DESMOND BAKER v. STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2019 )


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  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    DESMOND BAKER, DOC #R17904,                 )
    )
    Appellant,                    )
    )
    v.                                          )     Case No. 2D17-2160
    )
    STATE OF FLORIDA,                           )
    )
    Appellee.                     )
    )
    Opinion filed July 10, 2019.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for
    Pinellas County; William H. Burgess, III,
    Judge.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
    and Carol J. Y. Wilson, Assistant Public
    Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Jeffrey H. Siegal,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
    Appellee.
    ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
    Desmond Baker challenges his sentence of fifty years' imprisonment
    without review after twenty-five years, which the trial court imposed for his 1999 first-
    degree murder conviction upon resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    (2012) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for offenders who
    were younger than eighteen years old at the time of their offense violates the Eighth
    Amendment). We agree with the State that Baker is not entitled to review because
    previous to his original sentencing on the first-degree murder count, he had been
    convicted of armed robbery and armed burglary arising out of criminal episodes
    separate from the one involving the murder. See § 921.1402(2)(a)(4), (5), Florida
    Statutes (2017) ("A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b)1. is entitled to a
    review of his or her sentence after 25 years [unless] he or she has previously been
    convicted of [certain enumerated offenses that were] part of a separate criminal
    transaction or episode . . . ."); cf. Wasko v. State, 
    505 So. 2d 1314
    , 1317-18 (Fla. 1987)
    (explaining that convictions obtained contemporaneously with a conviction for a capital
    offense "can qualify as previous convictions of violent felony and may be used as
    aggravating factors" at sentencing for the capital offense when those convictions
    "involved multiple victims in a single incident or separate incidents combined in a single
    trial" (and cases cited therein)). We reject Baker's other arguments without discussion.
    Affirmed.
    BLACK and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2160

Filed Date: 7/10/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/10/2019