SHAVIS JOHNSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2019 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    SHAVIS JOHNSON,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA and RIC L. BRADSHAW, As Sheriff,
    Respondents.
    No. 4D19-826
    [May 1, 2019]
    Petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth
    Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Jeffrey Colbath and Glenn Kelley,
    Judges; L.T. Case Nos. 502018CF010387A, 502018CF011707A and
    502019CF002203A.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant
    Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L.
    Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
    respondents.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant Shavis Johnson petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
    challenging his pretrial detention. He contends that a first appearance
    judge’s ruling declining to revoke bond in pending cases bound the trial
    court. We disagree and deny the petition writing to clarify that, absent
    circumstances not present here, the ultimate authority to revoke an
    existing bond lies with the court having trial jurisdiction. 1
    1 Petitioner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal after this opinion had been
    prepared. We exercise our discretion and release this opinion to clarify the law.
    Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire, 
    670 So. 2d 153
    , 154–55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[A]n
    appellate court has discretion to release an opinion after a voluntary dismissal
    where the court had already expended substantial effort in preparing an opinion
    before the dismissal and the public interest will be thereby subserved.”).
    Background
    Defendant was charged in two 2018 case numbers with felony offenses.
    He posted bond and was released. While on release, he was arrested in a
    2019 case number for possession of crack cocaine with intent to sell,
    possession of marijuana, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and
    possession of ammunition by a convicted felon.
    At first appearance for the 2019 case, the state advised the first
    appearance judge of the 2018 cases and asked that bond be revoked in
    those cases. The state noted defendant’s history of violence and that he
    has approximately 12 prior felony convictions – including robbery,
    burglaries, and thefts. Defendant’s girlfriend addressed the court and
    asked that he not be taken into custody because he is the only one who
    helps with the kids. The first appearance judge declined to revoke bond
    in the 2018 cases and set a total bond of $65,000 for the 2019 case.
    Defendant posted the bond and was released.
    The state then filed a motion to revoke bond in the 2018 cases.
    Ultimately, the trial judge assigned to those cases revoked bond and
    ordered pretrial detention. This petition followed.
    Analysis
    “As a condition of pretrial release, whether such release is by surety
    bail bond or recognizance bond or in some other form, the defendant must:
    (a) Refrain from criminal activity of any kind.” § 903.047(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
    (2018). The trial court can order pretrial detention when it finds probable
    cause that the defendant violated this condition by committing a new
    offense. Section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, “Violation of condition of
    pretrial release,” provides: “Notwithstanding s. 907.041, a court may, on
    its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the
    court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new
    crime while on pretrial release.”
    Defendant argues that, because the first appearance judge declined to
    revoke bond based on the new offenses, the state was required to show
    “good cause” and changed circumstances to modify this ruling. See Fla.
    R. Crim. P. 3.131(d)(2) (“The state may apply for modification of bail by
    showing good cause and with at least 3 hours' notice to the attorney for
    the defendant.”); Keane v. Cochran, 
    614 So. 2d 1186
    , 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA
    1993) (holding that where the state seeks modification of pretrial release
    conditions, the “good cause” requirement of rule 3.131(d)(2) requires a
    2
    showing of changed circumstances that were not considered by the judge
    when previously setting bond).
    We disagree. When a defendant violates pretrial release conditions, the
    statutes and rules of criminal procedure vest the judge having trial
    jurisdiction with the ultimate authority to revoke an existing bond and
    order commitment. The first appearance judge’s ruling did not bind the
    trial court or preclude it from exercising its authority to order pretrial
    detention under the statute.
    Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(g) provides: “The court in
    which the cause is pending may direct the arrest and commitment of the
    defendant who is at large on bail when: (1) there has been a breach of the
    undertaking.” (emphasis supplied). “If the defendant applies to be
    admitted to bail after recommitment, the court that recommitted the
    defendant shall determine conditions of release, if any, subject to the
    limitations of (b) above.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(h) (emphasis supplied).
    Generally, only the trial judge can modify existing pretrial release
    conditions:
    (d) Subsequent Application for Setting or Modification
    of Bail.
    (1) When a judicial officer not possessing trial jurisdiction
    orders a defendant held to answer before a court having
    jurisdiction to try the defendant, and bail has been denied or
    sought to be modified, application by motion may be made to
    the court having jurisdiction to try the defendant or, in the
    absence of the judge of the trial court, to the circuit court. The
    motion shall be determined promptly. No judge or a court of
    equal or inferior jurisdiction may modify or set a condition of
    release, unless the judge:
    (A) imposed the conditions of bail or set the amount of bond
    required;
    (B) is the chief judge of the circuit in which the defendant
    is to be tried;
    (C) has been assigned to preside over the criminal trial of
    the defendant; or
    3
    (D) is the first appearance judge and was authorized by the
    judge initially setting or denying bail to modify or set
    conditions of release. 2
    Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(d); see also § 903.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (containing
    similar provisions).
    The trial judge has inherent authority to enforce the pretrial release
    orders in the existing cases and the ultimate authority to order pretrial
    detention in those cases. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.132(b) (“A motion for pretrial
    detention may be filed at any time prior to trial. The motion shall be made
    to the court with trial jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied)); see also §
    903.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“After a person is held to answer by a trial
    court judge, the court having jurisdiction to try the defendant shall, before
    indictment, affidavit, or information is filed, have jurisdiction to hear and
    decide all preliminary motions regarding bail . . . .” (emphasis supplied)).
    When a defendant is arrested for new charges while on pretrial release
    for existing cases, the rules provide a mechanism for the first appearance
    judge to hold a defendant pending a ruling by the trial court:
    [At first appearance,] the judicial officer may inquire whether
    the state intends to file a motion for pretrial detention, and if
    so, grant the state no more than three days to file a motion
    under this subdivision. Upon a showing by the state of
    probable cause that the defendant committed the offense and
    exigent circumstances, the defendant shall be detained in
    custody pending the filing of the motion.
    Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.132(a).
    But, the first appearance judge’s decision is only temporary and subject
    to the trial judge’s ultimate discretion. See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.130(d)
    (allowing the judge at first appearance to commit a defendant charged with
    violating probation “to be brought before the court that granted probation
    . . . to await further hearing”). Although the first appearance judge
    declined to detain defendant, this ruling did not bind the trial court, which
    has the ultimate authority to revoke pretrial release under section
    2 Rule 3.131(j) allows a trial judge issuing a capias to endorse the amount of bail,
    if any, and permits the trial judge to “authorize the setting or modification of bail
    by the judge presiding over the defendant’s first appearance hearing.” Thus, the
    rules allow the trial judge to cede its authority to the first appearance judge. That
    did not occur here.
    4
    903.0471, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Santiago v. Ryan, 
    109 So. 3d 848
    ,
    850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (denying habeas corpus petition where the trial
    court revoked bond under section 903.0471 even though defendant had
    been released on bond at first appearance for a new offense).
    Defendant relies on Gadson v. Jenne, 
    882 So. 2d 531
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    2004), but that case is distinguishable. In Gadson, the trial judge had
    declined to revoke bond and a successor trial judge—after the case was
    transferred to another division—purported to reverse the prior trial judge’s
    ruling. 
    Id. at 533
     (“One [trial] circuit court judge does not have the
    authority to reverse the prior order of another [trial] circuit court judge.”).
    Here, the first appearance judge determined simply whether there was
    probable cause for the new offenses and set pretrial release conditions for
    those offenses. The first appearance judge had no authority to make a
    final determination over the pretrial release conditions in the pending 2018
    cases. The trial court properly exercised its authority to revoke bond
    pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes.
    Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
    Petition denied.
    GERBER, C.J., CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-0826

Filed Date: 5/1/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/1/2019