D.H. v. DCF ( 2017 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    D.H., MOTHER OF S.R., A CHILD,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                    Case No. 5D16-3435
    DEPARTMENT OF
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
    Appellee.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed February 23, 2017
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Citrus County,
    Mary Hatcher, Judge.
    Elliott Ambrose, Brooksville, for Appellant.
    Deborah A. Schroth, of Children's
    Legal Services, Department      of
    Children & Families, Jacksonville,
    for Appellee.
    Laura J. Lee, for Guardian ad
    Litem Program, Sanford.
    PER CURIAM.
    The mother, D.H., appeals the final judgment terminating her parental rights as to
    her two-year old daughter, S.R. Concluding that the trial court erred in finding that the
    Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) proved by clear and convincing evidence
    that D.H.’s parental rights should be terminated under section 39.806(1)(b), Florida
    Statutes (2016), for abandoning the minor child, we strike that provision from the final
    judgment. See L.K. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 
    62 So. 3d 1241
    , 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    (“‘To reverse a trial court’s determination that’ a child was abandoned, the appellate court
    must find that the determination was not ‘supported by clear and convincing evidence.’”
    (quoting In re E.D., 
    884 So. 2d 291
    , 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))).
    We nevertheless affirm the final judgment because the trial court’s termination of
    D.H.’s parental rights on the other statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806 as
    described in the judgment is supported by the evidence presented at trial. See M.D. v.
    State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 
    187 So. 3d 1275
    , 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“[S]o long as
    the trial court’s ruling on one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 39.806, Florida
    Statutes, is supported by the evidence, the court’s decision [to terminate parental rights]
    is affirmable.” (first alteration in original) (quoting J.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 
    126 So. 3d 424
    , 427–28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013))). Lastly, the trial court correctly concluded that DCF
    presented clear and convincing evidence at trial that the termination of parental rights
    was in the manifest best interests of the minor child and that it is the least restrictive
    means of protecting the child from serious harm. See R.A. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 
    30 So. 3d 722
    , 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that an order terminating parental rights
    must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that there is a ground for termination
    under section 39.806, the termination is in the manifest best interest of the child pursuant
    to section 39.810, and the termination of the parental rights is the least restrictive means
    of protecting the child from serious harm).
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    Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment terminating D.H.’s parental rights to S.R.,
    but we remand with directions for the entry of an amended final judgment striking any
    language from the judgment regarding section 39.806(1)(b) being one of the grounds for
    the termination of the parental rights.
    AFFIRMED; REMANDED with directions.
    COHEN, C.J., BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
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