Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed April 10, 2019.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D18-0550
Lower Tribunal No. 12-19187
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Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
Appellant,
vs.
Vadne Winters,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez,
Judge.
Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Melinda S. Thornton, for appellant.
Steinger Iscoe & Greene, P.A., and Alejandro M. Garcia (Fort Lauderdale);
Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., and Nichole J. Segal and Andrew A. Harris (West
Palm Beach), for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and HENDON, JJ.
HENDON, J.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (“Winn-Dixie”) seeks to reverse the order vacating
the Final Judgment and granting Plaintiff Vadne Winters’ (“Winters”) motion for
new trial. We affirm.
In 2011, Winters slipped, fell, and was injured at Winn-Dixie, allegedly on
water that had accumulated from the dripping mist system near the fresh vegetable
section. She filed suit against Winn-Dixie for breach of duty of care by negligent
maintenance of the produce section floor, or alternatively, by failing to warn her of
a known dangerous condition, resulting in her injuries. The action went to trial in
2017. Throughout the trial, the trial court cautioned the parties and jury that they
were not to assume that any of his trial decisions indicated any bias or opinion as to
the merits of the case. The jury found Winn-Dixie was not negligent.
Winters subsequently filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, alleging that
the trial judge’s comments and behavior demonstrated prejudice against her counsel
and deprived her of a fair trial. The trial judge appropriately recused himself from
the case, and a successor judge was assigned. The successor judge entered Final
Judgment in favor of Winn-Dixie pursuant to the jury verdict. Subsequently, the
successor judge conducted a hearing on Winters’ motion for new trial. After hearing
arguments of both counsel, the successor judge granted Winters’ motion for new
trial, and vacated the prior Final Judgment based on “the reasons stated by the Court
during the February 12, 2018 hearing . . .”
2
As a general proposition, a trial court, when asked to rule on a motion to
disqualify, must accept the facts alleged as true and then determine legally if those
facts would cause a reasonable person to develop a well-grounded belief that he or
she would not receive a fair hearing before that trial judge. See Shumpert v. State,
703 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Rucks v. State,
692 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1997); Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(f). The facts alleged in the motion need only
show a well-grounded fear that the movant will not receive a fair trial at the hands
of the judge. “The question of disqualification focuses on those matters from which
a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the judge's
perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially.” Livingston v. State,
441 So.
2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983). If the facts as alleged do not meet that burden, the motion
is determined to be legally insufficient. J & J Indus., Inc. v. Carpet Showcase of
Tampa Bay, Inc.,
723 So. 2d 281, 282–83 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In the case before
us, the original trial court judge granted Winter’s motion to disqualify as the facts
alleged in her motion were sufficient to support her assertions that she believed that
she could not receive a fair trial.
We review the successor judge’s grant of a motion for new trial for abuse of
discretion. Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. de Diaz,
18 So. 3d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA
2008). In its brief, Winn-Dixie acknowledges the general applicability of this
standard of review, but contends that where the motion for new trial is ruled on by a
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successor judge (who must base his or her determination on review of a cold record,
having not presided over the trial), the deference accorded such ruling is
significantly narrowed. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ward,
203 So. 3d 984, 989 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2016) (affirming the trial court’s order granting a new trial based on attorney
misconduct and explaining that the abuse of discretion standard is “based on the
presumption that the trial judge ruling on the motion for new trial was the one who
presided over the case and is therefore in the best position to determine the propriety
and potential impact of the conduct”) (citation omitted). See also Nat’l Healthcorp
Ltd. P’ship v. Close,
787 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (observing: “Because the
order awarding a new trial was entered by a successor judge on the basis of a study
of the record, the discretion of the trial court to set aside the jury’s verdict is
significantly diminished in this case.”); Lindon v. Dalton Hotel Corp.,
113 So. 3d
985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). Winn-Dixie’s point is well taken but ultimately
unavailing: Even applying this narrowed abuse of discretion standard, we would
affirm the successor judge’s order. If the appellate court determines that reasonable
people could differ as to the propriety of the trial court's action, there can be no
finding of an abuse of discretion. Hahn v. Medeiros,
858 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 5th DCA
2003); see also Gen. Hosp. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gager,
160 So. 2d 749, 751
(Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (stating that appellate courts are much more reluctant to
interfere with an order granting a new trial than an order denying a new trial).
4
Finding no abuse of discretion, we therefore affirm the order granting the
Plaintiff’s motion for new trial.
Affirmed.
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