David Antonio Williams v. State of Florida ( 2015 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
DAVID ANTONIO WILLIAMS, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D13-2893
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed May 1, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Union County.
David A. Glant, Judge.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public
Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.
MARSTILLER, J.
David Antonio Williams appeals his convictions and sentences for two
counts of battery on a law enforcement officer and two counts of resisting an
officer with violence. Williams argues that the trial court reversibly erred by
denying his request to represent himself at trial, and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel from his appointed attorney. Finding that the court
incorrectly denied Williams’ request to represent himself, we reverse and remand
for a new trial.
Prior to trial, Williams filed a written waiver of representation by counsel
stating that he “voluntarily, knowingly and competently” waived his right to be
represented by an attorney. The day of jury selection, the trial court conducted a
Faretta 1 hearing and questioned Williams on his educational level, language
competency and motivation for wanting to proceed unrepresented. Williams stated
that he had completed high school and one year of college, his main language was
English, and he felt he was better able than appointed counsel to address the issues
in his case. After substantial discussion between the court and Williams about
whether Williams understood the legal grounds for the State’s request for enhanced
sentencing and whether it would be appropriate to grant Williams a continuance to
conduct research prior to picking a jury, the court concluded:
Well, because of your hesitation and not feeling
comfortable with knowing how to proceed in selecting a
jury, based upon your announcement that you would
want to do further research before you proceed, it’s an
indication to me that you don’t have the necessary legal
experience and training to go forward today. And
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Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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therefore, I’m going to deny your request for you to
represent yourself before a court.
“Under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Faretta, an accused has
the right to self-representation at trial. A defendant’s choice to invoke this right
‘must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law.’” Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 377-78 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Faretta, 422
U.S. at 834). Once a defendant makes an unequivocal request for self-
representation, pursuant to Faretta and Florida Supreme Court precedent, the trial
court is obligated to hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant is
knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel. See
McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 864 (citing Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 378). “[I]t is
error to deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself, regardless of
his legal skills or the complexity of the case, if the trial court determines that the
defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and ‘does
not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.’” Neal v. State, 132 So. 3d
949, 950 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(3)).
The trial court in this instance did not consider whether Williams’ waiver of
counsel was knowing and intelligent and whether he was mentally competent to
represent himself, and impermissibly denied Williams’ self-representation request
based on a perceived lack of legal training and experience. The court thus failed to
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conduct a legally sufficient Faretta hearing, and in so doing, committed an error
that requires reversal of Williams’ convictions and remand for new trial. See Neal,
132 So. 3d at 951 (stating that such error is not subject to harmless error review)
(citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 (2006)).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ROBERTS, J., CONCURS; SWANSON, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION.
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SWANSON, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Appellant’s request to represent himself was not
unequivocal, was not made in good faith and was designed solely for purpose of
delay. Haram v. State, 625 So.2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Moreover,
Appellant’s subsequent conduct indicated he had abandoned the request.
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