Clark and Glenz v. Bluewater Key Rv Ownership Park Property Owners Assoc., Inc. ( 2017 )

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 10, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D16-1645
Lower Tribunal No. 14-827-K
________________
Rita Clark, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Bluewater Key RV Ownership Park Property Owners Association,
Inc.,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Monroe
County, Mark H. Jones, Judge.
Easley Appellate Practice PLLC, and Dorothy F. Easley; The Smith Law
Firm, Brett Tyler Smith and Wayne LaRue Smith, for appellants.
Lee Robert Rohe, for appellee.
Before LAGOA, SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
SALTER, J.
Rita Clark, Roland Clark, and David Glenz, defendants below, appeal a
Final Judgment Granting Declaratory and Injunctive Relief entered against them
by the Circuit Court for Monroe County in June 2016. The defendants own and
control various lots within the Blue Water Key RV Ownership Park, in
Saddlebunch Key. They operate a transient rental business for lots within the Park
(referred to as the “Clark Rental Program”). The plaintiff below, appellee here, is
Bluewater Key RV Ownership Park Property Owners Association, Inc.
(“Association”), which has its own transient rental business (the “Association
Rental Program”).
Earlier litigation, and much of the history of the Park, the Association, and
the competing transient rental programs, are detailed in Clark v. Bluewater Key
RV Ownership Park, 197 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Clark I”). Two years
after Clark I, the Association and the appellants (as lot owners and operators of
Bluewater Rentals), were back in the trial court on competing claims regarding the
1989 recorded Declaration of Restrictions and Protective Covenants (the
“Declaration”) applicable to the Association and to all 81 lots and the common
areas within the Park.
I. The Amended Complaint and the Counterclaims
The Association filed its amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief in October 2014 against the Clarks and Glenz, alleging that the Clark Rental
2
Program violated the Declaration and Park Rules (enacted by the Association
under Article VII, Section 14 of the Declaration). The Clark Rental Program
managed some 21 rental lots for absentee owners, renting those lots to recreational
vehicle owners visiting the Keys. The alleged violations included (1) the
employment of workers who reside in the Park while engaged in prohibited
“commercial activity” on those lots, (2) violations of Monroe County Code section
130-92(a)(1) prohibiting tenancies in excess of six months in a land use district
classified as an RV Park, and (3) creating an annoyance or nuisance to other lot
owners by using lots as staging areas, for stockpiling materials and supplies, and
for storing equipment and tools utilized in the operation of the Clark Rental
Program. The annoyance and nuisance allegations were based on complaints by
lot owners regarding the noise of vehicles and transport of materials supporting the
Clark Rental Program’s maintenance, repair, and rental activities.
Rita Clark and Glenz each filed counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Association. The counterclaims alleged that the Association
selectively enforced the Declaration and Park Rules in order to drive the Clark
Rental Program out of business, even though the Clark Rental Program office for
reservations and rental activities was operated near, but outside, the Park lots and
common areas.
3
Rita Clark and Glenz also alleged that the Association adopted rules to
impose burdensome conditions on them (but not on the Association Rental
Program) for employee background checks, and for bonding and insurance
requirements. The counterclaims further asserted that the Association’s Board had
been reduced from seven to three directors in contravention of the Association’s
articles, such that the lawsuits initiated by the Association and other purported
corporate actions were ultra vires and void. Finally, the counterclaims alleged that
the Association violates its own rules, including the prohibition against
“commercial activity,” in the operation of the Association Rental Program and in
providing housing to employees within the Park. The declaratory and injunctive
relief sought in Glenz’s counterclaim includes attorney’s fees, but not money
damages. Clark’s counterclaim includes additional counts for tortious interference
with advantageous business relationships and for unfair trade practices under
Chapter 501, Florida Statutes (2014), the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (FDUTPA).
II. Trial and Final Judgment on the Association Claims
The trial court tried the Association’s non-jury claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief in March 2016. Documentary evidence and testimony established
that the Clark Rental Program relied on “work campers” who received the free use
of a lot in return for managing repairs, lot cleanup, and acting as an in-Park contact
4
for problems encountered by renters in the Clark Rental Program. The court found
that this constituted “commercial activity” on lots within the Park in violation of
the Declaration and Rules, and that the activity of the Clark Rental Program
employees was also a nuisance in violation of Article VII, Section 5A of the
Declaration.
After considering the affirmative defenses of the Clarks and Glenz in light
of the evidence presented, the court found no basis for unclean hands, estoppel
(including an estoppel alleged based on “selective enforcement in an arbitrary and
capricious manner”), waiver, and laches. The court entered judgment in favor of
the Association and against the defendants on the actions to enjoin a nuisance and
commercial activity. The permanent injunction prohibited the defendants and
those working for and through them (agents, servants, employees, etc.) from
engaging in specified conduct:
a. Using any RV lot within Bluewater Park for housing employees,
work campers, or anyone whose purpose is to serve in furthering
Defendants’ lot rental business.
b. Using any lot as a satellite office or main office to greet guests,
make reservations, accept payment for lot rentals and golf cart rentals,
transact business or to store lot maintenance tools, materials, golf
carts, or other vehicles regardless of whether the lot is being used as a
residence or sleeping quarters.
c. Using any lot to repair or maintain equipment, appliances,
furnishings, or other personal property in furtherance of Defendants’
lot rental business.
5
d. Violating Article VII, Section 2(h) of the Declaration of
Restrictions and Protective Covenants.
e. Violating Article VII, Section 5 of the Declaration of Restrictions
and Protective Covenants.
f. Placing signs or other forms of advertising for Defendants’ rental
business on Resort lots.
g. Storing or parking “work carts,” trailers, or other vehicles overnight
on any lot in furtherance of Defendants’ lot rental business.
The Final Judgment stated clearly that the defendants “are not enjoined from
renting their own lots” themselves or through any other property management
business, so long as those activities do not violate the Declaration. The court also
recognized that the process of renting the lots through any transient rental program
“involves certain tasks such as, greeting and orienting renters, parking and hooking
up RV’s, doing maintenance and yardwork, and performing other related tasks.
These tasks do not constitute commercial activity as long as done within the
parameters of the Covenants and Rules.” Recognizing that the injunction could
not delineate every scenario that might arise, the court urged lot owners,
Association members and officers, and the defendants to “employ common sense,
reason, and courtesy when engaging in the rental process and when applying and
enforcing the Covenants and Rules.”
III. Analysis
6
The defendants appeal the entry of the injunction on four grounds: (1) that
the trial court erred by conducting a bench trial on the Association’s complaint
“before the jury trial” on the counterclaims; (2) the court erred in its application of
the Declaration liberally in favor of the Association and against the lot owners’
“free and unrestricted use of the lots;” (3) the injunction for “mere annoyances” is
error; and (4) as the complained-of activity has been ended and there is no real
likelihood of recurrence, the permanent injunction is improper or overbroad, and a
“work camper” is not a “nuisance” includible in the injunction. We address these
in turn.
(1) Bench Trial Before Jury Trial
As a threshold matter, our review of the record and the docket below does
not reveal a demand for trial by jury by Rita Clark or Glenz in their counterclaims
or other pleadings in conformance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.430.
During a hearing on September 8, 2015, on the Association’s motion for separate
trials, defense counsel stated that a jury trial had been demanded, but we have not
been able to locate such a demand in any pleading or docket entry.1
1 Because this case comes to us as an appeal from a non-final order under Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B) relating to injunctions, the parties have
filed appendices rather than a complete appellate record. A review of the Monroe
Circuit Court docket for the case, however, does not disclose a demand for jury
trial filed separately from the amended complaint, counterclaims, answers, and
affirmative defenses in the appendices.
7
If a timely, written demand is shown to have been made, the issues can be
tried separately unless the factual issues are so interrelated that the severance of the
equitable and legal claims risks inconsistent outcomes. Kavouras v. Mario City
Restaurant Corp., 88 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). But otherwise, the
decision to sever claims and conduct separate trials pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.270(b) is within the trial court’s discretion. Bethany Evangelical
Covenant Church of Miami, Florida, Inc. v. Calandra, 994 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2008).
A review of the claims and counterclaims in the present case discloses
distinct, rather than intertwined, claims and issues. The Association’s claims for
injunctive relief are pursued on behalf of all lot owners (as to the alleged
“commercial activity” violations of the Declaration) and certain individual
complainants occupying lots who are annoyed by noise and other disruption
arising to the level of an alleged nuisance. These are classic equitable claims for
the violation of restrictive covenants within a neighborhood.
The counterclaims of Glenz and Rita Clark are significantly different. Glenz
seeks only declaratory relief, not money damages for tortious interference and
FDUTPA violations. Some of the declarations sought by Glenz involve the
lawsuits brought by the Association against Monroe County and another regarding
8
rights to a trademark. These are not factual or legal issues intertwined with the
restrictive covenant and nuisance claims.
Glenz’s other claims for declaratory relief involve the Association’s
compliance with its own bylaws and articles in initiating the lawsuit against the
Clarks and Glenz. A review of those claims does not reveal any issues of fact
triable to a jury, however, as those issues are governed by the written documents
and Chapter 617, Florida Statutes (2014), governing corporations not for profit.
Each such claim was also raised as an equitable defense to the Association’s
amended complaint, and (to the extent presented to the trial court) was considered.
Turning to the counterclaims of Rita Clark, Count I is essentially identical to
Glenz’s counterclaim for declaratory relief, does not present factual issues as
opposed to legal issues, and was considered by the trial court to the extent
presented as an affirmative defense to the entry of the injunction. Count II,
tortious interference with advantageous business relationships, and Count III, for
alleged violations of FDUTPA, are counterclaims which seek to establish torts,
unfair business practices, and statutory violations by the Association over a longer
period (“over the course of the past fifteen years”) and regarding the Association’s
separate rental program—not the Association’s enforcement of the restrictive
covenants in the Declaration. The alleged actions by individuals in control of the
Association, “motivated by malice and animosity” to “destroy Defendant Rita
9
Clark’s Clark Rental Program” are a far more complex set of claims involving
different elements of proof (including money damages) rather than compliance or
non-compliance with restrictive covenants.
Expressed another way, the Association’s motivation in the enforcement of a
clear legal right under the Declaration is irrelevant to the other disputes raised in
the counterclaims. If Rita Clark is concerned that the Association is engaging in
commercial activity on other lots or common areas in connection with the
Association’s management of its rental program, and if she alleges that those
activities violate the Declaration, there is no apparent impediment to her
commencement of a suit for an injunction to prohibit such activities. Her
counterclaims and prayers for relief, however, include no such claim for injunctive
relief.
For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion or legal error in the trial
court’s decision to conduct a separate bench trial on the Association’s claims for
injunctive relief before addressing the tortious interference and FDUTPA claims.
And for the sake of emphasis, we remind the parties that those “Phase II” claims
may or may not be triable to a jury, dependent on the trial court’s subsequent
review of the complete docket.
(2) Construction of the Terms in the Declaration
10
Our consideration of this argument by the defendants/appellants is subject to
de novo review. Gem Estates Mobile Home Vill. Ass’n v. Bluhm, 885 So. 2d 435,
437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Klak v. Eagles’ Reserve Homeowners’ Ass’n, 862
So. 2d 947, 954 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). When interpreting restrictive covenants, the
courts “should give effect to the commonly understood meaning of the words of
the pertinent provisions.” Gem Estates, 885 So. 2d at 437. Such covenants are to
be strictly construed in favor of the free use of real property, and substantial
ambiguities must be construed against the party claiming the right to enforce the
covenant. Washington Apartment Hotel Co. v. Schneider, 75 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla.
1954) (citing Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879, 885, 106 So. 901, 904 (Fla. 1925)).
However, these provisions should not be construed in a manner which defeats the
intent and obvious purpose of the restriction. McMillan v. Oaks of Spring Hill
Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 754 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed., defines commercial activity as an
“activity, such as operating a business, conducted to make a profit.” The
restrictive covenant at issue prohibits commercial activity “including the use of
any lot for a home occupation or profession.” Although the Declaration and
restrictive covenants are silent as to whether the lots may be rented to “work
campers,” the intent of the restrictive covenant is expressed in Article VII, section
2, of the Declaration: “to maintain the RV Park as an exclusive luxury resort to be
11
used soley [sic] for recreational vehicles . . . It is the intent hereof to prohibit mobil
[sic] homes and/or permanent or semi permanent structures. . . .”
Clark’s and Mr. Glenz’s rental of their lots to work campers violates the
restrictive covenant because that is not a recreational use, but is instead to further
the for-profit Clark’s Rental Program business. While certain tasks such as helping
clients arrive at their rented lot need to occur in the Park,2 other tasks—such as
conducting extensive repairs and allowing workers to live on and work from the
lot—go beyond the provisions within the Declaration and restrictive covenants.
Further, the record shows that work campers (Pete Hermansen, for example)
repaired business equipment and stored tools and equipment (such as a power
washer, ladder, and golf carts) on the lots. These activities assist Clark’s business
and her ability to profit from the rental program; therefore, they constitute the
commercial activity that the restrictive covenants clearly prohibit. Moss v.
Inverness Highlands South and West Civic Ass’n, Inc., 521 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1988), relied upon by the Clarks and Glenz, is distinguishable (the fact that a
homeowner received rental income and made a profit from sharing her home with
elderly people did not violate the covenant’s restriction that property can only be
used for residential purposes).
2 As noted, the trial court recognized that these types of tasks “do not constitute
commercial activity as long as done within the parameters of the Covenants and
Rules.”
12
Moreover, there is no ambiguity in the restrictive covenant. The covenant’s
intent is clear that Clark (and other lot owners) may not rent lots to individuals
who conduct business on the lots within the Resort. James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d
1074, 1076–77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), cited by the Clarks and Glenz, is
distinguishable on this point (the restrictive covenant in that case prohibited raising
horses on the lot, but the exclusion regarding “domestic pets” was ambiguous as
the defendants owned two ponies, and horses can be considered domestic pets).
Thus, the trial court correctly found that Clark’s activities violate the restrictive
covenant.
The argument that the Association’s conduct is inconsistent with its own
application and enforcement of the Declaration is also unavailing, as already noted.
If the Association’s transient rental program relies on work campers on lots within
the Park, lot owners within the Association are entitled to invoke the provisions of
the Declaration and to seek injunctive relief (though we express no opinion
regarding the merits of such a future claim or the particular facts that might relate
to it). The trial court’s findings and legal conclusions regarding the affirmative
defenses raised by the Clarks and Glenz (waiver, estoppel, and unclean hands)
were detailed and were supported by the evidence at trial, the provisions of the
Declaration, and well-settled law.
(3) “Mere Annoyances” versus “Actionable Nuisance”
13
Article VII, section 5A, of the Declaration prohibits “anything” constituting
an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood or any other lot owner. Under the
case law applicable to claims for injunctive relief to abate a nuisance, the trial
court applied an objective standard comparable to the objective standard applicable
to a claim of negligence. Bechold v. Mariner Props., Inc., 576 So. 2d 921, 923
(Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. 1956).
However, “[m]ere disturbance and annoyance as such do not in themselves
necessarily give rise to an invasion of a legal right.” A. & P. Food Stores, Inc. v.
Kornstein, 121 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). Plainly, the application of
these standards presents an evidentiary issue, and the trial court’s findings on the
issue were supported by substantial competent evidence.
(4) Future Activity—Is the Permanent Injunction Overbroad?
The Clarks and Glenz assert that the complained-of activities were abruptly
ended, and that there is no real likelihood the conduct will occur in the future.
They maintain that the scope of the permanent injunction is improperly broad. We
disagree. The trial court’s ten-page final judgment was carefully tailored.
In paragraph 4 of the final judgment, the trial court found that the defendants
and other lot owners were not enjoined from renting their own lots themselves,
through the Clark Rental Program, or through some other property management
business, so long as they do not violate specific provisions of the Declaration. In
14
paragraph 5, the trial court listed activities which both the Association Rental
Program and the Clark Rental Program could conduct without constituting
“commercial activity,” if done within the parameters of the Declaration.
IV. Conclusion
To the extent that the trial judge’s decision to grant a permanent injunction
rests on questions of fact, the standard of review is an abuse of discretion.
Carricarte v. Carricarte, 961 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); see also Gulf
Bay Land Invs., Inc. v. Trecker, 955 So. 2d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). A
trial court may grant injunctive relief to redress violations of a restrictive covenant
affecting real property without proof of irreparable harm. Autozone Stores, Inc. v.
Ne. Plaza Venture, LLC, 934 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Evidence
showing the violation is sufficient for a trial court to grant an injunction. Id. at
674.
In the present case, and for all these reasons, we affirm the Final Judgment
Granting Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
15