IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA
June 26, 2019
LABRONX BAILEY, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-23
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
)
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
The appellant's motion for rehearing is granted. The opinion dated March
22, 2019, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor. The disposition
remains the same. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained.
HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A
TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.
MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
LABRONX BAILEY, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-23
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed June 26, 2019.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Emmett Battles,
Judge.
Dane K. Chase of Chase Law
Florida, P.A., Saint Petersburg,
for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
MORRIS, Judge.
Labronx Bailey appeals his sentence of fifty years in prison for the offense
of first-degree murder committed when he was a juvenile. He was convicted after a jury
trial in 2009 and originally sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. After the Supreme
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Court ruled that such a sentence is unconstitutional, see Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S.
460 (2012), in 2015 the trial court granted a new sentencing hearing to determine if a
life sentence is appropriate under the new individualized sentencing procedure set forth
in section 921.1401, Florida Statutes (2014).1 See Falcon v. State,
162 So. 3d 954 (Fla.
2015) (holding that Miller applies retroactively), receded from on other grounds by
Williams v. State,
242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018); Horsley v. State,
160 So. 3d 393, 395
(Fla. 2015) (holding that the 2014 version of section 775.082(1)(b)(1) applies
retroactively "to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under
Miller"). The trial court held a new sentencing hearing in 2016, after which the trial court
determined that a life sentence is not appropriate. But the trial court found that Bailey
intended to kill the victim and accordingly imposed a fifty-year sentence with review
after twenty-five years as set forth in sections 775.082(1)(b)(1) and 921.1402(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (2014). The trial court also imposed a twenty-year minimum mandatory
term for discharging a firearm as required by the 10-20-Life statute, section 775.087,
Florida Statutes (2007).2 Bailey raises several challenges to his sentence; we affirm for
the reasons explained below.
1In 2014, the legislature responded to Miller by amending section 775.082
and enacting sections 921.1401 and 921.1402. Ch. 2014-220, §§ 1-3, Laws of Fla.
(effective July 1, 2014).
2We note that the trial court further imposed a "minimum mandatory" term
of forty years in prison under section 775.082(1)(b)(1), reflected on Bailey's written
sentence as "40YR MIN/MAN UNDER FS#775.082(1B1)." Section 775.082(1)(b)(1)
provides that when a trial court determines that life imprisonment is not appropriate, it
shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment "of at least 40 years." We do
not address whether section 775.082(1)(b)(1) authorizes the imposition of a forty-year
term that may be read as requiring Bailey to serve forty years day for day because
Bailey has not raised this issue on appeal. For purposes of addressing the issues
raised by Bailey in this opinion, we refer to the forty-year term in section
775.082(1)(b)(1) as a "minimum sentence."
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On appeal, Bailey first argues that the trial court erred in imposing
sentence under section 775.082(1)(b)(1), which provides for a forty-year minimum
sentence with review after twenty-five years if the trial court finds that the juvenile had
an intent to kill. Bailey argues that the ground for enhancement was not charged in the
indictment and that it could not have been charged in the indictment because the
statutory enhancement did not exist at the time, thus preventing application of the
statutory enhancement to him. He also contends that the ground for enhancement was
not found by the jury. For these reasons, he argues that he could not receive enhanced
sentencing under the 2014 version of section 775.082(1)(b)(1).
Bailey was resentenced under the 2014 version of section
775.082(1)(b)(1), which provides as follows:
A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to
kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a
capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital
felony, which was committed before the person attained 18
years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for
life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in
accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life
imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds
that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such
person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at
least 40 years. A person sentenced pursuant to this
subparagraph is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in
accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
(Emphasis added.) Section 921.1402(2)(a) provides for a "review of his or her sentence
after 25 years" unless the defendant has been convicted of an enumerated offense
during a separate criminal transaction or episode.
As for Bailey's claim that the statutory enhancement did not exist at the
time of his indictment, the Florida Supreme Court holds that the 2014 version of section
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775.082(1)(b)(1) applies retroactively "to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are
unconstitutional under Miller." Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. Furthermore, Bailey was
charged in the indictment with killing the victim "with a premeditated design to effect the
death of" the victim. Thus, the ground for enhancement—the element of intent
necessary to support a sentence under section 775.082(1)(b)(1)—was charged in the
charging document. See Rogers v. State,
875 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
("The grounds for enhancement of a sentence must be charged in the information."); cf.
Whitehead v. State, 884 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that defendant's
sentence could not be enhanced based on a jury finding that he discharged a firearm
where charging document only charged that he used a firearm).
In addition, the jury specifically found Bailey guilty of first-degree
premeditated murder. See § 782.04(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Therefore, the finding of
intent to kill was "inherent" in the guilty verdict. See Williams, 242 So. 3d at 289
(holding that general verdict of first-degree murder did not constitute a jury finding of
intent that would support a sentence under section 775.082(1)(b)(1) but recognizing that
"a finding of intent to kill would have been inherent in a guilty verdict as to first-degree
premeditated murder"); see also Robinson v. State,
256 So. 3d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2018) (rejecting similar challenge to defendant's sentence because he was
charged only with first-degree premeditated murder and "so the jury's guilty verdict
contain[ed] an inherent unambiguous finding of intent to kill"). The jury was instructed
on a principal theory, and the jury found Bailey guilty of first-degree premeditated
murder. See Williams, 242 So. 3d at 289 (recognizing that the finding of intent would be
inherent in verdict of first-degree premeditated murder "whether [the defendant] actually
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killed [the victim] or was a principal"); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.5(a) ("If the
defendant helped another person or persons [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime, the
defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he] [she] had done all the things the
other person or persons did . . . ."). Thus, the necessary intent to kill was found by a
jury, and Bailey's sentence does not run afoul of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99,
108 (2013), which requires that "[f]acts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence .
. . be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." Because the 2014
version of section 775.082(1)(b)(1) applies retroactively to Bailey and the ground for
enhancement was charged in the indictment and found by the jury, we reject Bailey's
first challenge to his sentence.
In his second point on appeal, Bailey argues that the forty-year minimum
sentence in section 775.082(1)(b)(1) is unconstitutional for the same reasons set forth in
Miller. He claims that the statute takes away the discretion of the trial court and
requires the trial court to impose a certain sentence, despite the Supreme Court's
directive that juveniles are entitled to individualized sentencing hearings.
In Miller, the Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."
567 U.S. at 479. "[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before the imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles."
Id. at
489. The Court relied on precedent that had "establish[ed] that children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing."
Id. at 471. The Court
held that a trial court may sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life in prison without
the possibility of parole but only after it "take[s] into account how children are different[]
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and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing [him or her] to a
lifetime in prison."
Id. at 480.
The Miller decision focused on juveniles receiving mandatory sentences of
life without parole, which the Court repeatedly referred to as the "harshest" or "most
severe" of sentences, akin to the death penalty. Miller,
567 U.S. at 472, 474, 477, 479,
489; see St. Val v. State,
174 So. 3d 447, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ("Although Miller
looked disapprovingly at mandatory sentencing schemes, it limited its disapproval to
those schemes that resulted in sentences of life without parole."). When imposed on a
juvenile, the minimum sentence of forty years required by section 775.082(1)(b)(1) is
not comparable to mandatory life in prison or the death penalty. And Bailey will be in
his early forties when he receives review of his sentence after twenty-five years, and an
opportunity for early release, under sections 775.082(1)(b)(1) and 921.1402(2).3 The
3InMontgomery v. State, 230 So. 3d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), the
court discussed the interplay between the minimum term in section 775.082(1)(b)(1)
and the mandatory judicial review of a juvenile's sentence after twenty-five years:
[T]he juvenile sentencing statutes contemplate the
modification of any sentence after the mandated judicial
review. For example, under section 775.082(1)(b)1., a
sentencing court is required to impose a minimum sentence
of forty years to life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year
judicial review (as long as the juvenile was not previously
convicted of a separate criminal offense) when sentencing a
juvenile convicted of a capital offense with an actual intent to
kill. The forty-year minimum sentence notwithstanding, if the
court determines at a sentence review hearing twenty-five
years later that the juvenile offender has been rehabilitated
and is reasonably believed to be fit to reenter society, the
court is authorized to modify the sentence by releasing the
juvenile based on maturity and rehabilitation but must
impose a term of probation of at least five years. §
921.1402(7), Fla. Stat. (2014). This is still true even though
section 944.275(4)(f), Florida Statutes (2014), which
mandates prisoners to serve at least eighty-five percent of
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Miller holding does not extend to Bailey's sentence imposed pursuant to section
775.082(1)(b)(1), where he received the individualized sentencing hearing required by
Miller (codified in section 921.1401(1)) and where he will receive a review of his
sentence after twenty-five years. See Martinez v. State,
256 So. 3d 897, 900 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2018) (rejecting claim that twenty-five-year minimum mandatory term under the
10-20-Life statute is unconstitutional; "a sentence with a non-life minimum mandatory
imposed against a juvenile offender facing a potential life sentence does not violate . . .
Miller so long as the juvenile was afforded an individualized sentencing hearing
pursuant to section 921.1401 and is later afforded periodic judicial review of his or her
sentence as provided in section 921.1402"); Montgomery v. State,
230 So. 3d 1256,
1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (holding that "the mandatory twenty-five-year minimum
sentence [imposed pursuant to 10-20-Life statute] does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment when applied to a juvenile offender as long as he or she gets the mandated
judicial review" required under section 921.1402); St. Val, 174 So. 3d at 450 (holding
that "[u]nlike life without parole and death sentences, appellant's twenty-five-year
mandatory minimum sentence is not permanent and affords definite release" and is thus
constitutional).
Last, Bailey argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing
because the record does not reflect that the trial court considered the statutory factors
set forth for individualized sentencing of a juvenile under section 921.1401(2)(a) through
the sentence imposed, would require the juvenile offender to
serve a minimum of thirty-four years. Nonetheless, the
juvenile offender would be entitled to a judicial review and
possible release in twenty-five years.
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(j). He contends that the statute and Miller make clear that the trial court is required to
consider the factors as they relate to Bailey's circumstances.
Section 775.082(1)(b)(3) provides that "[t]he court shall make a written
finding as to whether a person is eligible for a sentence review hearing under s.
921.1402(2)(a) or (c). Such a finding shall be based upon whether the person actually
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim." See Cutts v. State,
225 So. 3d
244, 245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that trial court erred in failing to make written
findings that are required by section 775.082(1)(b)(3)). Section 921.1401(2), on the
other hand, states that the trial court shall consider factors (a) through (j) in determining
whether a life sentence is appropriate, but it does not require the trial court to make
specific findings regarding those factors. Cf. Cutts, 225 So. 3d at 245; Barber v. State,
207 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding that findings are required where
statute expressly provides that court shall make written findings if it determines that a
felony offender of special concern has committed a violation of probation); Knott v.
State,
190 So. 3d 222, 222 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that findings are required
where statute, section 775.082(10), requires court to make written findings that a
nonstate prison sanction would present a danger to the public).
And Miller itself does not mandate a sentencing scheme that requires a
trial court to make certain findings. Rather, Miller prohibits a "sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders," and it
requires a sentencing scheme "to take into account how children are different."
567
U.S. at 479-80. The legislature cured the Miller problem by adopting a sentencing
scheme that no longer mandates life in prison for juveniles.
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Further, it is clear from the trial court's statements that the trial court
considered the factors:
Florida statute 921.1401 provides a nonexhaustive list of
factors for the sentencing court to take into consideration in
determining whether a life sentence is appropriate. And the
Court has consulted the statute and each of those factors
and listened carefully to counsel and the witnesses as they
addressed those today.
....
I'm mindful of these factors.
The trial court specifically referenced two factors, the nature and circumstances of the
offense, see § 921.1401(2)(a), and the defendant's prior criminal history, see §
921.1401(2)(h), before stating that "life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence
based upon consideration of those factors." The trial court complied with the mandates
of section 921.1401 and Miller.
For these reasons, we affirm Bailey's amended sentence.
Affirmed.
BADALAMENTI and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
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