Noriega v. State , 228 So. 3d 170 ( 2017 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed August 16, 2017.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D16-1740
    Lower Tribunal No. 16-2598
    ________________
    Emiliano E. Noriega,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    The State of Florida,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Miguel de la O,
    Judge.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Natasha Baker-Bradley, Assistant
    Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, FERNANDEZ and LUCK, JJ.
    LUCK, J.
    Defendant Emiliano E. Noriega, after trial, was convicted of trespassing in
    the backyard of Mr. and Mrs. Eduardo Godoy’s home. Noriega contends on
    appeal that his conviction should be reversed because two statements made by the
    state during its closing argument shifted and misstated the burden of proof. Even
    though he did not object to either statement, Noriega claims that together they
    resulted in fundamental error. After review of the record and briefs, we find no
    error, and affirm.
    In the early morning hours of February 8, 2016, Eduardo Godoy, a retired
    security officer, was awoken by the barking of his neighbor’s dog. Looking
    through the window of his bedroom, he saw Noriega walking around his backyard
    and called 911. As Godoy spoke with the 911 dispatcher, Noriega started walking
    toward the front of the house. The dispatcher told Godoy not to leave his home, but
    Godoy decided to stop the man, who he believed to be a burglar. Godoy armed
    himself and encountered Noriega in the front driveway holding a bag, which
    Godoy recognized as belonging to his daughter and had been stored in an open
    utility room in the backyard. At gun point, Godoy ordered Noriega to put his
    hands up and get down. Noriega dropped the bag, containing batteries and
    flashlights, said “I’m going home,” and ran off. Godoy initially pursued but
    retreated when he saw Noriega stopped by police about three houses down from
    his home.
    2
    Noriega was arrested and charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling and
    petit theft. At his trial, Godoy, his wife and daughter, and the arresting officer
    testified.   Godoy’s wife and daughter corroborated Godoy’s testimony.             The
    arresting officer testified that Noriega was out of breath from running when he was
    stopped, but was otherwise calm and obeyed the officer’s instructions in all
    respects. Noriega was not wearing gloves, a mask, or a hoodie and carried no
    weapons, burglary tools, or a bag.
    The theory of defense at trial, which was relayed to the jury beginning with
    opening statement, was that Noriega had been out late at a Super Bowl party, had
    exited a bus near Godoy’s home, and on the way home felt the need to urinate.
    Noriega decided to go into the bushes in front of Godoy’s home where he was later
    confronted by the armed Godoy. The defense denied Noriega was in the backyard
    or that he took any bag.
    During the state’s closing argument, the state first reviewed the evidence
    supporting the elements of the crimes charged and then, without objection, argued:
    But you should know. You can only use the evidence presented
    to you. And the arguments by the attorneys in either opening and
    closing by the State or by the defense is not evidence. In fact, even the
    questions by the attorneys either the State or the defense to the
    witnesses are not evidence. The evidence before you is what the
    witnesses say, that is what you’re assessing.
    So I would like you to note that there is zero evidence of the
    defendant urinating. There is zero evidence of any bus drop off. There
    is zero evidence any party go. Now, there’s no evidence of that
    because, of course, it didn’t happen. . . .
    3
    ....
    [Godoy’s wife and daughter] told you only what they saw and that
    corroborates what happened that night. Because that’s how it
    happened. What simple is true.
    That is your job through the day is to ask yourselves three
    words; what is true? Because described on the courtroom wall is we
    do labor here seek only the truth. So what happened here? You know
    what happened beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Subsequently, the jury convicted Noriega of the lesser-included offense of trespass.
    On appeal, Noriega claims he was deprived of a fair trial by the state’s
    closing argument, which he contends misstated the burden of proof and shifted the
    burden from the state to him. Noriega candidly acknowledges that, because he
    failed to contemporaneously object to the argument during the trial, the challenged
    comments were not preserved for appellate review. See Tillman v. State, 
    471 So. 2d
    32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher
    court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument
    or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is
    to be considered preserved.”)       Therefore, he urges this court to review the
    cumulative effect of the alleged errors under the fundamental error standard. See
    Brooks v. State, 
    762 So. 2d 879
    , 898-99 (Fla. 2000) (“The sole exception to the
    general rule [requiring contemporaneous objection] is where the unobjected-to
    comments rise to the level of fundamental error, which has been defined as error
    that ‘reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of
    guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’”
    4
    (quoting McDonald v. State, 
    743 So. 2d 501
    , 505 (Fla. 1999)). We find no error,
    fundamental or otherwise.
    Noriega, first, contends the state’s closing argument that there was “zero
    evidence of the defendant urinating” shifted the burden of proof from the state to
    him. Where the defendant presents and argues for its theory of the case, the state is
    permitted to respond (if true) that the defendant’s theory is not supported by the
    evidence at trial. The Florida Supreme Court has twice said so within the last
    decade.
    In Scott v. State, 
    66 So. 3d 923
    (Fla. 2011), the state introduced at trial a
    jailhouse recording of the defendant and his co-conspirator talking about the
    robbery and murder. 
    Id. at 927.
    During the defendant’s closing argument, he
    “insinuated that [the co-conspirator] had scripted the jailhouse conversation with a
    third party in order ‘to go home’ because [the co-conspirator] was the actual
    killer.” 
    Id. at 930.
    The defendant’s theory, in other words, was that the co-
    conspirator “scripted this conversation with someone other than” the defendant in
    order to shield himself from a longer sentence. 
    Id. The state,
    in its closing
    argument, “went no further than to point out the lack of evidence to support [the
    defendant’s] alternative theory and that the [s]tate’s evidence on this matter was
    uncontradicted.” 
    Id. This response,
    the Florida Supreme Court concluded, “did
    not constitute impermissible burden-shifting, but [was] rather invited responses to
    5
    [the defendant’s] own suggestion that [the co-conspirator] could have scripted the
    recording in an effort to frame [the defendant] for the murder.” 
    Id. “[T]he [s]tate
    is permitted to emphasize uncontradicted evidence for the narrow purpose of
    rebutting defense arguments since the defense has invited the response.” 
    Id. at 929-30
    (quotation omitted).
    Likewise, in Poole v. State, 
    997 So. 2d 382
    (Fla. 2008), the defendant said in
    closing argument that he “acknowledged that he committed the crimes of sexual
    battery, robbery, and burglary but denied that he was the person who inflicted
    injuries on [the victims].” 
    Id. at 390.
    In response, the state argued “that there was
    no evidence in the case to support the argument that [the defendant] acknowledged
    he committed those crime or to support the argument that someone else inflicted
    the injuries on the victims.” 
    Id. The state’s
    comments, the Court explained, “were
    invited responses,” and therefore “cannot be deemed improper.” 
    Id. Here, too,
    Noriega argued an alternative theory of the case that he was
    walking past Godoy’s home when nature called and Noriega used Godoy’s bushes
    as a restroom. Godoy, the theory goes, made up the story that Noriega entered
    Godoy’s property and stole the sack of flashlights because Godoy improperly
    threatened and chased Noriega with a firearm, and Godoy didn’t want to get in
    trouble with the police. This is what Noriega said in his opening statement:
    At that moment in time Mr. Godoy realizes that he just held
    somebody at gun point who was not a burglar[], who was not doing
    6
    anything wrong – Mr. Godoy has to come up with a story.
    Unfortunately, for Mr. Noriega it’s a story that puts him in Mr.
    Godoy’s back yard. So Mr. Godoy tells the police oh yeah that guy,
    he was in my front yard. He was in my back yard going through my
    stuff. He was stealing from me. . . .
    . . . . [A]s [Noriega’s] walking down the path to his friend[’]s
    house and then he gets to 969 East 29th Street, now being 52-years-
    old at that time and now 53, with – or what he had consumed, Mr.
    Noriega felt the need to urinate.
    Now, I’m not asking if you like this and it’s not okay. But what
    if he goes to the bushes on 969 East 29th Street – and that fence is not
    protected by anything, and in the bushes and was about to urinate.
    The problem is that [Noriega’s] a little too close to Federico Godoy’s
    cars. And it was that moment in time Federico Godoy comes out with
    the gun . . . .
    In response to Noriega’s defense theory that he did not enter Godoy’s property but
    was instead using the bathroom at the edge of the property line, the state was
    permitted to argue the lack of evidence supporting this theory. Indeed, of the four
    witnesses that testified at trial (Godoy, his wife and daughter, and the law
    enforcement officer who made the arrest), not one said Noriega was urinating in
    the bushes. As in Scott and Poole, the state’s lack-of-evidence argument was an
    invited and fair response to Noriega’s defense theory, and not error.
    Noriega, next, contends that the state’s “what is true” comment misstated the
    burden of proof by focusing the jury on whether it believed the state’s witnesses
    rather than on whether the state proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. While
    Noriega’s focus is on two lines of the state’s ten page closing argument, we must
    look to the closing as a whole to determine whether there was error. See Merck v.
    7
    State, 
    975 So. 2d 1054
    , 1061 (Fla. 2007) (“We look at the closing argument as a
    whole to determine whether that discretion was abused.”); Wilchcombe v. State,
    
    842 So. 2d 198
    , 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Here, on the whole, the comments
    made during closing were fair comments on the evidence and direct responses to
    defense arguments, and did not amount to ‘fundamental error’ which tainted the
    validity of the trial.”). Here, reviewed as a whole, the state did not misstate the
    burden of proof. The state repeatedly told the jury that the evidence proved
    Noriega committed the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.
    For example,1 the state argued:
    How there is zero reasonable doubt in this case, that forced doubts,
    that may allow you to entertain a friction [sic] about how a family of
    three and police framed a man and none of even know because it
    wouldn’t be just Mr. Godoy would be part of this conspiracy and
    lying. . . . That’s not reasonable. The doubt must be reasonable.
    The case is full of facts like the bag. Facts that are on their own
    have no explanation but for dealings. Facts are defy reasonable doubt
    and in this case defy a verdict of not guilty.
    The state also argued:
    The only two questions that legally matter, did any part of
    [Noriega] enter someone’s home including as the Judge just finished
    reading to you the enclosed space around it? And did the defendant in
    crossing that threshold do so because he was looking to steal
    something. If you answer yes to those questions beyond a reasonable
    doubt, your verdict must be guilty.
    1 Emphasis has been added to each of the quotes from the state’s closing argument
    that follow.
    8
    And the state argued: “So we know at the very least the defendant was trespassing.
    That, you know beyond a reasonable doubt as well.” Even in the portion of the
    closing argument that Noriega claims misstated the burden of proof, the state
    emphasized the correct burden:
    That is your job through the day is to ask yourself three words; what is
    true? Because described on the courtroom wall is we do labor here
    seek only the truth. So what happened here? You know what
    happened here beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Taken as a whole, including the trial court’s instructions to the jury before and
    after the closing arguments, the state’s closing did not misstate the burden the
    proof. The state was clear that the jury had to find that Noriega committed the
    charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and testimony
    presented during the trial.
    For these reasons, Noriega’s trespass conviction and sentence are affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3D16-1740

Citation Numbers: 228 So. 3d 170, 2017 WL 3495877

Judges: Suarez, Fernandez, Luck

Filed Date: 8/16/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024