunal No. 14-2020
    ________________
    Michael Anthony Callaway,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    The State of Florida,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the
    Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L. Fernandez, Judge.
    Michael Anthony Callaway, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
    ROTHENBERG, J.
    Michael Anthony Callaway (“Callaway”) appeals the trial court’s order
    denying Callaway’s motion to vacate his plea and sentence as a Habitual Violent
    Felony Offender for two counts of armed robbery with a firearm committed on
    January 26, 2014. Callaway’s motion was based on three separate claims of
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel:
    1. Trial counsel’s failure to depose certain witnesses where there
    existed an identification issue;
    2. Trial counsel’s failure to request a competency evaluation of
    Callaway;
    3. Trial counsel’s waiver of a presentence evaluation without
    Callaway’s knowledge and consent.
    Because Callaway failed to allege and demonstrate that the alleged deficient
    performance of his trial counsel resulted in any prejudice to Callaway, we affirm.
    See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984) (requiring that the
    defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and the
    deficient performance prejudiced the defendant).      “It is not enough for the
    defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
    the proceeding.” 
    Id. at 693.
          Rather, the defendant must show that, but for
    counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different. 
    Id. at 694;
    Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 59 (1985); Kennedy v. State,
    
    547 So. 2d 912
    , 913-14 (Fla. 1989); Zerquera v. State, 
    583 So. 2d 348
    , 349 n.1
    (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
    1.   Failure to depose the victims
    2
    The failure to depose witnesses, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate
    ineffective assistance of counsel. Magill v. State, 
    457 So. 2d 1367
    , 1370-71 (Fla.
    1984). In the instant case, Callaway does not claim that had his trial counsel
    deposed the witnesses, counsel would have discovered evidence that he was
    unaware of or that Callaway would not have pled guilty to the charges, nor could
    he as the record demonstrates the opposite.
    First, the record reflects that the strengths and weaknesses of the eyewitness
    identifications were well known to both Callaway and Callaway’s counsel prior to
    Callaway entering his guilty plea. An Arthur1 hearing was held on June 4, 2014,
    over one month prior to Callaway entering into a negotiated plea with the State on
    July 15, 2014.      At the Arthur hearing, defense counsel litigated the potential
    discrepancies in the identification evidence, and the judge who conducted the
    hearing found the arguments unpersuasive.
    Defense counsel argued at the Arthur hearing that the victim’s identification
    of Callaway was unreliable because when the victim initially described the
    assailant, the victim did not specifically describe any of the distinctive tattoos
    Callaway had on his face and neck. These descriptions were provided later when
    the victim was being interviewed by the prosecutor.         Specifically, the victim
    described the assailant as a thin built medium height man, whose face and neck
    1   State v. Arthur, 
    390 So. 2d 717
    (Fla. 1980).
    3
    were completely covered in tattoos. The victim described three of the tattoos as
    follows: a group of tattoos on the assailant’s face that looked like bricks, a
    teardrop tattoo on his cheek, and a tattoo on the center of his neck that said “game
    over.”
    At the Arthur hearing, the judge noted that Callaway’s height and build
    matched the description given by the victim; the victim was able to positively
    identify Callaway when presented with a photographic lineup, which contained a
    picture of Callaway without any visible tattoos; and during the victim’s pre-filing
    interview with the prosecutor, the victim had described the distinctive tattoos
    Callaway had on his face and neck during the robbery without any influence or
    suggestion by the State. The judge who conducted the Arthur hearing found that
    the identification evidence was reliable and therefore denied Callaway’s request
    for the setting of a monetary bond and release from custody pending trial.
    Thus, defense counsel and Callaway were aware, without deposing the
    witnesses, of the victim’s delayed reporting of the specific description of the
    tattoos he observed on Callaway’s face and neck, and they were able to weigh the
    potential benefit of this evidence with the benefit of accepting the favorable plea
    being offered by the State. Specifically, the plea being offered, which Callaway
    accepted, was to plead guilty to the two armed robbery counts pending in the
    instant case and to admit to violating his probation in two pending probation
    4
    violation cases in Broward County and to be sentenced to two concurrent fifteen-
    year sentences with ten-year minimum mandatories followed by five years of
    probation on each count of armed robbery, to run concurrent with the sentences to
    be imposed on the two pending probation violation cases in Broward County. The
    benefit of accepting this plea is readily obvious. Callaway was potentially facing
    two consecutive life sentences in the instant case and a combined sentence of fifty
    years on the probation cases in Broward County (he was on probation for robbery
    with a weapon and burglary of an occupied dwelling in one case, and grand theft
    vehicle in a separate case), which could have been ordered to run consecutive to
    the sentences imposed in the instant case. The burden of proof at a probation
    violation hearing is also substantially lower, requiring only that the proof be by a
    preponderance of the evidence.
    Because Callaway was aware of “issues” concerning the identification
    evidence prior to accepting the plea, and he has not alleged, nor have we found, the
    particularized harm that allegedly flows from his trial counsel’s failure to depose
    certain witnesses, we affirm the trial court’s order on this claim. See Brown v.
    State, 
    846 So. 2d 1114
    , 1124 (Fla. 2003) (requiring that when the failure to depose
    a witness is alleged as a part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
    defendant must articulate particularized harm that resulted on a specific evidentiary
    issue); see also Davis v. State, 
    928 So. 2d 1089
    , 1117 (Fla. 2005) (finding that
    5
    Davis failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice where he failed to articulate any
    testimony that the witnesses could have given if they had been deposed and which
    was unknown by his trial counsel prior to trial); 
    Kennedy, 547 So. 2d at 913-14
    (holding that the defendant must show that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
    the result of the proceeding would have been different).
    2. Failure to request a competency evaluation
    Callaway claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
    counsel by failing to order a competency evaluation and request an evidentiary
    hearing to determine his competency to enter into the plea negotiated with the
    State. Callaway again fails to satisfy the Strickland prejudice prong. 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    . In order to satisfy the prejudice prong in an ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim where failure to evaluate a defendant’s competency is alleged, a
    defendant must demonstrate “at least a reasonable probability that a psychological
    evaluation would have revealed that he was incompetent to stand trial.” Alexander
    v. Dugger, 
    841 F.2d 371
    , 375 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Lamarca v. State, 
    931 So. 2d
    838, 847-48 (Fla. 2006) (holding that where nothing in the record suggests that
    the defendant was not able to consult with his lawyer or lacked an understanding of
    the proceedings against him, defense counsel will not be found to be ineffective for
    failing to move for a competency evaluation). A defendant is not entitled to an
    evidentiary hearing unless there is a “real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to
    6
    [his] mental capacity . . . to meaningfully participate and cooperate with counsel”
    and the facts “positively, unequivocally and clearly generate legitimate doubt.”
    Adams v. Wainwright, 
    764 F.2d 1356
    , 1360 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Bruce v.
    Estelle, 
    483 F.2d 1031
    , 1043 (5th Cir. 1973)).
    Neither the record nor Callaway’s motion demonstrates the reasonable
    probability that a psychological evaluation would have revealed that Callaway was
    incompetent to enter his plea to the charges in this case or that there is a real,
    substantial, and legitimate doubt as to his ability to consult with his attorney
    regarding his plea or to understand and appreciate the proceedings. The transcripts
    of the Arthur hearing and the subsequent plea colloquy reflect that Callaway
    provided appropriate answers to all questions posed to him; his answers were not
    solely “yes” and “no” answers; he asked questions to clarify the issues; he
    corrected the State and the trial court regarding a prior sentence; and he asked for
    others in the courtroom to be quiet so that he could hear what the trial court was
    saying to him. He repeatedly and consistently demonstrated an understanding of
    the charges and evidence in the case, as well as the specifics of the offered plea and
    the rights he was giving up in accepting the plea. We, therefore, find that the trial
    court did not err by rejecting this claim of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
    3. Waiver of the presentence evaluation
    7
    First, Callaway was not automatically entitled to a presentence evaluation
    because this was not his first felony conviction. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(a); see
    also Hardwick v. State, 
    630 So. 2d 1212
    , 1215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that
    the plain language of rule 3.710(a) requires a trial court to order a presentence
    investigation report for a defendant convicted of his first felony offense). In fact,
    Callaway admitted on the record that he qualified to be sentenced as a Habitual
    Violent Felony Offender and was on probation in Broward County when he
    accepted the negotiated plea in the instant case.       Thus, in order to obtain a
    presentence evaluation, Callaway needed to request one. Callaway has not alleged,
    and the record does not demonstrate, any prejudice flowing from the failure to
    request a presentence investigation where Callaway was sentenced according to a
    plea agreement he bargained for, rather than as a result of a trial or an open plea to
    the court and a sentencing hearing where the trial court is asked to consider
    aggravating and mitigating circumstances when determining what sentence to
    impose after a finding of guilt. We, therefore, conclude that this claim is totally
    without merit.
    Affirmed.
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