John Swearingden v. State of Florida ( 2015 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JOHN SWEARINGDEN, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D14-146
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed May 12, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Mark Hulsey, III, Judge.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Courtenay H. Miller, Assistant Public
Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison for stabbing a man in the head with a knife during an alcohol-fueled
argument over a woman. Appellant claimed that he stabbed the victim in self-
defense. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the victim or Appellant was
the initial aggressor. The trial court instructed the jury that:
If the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity
and was attacked in a place where he had a right to be, he
had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand his
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force
if he reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to
prevent death or great bodily harm to himself.
* * *
However, use of deadly force is not justifiable if you find
the defendant initially provoked the use of force against
himself unless, one, force asserted toward the defendant
was so great that he reasonably believed that he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had
exhausted every reasonable means to escape the
danger of [sic]1 using deadly force on [the victim] or,
number two, in good faith, the defendant withdrew from
physical contact with [the victim] and clearly indicated to
[the victim] that he wanted to withdraw and stop the use
of deadly force but [the victim] continued or resumed the
use of force.
(emphasis added).
Appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental error2 in
1
The word “of” appears to be a misstatement by the trial court or an error in
transcription by the court reporter because the written instructions contained in the
record track Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.6(f) verbatim and read
in pertinent part: “. . . exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger,
other than using deadly force on [the victim] . . . .” This discrepancy does not
affect our analysis of the issue raised by Appellant.
2
Appellant did not object to the instructions at trial, but because the record does
not reflect that he specifically requested or affirmatively agreed to the challenged
portions of the instructions, he did not waive the issue for appeal. See Moore v.
2
giving these instructions because the portions of the instructions emphasized above
negate each other with respect to his duty to retreat or not. We are compelled to
agree based on Floyd v. State, 151 So. 3d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), rev. granted
2014 WL 7251662 (Fla. Dec. 16, 2014), and Ross v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly
D327 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 3, 2015). But see Sims v. State, 140 So. 3d 1000, 1003
n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (stating in dicta that where there is a dispute as to who
was the initial aggressor, no error results from instructing the jury that the
defendant both did (if he was the initial aggressor) and did not (if the victim was
the initial aggressor) have a duty to retreat). Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s
judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial. 3
Additionally, we certify that this case passes on the same question of great
public importance that we certified to the Florida Supreme Court in Floyd:
DOES FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION
(CRIMINAL) 3.6(F) PROVIDE CONFLICTING
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE DUTY TO RETREAT?
Floyd v. State, Case No. 1D11-4465 (Oct. 17, 2014) (order granting Appellee’s
motion to certify a question of great public importance). More specifically, the
State, 114 So. 3d 486, 490-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); cf. Oliver v. State, 40 Fla. L.
Weekly D303 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 29, 2015) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
jury instructions were fundamentally erroneous based on Floyd because, at the
charge conference, defense counsel affirmatively requested and specifically agreed
to the applicable parts of the justifiable use of deadly force instructions that were to
be given to the jury).
3
Based on this disposition, we need not address the other issues raised by
Appellant.
3
question of great public importance framed by this case is:
IN A CASE WHERE THE DEFENDANT’S SOLE
DEFENSE IS SELF-DEFENSE AND THERE IS A
DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER THE DEFENDANT OR
THE VICTIM WAS THE INITIAL AGGRESSOR,
DOES A TRIAL COURT COMMIT FUNDAMENTAL
ERROR BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY BOTH (1)
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A DUTY
TO RETREAT AND THAT HE COULD MEET FORCE
WITH DEADLY FORCE IF HE REASONABLY
BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SO
TO PREVENT DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM
TO HIMSELF, AND (2) THAT THE DEFENDANT’S
USE OF DEADLY FORCE WAS NOT JUSTIFIABLE
IF HE WAS THE INITIAL AGGRESSOR UNLESS HE
EXHAUSTED EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO
ESCAPE THE DANGER OTHER THAN USING
DEADLY FORCE?
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
CLARK, WETHERELL, and RAY, JJ., CONCUR.
4