National Council on Compensation Insurance, Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, and David Altmaier, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation v. James F. Fee Jr., Individually , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 6518 ( 2017 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
COMPENSATION FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
INSURANCE, FLORIDA DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
OFFICE OF INSURANCE
REGULATION, and DAVID CASE NO. 1D16-5408 & 1D16-5416
ALTMAIER, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE
FLORIDA OFFICE OF
INSURANCE REGULATION,
Appellants,
v.
JAMES F. FEE, JR.,
INDIVIDUALLY,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed May 9, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Karen A. Gievers, Judge.
Thomas J. Maida, James A. McKee, Benjamin J. Grossman, and Nicholas R.
Paquette of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellant National Council on
Compensation Insurance, Inc.; Shaw P. Stiller, Chief Assistant General Counsel, and
C. Timothy Gray and Lacy End-Of-Horn, Assistant General Counsels, for
Appellants Florida Office of Insurance Regulation and David Altmaier.
John K. Shubin, Salvatore H. Fasulo, Lauren G. Brunswick, and Mark E. Grafton of
Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
Andrea Flynn Mogensen of Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A., Sarasota,
for Amicus Curiae The Florida Press Association, The First Amendment
Foundation, and The Associated Press, Inc.
Richard A. Sicking of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral Gables, for Amicus
Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc.
ROWE, J.
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and the Office of
Insurance Regulation (OIR) appeal the trial court’s order invalidating OIR’s
approval of a 14.5% increase in workers’ compensation insurance rates. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the order in its entirety.
I. Facts
OIR regulates all insurance activities in Florida, including all activities
relating to workers’ compensation insurance. Insurance companies writing workers’
compensation insurance policies in Florida must seek approval from OIR when
setting or changing insurance rates by filing a rate proposal. OIR reviews filings
seeking a rate change to determine if the proposed rate is “excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory . . . in accordance with generally accepted and reasonable
actuarial techniques.” § 627.062(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). In determining whether
the rate proposal should be approved, OIR may examine the statistical data
supporting the proposed rate, and it may hold a public hearing. §§ 627.091(2), .101,
2
Fla. Stat. (2015). OIR takes official action on rate filings through its agency head,
the Commissioner of Insurance Regulation, currently David Altmaier. See §§
20.121(3)(a)1., (4), Fla. Stat. (2015).
Insurers have the option of directly filing rate change proposals with OIR or
joining a licensed rating organization that will file the proposals on their behalf.
§ 627.091(4), Fla. Stat. (2015). A rating organization is defined as “every person,
other than an authorized insurer, whether located within or outside this state, who
has as his or her object or purpose the making of rates, rating plans, or rating
systems.” § 627.041(3), Fla. Stat. (2015). NCCI is a licensed rating organization
operating in more than forty states. And it represents and files rate proposals on
behalf of most of the workers’ compensation insurers in Florida. 1 Before 1991, the
responsibility for establishing rates fell to NCCI’s Classification and Ratings
Committee. NCCI had such a committee in each state in which it operated, including
Florida. These rate-determination committees were composed of representatives of
competing workers’ compensation insurers who would meet periodically to fix the
rates to be submitted for approval to insurance regulators. The committees were
disbanded in 1991. Since then, no specific committee at NCCI has been assigned
1
Pursuant to a separate contract with OIR, NCCI also serves as the statistical agent
for Florida. In this role, NCCI compiles data regarding the loss, expense, and claims
experience of workers’ compensation insurance carriers. See § 627.331(3), Fla. Stat.
(2015).
3
responsibility for overseeing, reviewing, or preparing rate filings. In Florida, the
responsibility for rate determinations falls to a single employee of NCCI, one of its
actuaries – Jay Rosen.
Before filing a rate proposal with OIR, Rosen analyzes certain data to
determine whether there is a need for a change in insurance rates. After he decides
that a rate change is needed, a Technical Peer Review meeting is convened where
other NCCI actuaries challenge Rosen’s conclusions in order to assist him in
defending his recommended rate proposal. The next step in the process is a Phase
II meeting where Rosen provides an overview to other actuaries and members of
NCCI’s regulatory division explaining how he arrived at his rate proposal. After
these meetings, Rosen prepares the documents that are filed with OIR.
II. Procedural History
NCCI announced in a May 2016 press release that, as a consequence of the
supreme court’s decision in Castellanos v. Next Door Company, 192 So. 3d 431
(Fla. 2016), which declared unconstitutional the statutory cap on claimants’
attorneys’ fees in workers’ compensation cases, a significant increase in workers’
compensation insurance rates would be necessary. Following this announcement,
James F. Fee, Jr., an attorney and the sole owner of a law firm that purchases
workers’ compensation insurance in Florida, requested from NCCI “all pertinent
information relating to all NCCI rate and rule filings affecting Florida Workers’
4
Compensation premiums that were in effect for the calendar years 2006 through
2016.” Fee made this request shortly before NCCI submitted a proposal to OIR for
a 17.1% increase in the overall statewide workers’ compensation insurance rate; he
made a second records request after the proposal was submitted. NCCI responded
by providing Fee with the records it submitted to OIR with its rate filing.
Before OIR could act on NCCI’s rate filing, the supreme court
decided Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016), holding that
the 104-week statutory limit on temporary total disability benefits was
unconstitutional, and reinstating a 206-week limitation on these benefits. NCCI
responded to the Westphal decision by amending its filing to propose a rate increase
of 19.6% to go into effect on October 1, 2016. After NCCI amended its filing, OIR
provided notice that it would conduct a public hearing on the proposed rate increase.
Fee then made another request to NCCI, seeking any information related to the
amended rate filing and any additional information related to his prior requests. Two
weeks later, NCCI provided Fee with documents it submitted to OIR associated with
its 2016 amended rate filing. Days later, OIR published on the internet all of NCCI’s
rate filings from 2006 through 2016.
Fee then filed suit against NCCI, OIR, and Commissioner Altmaier and
sought to enjoin the public hearing on NCCI’s amended rate filing. Fee alleged that
(1) NCCI violated the Sunshine Law, section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2015), by
5
failing to provide notice of or a meaningful opportunity to participate in committee
meetings where its rate proposals were discussed; (2) the amended rate filing was
void ab initio due to violations of the Sunshine Law; (3) NCCI violated section
627.291(1), Florida Statutes, by denying Fee access to records regarding the rate
proposal; and (4) NCCI violated the Public Records Act by failing to respond to
Fee’s records requests.
Despite the pending complaint, the public hearing proceeded as scheduled on
August 16, 2016. At the four-hour hearing, every person who filled out a speaker
card spoke, including an actuary Fee hired to present testimony in opposition to the
proposed rate increase. OIR also allowed for additional commentary by holding
open the time for written public comments for an extra seven days. But after
reviewing NCCI’s rate proposal and considering public comments on the proposal,
OIR rejected the proposed 19.6% increase as unjustified. OIR determined that only
a 14.5% rate increase was appropriate. NCCI then submitted a revised rate proposal
requesting a 14.5% rate increase. On October 5, 2016, Commissioner Altmaier
issued a final order approving the revised rate proposal.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Fee’s complaint after the
Commissioner approved the final order, but before the rate went into effect. After
hearing testimony and receiving documentary evidence, the court determined that
the order approving the rate increase was void because NCCI and OIR violated the
6
Sunshine Law under three separate statutory provisions: section 627.091(6), Florida
Statutes; section 286.011, Florida Statutes; and section 627.093, Florida Statutes.
The trial court also concluded that NCCI violated sections 627.291(1) and 119.07,
Florida Statutes, when it denied Fee access to its records. NCCI and OIR appeal.
III. Analysis
We review the trial court’s factual findings to determine whether they are
supported by competent, substantial evidence. McDougall v. Culver, 3 So. 3d 391,
392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). But we review the trial court’s interpretation of the law de
novo. Liner v. Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 900 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 2008) (“We
review the statutory interpretation conducted by the trial court to reach this ultimate
ruling de novo, while we defer to those factual findings of the trial court that are
supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record.”).
A. Alleged Sunshine Law Violations
The trial court found that NCCI and OIR violated Florida’s Sunshine Law in
three respects. First, the trial court determined that NCCI violated section
627.091(6), Florida Statutes, by conducting meetings of the statutory rate-
determination committee outside the sunshine. Second, the trial court found that
OIR delegated its authority over rate filings to NCCI, subjecting NCCI’s rate
proposal activities to the sunshine requirements of section 286.011, Florida Statutes.
7
And third, the trial court concluded that section 627.093, Florida Statutes, requires
NCCI to conduct its activities in the sunshine.
i. Section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes
Florida’s Sunshine Law finds its origins in section 286.011, Florida Statutes
(2015), which provides:
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or
authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in
the Constitution, including meetings with or attended by any person
elected to such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office,
at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings
open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action
shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.
The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all such
meetings.
The Sunshine Law was made part of the Florida Constitution in 1992, in article I,
section 24, which requires “[a]ll meetings of any collegial public body” to be open
and noticed to the public. By its express terms, the Sunshine Law applies exclusively
to governmental bodies and not to private entities. See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 16-01
(2016).
Despite this limitation, the Florida Legislature extended the scope of the law
to include licensed insurance rating organizations, such as NCCI, under certain
specified circumstances:
Whenever the committee of a recognized rating organization with
responsibility for workers’ compensation and employer’s liability
insurance rates in this state meets to discuss the necessity for, or a
8
request for, Florida rate increases or decreases, the determination
of Florida rates, the rates to be requested, and any other matters
pertaining specifically and directly to such Florida rates, such
meetings shall be held in this state and shall be subject to s. 286.011.
The committee of such a rating organization shall provide at least 3
weeks’ prior notice of such meetings to the office and shall provide at
least 14 days’ prior notice of such meetings to the public by publication
in the Florida Administrative Register.
§ 627.091(6), Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). This unique extension of the
Sunshine Law applies only when the rate-determination committee of a rating
organization meets to determine workers’ compensation insurance rates. NCCI
argues, and it is undisputed, that no committee at NCCI has been charged with the
responsibility for determining worker’s compensation insurance rates in over
twenty-five years. 2
Although NCCI does not entrust a specific committee with responsibility for
determining workers’ compensation insurance rates in Florida, Fee contends, and
the trial court found, that the following configurations of NCCI’s and OIR’s
employees met and acted in place of the rate-determination committee contemplated
under the statute and that meetings of those groups were subject to the sunshine:
2
The trial court concluded that NCCI’s disbanding of its Classification and Rate
Committee in 1991 and its delegation of the responsibility for rate proposals to one
person was an attempt to evade the sunshine. But the application of the Sunshine
Law does not depend on a party’s “intentions, sincerity of purpose or noble
motives.” IDS Props., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 357 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1973). Further, it is unclear on this record how the trial court reached the
conclusion that NCCI restructured its rate-proposal process in over forty states to
avoid compliance with Florida’s Sunshine Law.
9
(1) Jay Rosen, in his individual capacity; (2) the Team Peer Review and Phase II
meeting participants; (3) Rosen and his staff; and (4) NCCI’s and OIR’s staff. We
conclude that none of these individuals or groups meets the definition of the rate-
determination committee under the statute, and thus, none of these meetings was
subject to the sunshine.
Fee asserts that Rosen, in his individual capacity, acted in place of the rate-
determination committee contemplated by section 627.091(6). This argument
ignores the plain language of the statute and the ordinary meaning of the terms within
it. See McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Fla.
2006) (explaining that statutory construction starts with an examination of the plain
language of the statute); State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680, 685 (Fla. 2004) (observing
that it is assumed that the legislature knows the ordinary meaning of words when it
enacts a statute). The statute applies only to meetings of a rating organization
committee where workers’ compensations insurance rates are discussed and
determined. A “committee” has been defined as a “subordinate group,” not a single
person. See Committee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Moreover, the use
of the term “meets” indicates that the statute is designed to apply to a group of
people, not a single individual. The multi-person concept of the term “committee”
further finds support in well-established precedent construing the Sunshine
Law. See Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d
10
755, 764 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Sunshine Law protections extend to formal and
informal meetings only when two or more members of the same board or
commission meet to deal with a matter on which action will be taken in the future);
Office of the Attorney General, Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual, at 18 (2016
ed.) (observing that the Sunshine Law does not “ordinarily apply to an individual
member of a public board or commission or to public officials who are not board or
commission members.” (emphasis added)). Thus, under the plain and ordinary
meaning of the terms “committee” and “meet,” Rosen, in his individual capacity,
does not act or “meet” as the statutory rate-determination committee contemplated
by section 627.091(6).
The trial court also concluded that NCCI’s Team Peer Review and Phase II
meetings, the meetings between Rosen and his own staff, and the meetings between
NCCI and OIR3 were the functional equivalent of the rate-determination committee
meetings described in section 627.091(6) and that the actions of these groups were
subject to the Sunshine Law. The trial court’s conclusions are incorrect. With regard
to NCCI’s internal meetings, the Sunshine Law does not apply because none of the
3
Fee did not allege that the meetings between NCCI and OIR were subject to the
sunshine under this provision, and the issue was not listed in the pre-hearing
stipulation; thus, the trial court erred by addressing this issue. See LPI/Key W.
Assocs., Ltd. v. Beachcomber Jewelers, Inc., 77 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
(“A pretrial stipulation limiting the issues to be tried is ‘binding upon the parties and
the trial court, and should be strictly enforced.’”) (quoting Broche v. Cohn, 987 So.
2d 124, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008))).
11
participants, other than Rosen, had any authority to determine the worker’s
compensation insurance rate to be proposed to OIR. See Sarasota Citizens, 48 So.
3d at 762 (holding that the dispositive question for whether the Sunshine Law applies
to a committee subordinate to or selected by a traditional governmental authority is
whether decision-making authority has been delegated to the committee); Cape
Publ’ns, Inc. v. City of Palm Bay, 473 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (holding that
a committee that was formed to supply a city manager with information so that he
could properly exercise his duty to select a new police chief was not subject to the
Sunshine Law because the committee had no decision-making authority). Instead,
these meetings were held solely for the purpose of gathering
information. See Molina v. City of Miami, 837 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
(“In short, the committee is nothing more than a meeting of staff members who serve
in a fact-finding, advisory capacity to the chief. The Government-in-the-Sunshine
Law is not applicable to meetings of staffers serving this function.”); Lyon v. Lake
Cty., 765 So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“When a committee has been
established for and conducts only information gathering and reporting, the activities
of that committee are not subject to section 286.011, Florida Statutes.”). And with
regard to the meetings between NCCI and OIR, those meetings occurred after NCCI
made a rate determination and filed its rate proposal with OIR. In no way could
those meetings be considered a meeting of a rate-determination committee of a rating
12
organization to determine the rates to be filed. Accordingly, neither NCCI’s internal
meetings nor the meetings between OIR and NCCI was subject to the sunshine
pursuant to section 627.091(6).
ii. Section 286.011, Florida Statutes
Fee also argued, and the trial court found, that NCCI violated the Sunshine
Law itself. Section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2015), requires “[a]ll meetings of any
board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority
of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision” to be held in the
sunshine. The Sunshine Law thus applies to governmental bodies and does not apply
to private organizations that were not created by a public entity. See Op. Att’y Gen.
Fla. 07-27 (2007). However, the sunshine requirements may apply if a public entity
has delegated “the performance of its public purpose” to a private entity. Mem’l
Hosp.-W. Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d 373, 382-83 (Fla. 1999).
Fee contends that NCCI was subject to the sunshine because OIR delegated
its authority over rate filings to NCCI. However, no evidence in the record supports
Fee’s argument. OIR approves and disapproves rate filings; it does not make rate
filings. Conversely, NCCI and individual insurers have no authority to approve or
disapprove rate filings; rather, they are under a statutory mandate to file such
proposals. §§ 627.091(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (2015). OIR did not delegate to NCCI any
13
authority to carry out an agency function required to be performed in the sunshine.
Thus, Fee’s argument under section 286.011 fails.
iii. Section 627.093, Florida Statutes
The trial court also concluded, without any argument by the parties, that NCCI
was subject to the sunshine pursuant to section 627.093, Florida Statutes. This
statute provides as follows: “Section 286.011 shall be applicable to every rate filing,
approval or disapproval of filing, rating deviation from filing, or appeal from any of
these regarding workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances.” §
627.093, Fla. Stat. (2015). The plain language of the statute thus extends sunshine
requirements only to rate filings; actions taken by OIR subsequent to receiving a rate
filing (approval, disapproval or deviation); and appeals of OIR’s actions. The only
portion of the statute that has any nexus to NCCI’s activities in this case is the rate
filing itself. And a rate filing is specifically defined by statute to include the
following information: (1) “[t]he experience or judgment of the insurer or rating
organization”; (2) an “interpretation of any statistical data”; 4 (3) “[t]he experience
of other insurers or rating organizations;” or (4) “[a]ny other factors which the
insurer or rating organization deems relevant.” § 627.091(2), Fla. Stat. (2015).
Reading section 627.093 in conjunction with the statutory definition of a rate filing,
4
We note that if OIR requests an examination of the underlying statistical data for a
certain rate filing, this information would not be subject to public disclosure due to
the exemptions described in section 624.319, Florida Statutes (2015).
14
it is clear that the sunshine requirements of section 627.093 do not apply to NCCI
beyond the rate filing itself. It does not extend to NCCI’s rate determination
activities or to its decision-making process leading to the filing of a rate proposal.
The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary is incorrect.
B. Access to Records
Fee also alleges that NCCI failed to fully and completely respond to his
records requests, in violation of two statutes: section 627.291, Florida Statutes; and
section 119.07, Florida Statutes. We conclude that NCCI was not required to
provide Fee with access to its records under either provision.
i. Section 627.291, Florida Statutes
Fee contends that he is entitled to access NCCI’s records pursuant to section
627.291, Florida Statutes (2015), as an insured affected by a rate or aggrieved by a
rating system. The statute provides as follows:
(1) As to workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances,
every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates
shall, within a reasonable time after receiving written request therefor
and upon payment of such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to
any insured affected by a rate made by it, or to the authorized
representative of such insured, all pertinent information as to such
rate.
(2) As to workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances,
every rating organization and every insurer which makes its own rates
shall provide within this state reasonable means whereby any person
aggrieved by the application of its rating system may be heard, in
person or by his or her authorized representative, on his or her written
request to review the manner in which such rating system has been
15
applied in connection with the insurance afforded him or her. If the
rating organization or insurer fails to grant or rejects such request within
30 days after it is made, the applicant may proceed in the same manner
as if his or her application had been rejected. Any party affected by the
action of such rating organization or insurer on such request may,
within 30 days after written notice of such action, appeal to the office,
which may affirm or reverse such action.
§ 627.291, Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added).
Fee asserts that as an insured who would be affected by NCCI’s proposed rate
increase, he was entitled to access all pertinent records relating to NCCI’s rate filing.
But the plain language of the statute requires rating organizations to turn over “all
pertinent information” to an insured who has been “affected” by a rate. Even
assuming that Fee had standing as an insured, he could not have been “affected” by
a rate that had yet to go into effect and would never go into effect as OIR ultimately
rejected NCCI’s request for a 19.6% rate increase. The legislature drafted the statute
in the past tense, and it is presumed that the legislature understood this language
would limit any rating organization’s obligation to turn over rate information to rates
that were already in effect. See State v. McNeil, 162 So. 3d 274, 279 (Fla. 5th DCA
2015) (holding that the legislature is presumed to understand the rules of grammar
when enacting a statute).
Moreover, all portions of a statute must be read together to achieve a
consistent whole. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla.
2006). The language contained in section 627.291(2), also written in the past tense,
16
supports a construction of the statute that would require disclosure of information
for only rates that are already in effect. Subsection (2) requires rating organizations
to provide reasonable means for any person “aggrieved by the application of its
rating system” to review the manner in which “such rating system has been applied”
to his or her insurance. § 627.291(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). Further, when both
subsections are read together, it is apparent that this statute was designed to allow
an insured to obtain information about a rate that is in effect or was in effect and to
determine whether he has grounds to challenge the application of the rate to him.
Because nothing in section 627.291 makes it applicable to pending or rejected rate
filings, NCCI was not required to provide records in response to Fee’s requests.
ii. Section 119.07, Florida Statutes
Fee also argues, and the trial court found, that NCCI violated the Public
Records Act, which provides that “[i]t is the policy of this state that all state, county,
and municipal records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person.
Providing access to public records is a duty of each agency.” § 119.01, Fla. Stat.
(2015). The Act defines an “agency” to include any private business entity “acting
on behalf of any public agency.” § 119.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “This broad
definition [of agency] serves to ensure that a public agency cannot avoid disclosure
under the Act by contractually delegating to a private entity that which otherwise
would be an agency responsibility.” News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty
17
& Hanser Architectural Grp., Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992). Thus, in order
to find that NCCI was subject to section 119.07, the trial court was required to
determine whether NCCI acted on behalf of a governmental agency. In making this
determination, it was necessary for the court to examine multiple factors, including
the nine factors outlined in Schwab. 596 So. 2d at 1031. But, here, the trial court
expressly declined to apply the Schwab factors and concluded that NCCI was subject
to section 119.07. 5 This was error. Economic Dev. Comm’n v. Ellis, 178 So. 3d
118, 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
IV. Conclusion
The trial court erred in declaring OIR’s final order void and in concluding that
NCCI and OIR violated the Sunshine Law. The trial court also erred in determining
NCCI violated section 627.291, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Public Records Act,
by not providing Fee with access to certain records. Accordingly, we REVERSE
the trial court’s final order, and REMAND for reinstatement of OIR’s final order
issued on October 5, 2016, approving a 14.5% increase in the workers’
compensation insurance rates.
5
In the brief filed with this Court, neither Fee nor Amicus Florida Press Association
attempt to defend the trial court’s ruling that NCCI was subject to the Public Records
Act. However, when asked at oral argument to concede error on this point, Fee’s
counsel instead attempted to defend the trial court’s ruling by arguing that the trial
court did not need to rely on the Schwab factors because of the other relevant
statutory provisions dealing with an insured’s access to records from a workers’
compensation insurance company.
18
KELSEY and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
19