Scott Alan Kline v. State of Florida ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •            FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D18-1706
    _____________________________
    SCOTT ALAN KLINE,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    Angela M. Cox, Judge.
    June 7, 2019
    WOLF, J.
    Appellant challenges his judgments and sentences for 10
    counts of child pornography. He argues it is unclear whether the
    trial court used the correct standard when it denied his motion
    for new trial. We find appellant failed to preserve this issue and
    affirm.
    After the jury returned its verdict, appellant filed a motion
    for new trial raising a number of grounds. Some grounds
    challenged rulings the judge made during trial, such as the
    denial of appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant
    also alleged the verdict was contrary to the weight of the
    evidence. The trial court denied the motion stating, “[t]he motion
    for new trial is denied for reasons stated on the record during
    trial.” Appellant did not object or seek clarification.
    On appeal, appellant notes there was no discussion during
    trial of his argument that the verdict was contrary to the weight
    of the evidence. Thus, he argues it is unclear whether the trial
    court applied the correct legal standard to that portion of his
    motion. He suggests the trial court may have applied the
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard instead. The State argues
    the court was merely referencing the grounds in the motion for
    new trial that were addressed on the record, and there is no
    indication that the court applied the wrong standard when
    considering whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the
    evidence.
    “Defendants have the right to have the trial judge evaluate
    and weigh the evidence independently of the jury’s findings to
    determine whether the jury verdict was contrary to the weight of
    the evidence.” McCloud v. State, 
    150 So. 3d 822
    , 823 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2014) (quoting Kelley v. State, 
    16 So. 3d 196
    , 197 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2009)).
    This court has reversed where “the trial court’s findings
    indicate that the court may have applied the sufficiency of the
    evidence standard instead of the weight of the evidence
    standard.” Spear v. State, 
    860 So. 2d 1080
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    (emphasis added). However, this court has never expressly
    discussed whether this error must be preserved or whether it
    constitutes fundamental error.
    Perhaps if a trial court expressly applied the wrong standard
    to a claim that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the
    evidence, such an error might be found to be fundamental. See,
    e.g., Velloso v. State, 
    117 So. 3d 903
    , 905–06 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    (reversing where the trial court explicitly refused to weigh the
    evidence in response to a motion for new trial, stating its only
    role was to review for the legal sufficiency of the evidence).
    However, where it is unclear whether the trial court used the
    wrong standard, we find the potential that the trial court erred
    does not reach the level of fundamental error.
    2
    To remand for clarification now when counsel had the
    opportunity to ask for clarification but simply failed to do so
    would constitute a waste of judicial resources. See Fla.
    Emergency Physicians-Kang and Associates, M.D., P.A., v. Parker,
    
    800 So. 2d 631
    , 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“It is the function of the
    appellate court to review errors allegedly committed in the trial
    court, not to entertain for the first time on appeal, issues which
    the complaining party could have, and should have, but did not,
    present to the trial court.”). Had the trial court been apprised of
    the ambiguity in its ruling, it could have easily taken care of the
    potential problem during the hearing on the motion for new trial.
    Because appellant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, we
    AFFIRM.
    OSTERHAUS and JAY, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Jasmine Russell, Assistant
    Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant
    Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1706

Filed Date: 6/7/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/8/2019