Muchnick v. Goihman ( 2018 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed May 2, 2018.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D17-122
    Lower Tribunal No. 14-2925
    ________________
    Michael Muchnick and Valerie Muchnick,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    Richard Goihman,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Antonio Marin,
    Judge.
    International Law Partners LLP and Zahra Khan (Hollywood), for
    appellants.
    Nexterra Law, Steven M. Liberty, and Eric A. Jacobs, for appellee.
    Before LAGOA, EMAS and LUCK, JJ.
    LUCK, J.
    Michael and Valerie Muchnick, former tenants in a Williams Island
    apartment, appeal the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of their former
    rental agent, Richard Goihman, on their claims that Goihman fraudulently induced
    the couple to rent the apartment, and negligently repaired the water intrusion and
    mold problems with the apartment. We affirm the summary judgment on the fraud
    in the inducement claim, but reverse on the negligence claim and remand for
    further proceedings.
    Factual Background and Procedural History
    Goihman was a real estate agent working for Fortune International Realty.
    He knew the Muchnicks because they lived in the same apartment building in
    Aventura. When Goihman learned the Muchnicks needed to move from their
    current apartment because it was being sold, he approached them about renting a
    different unit in the same building. In April 2012, the Muchnicks entered into a
    two-year lease agreement to rent the new apartment for $7,500 a month. They paid
    their rent in six-month installments. Fortune International Reality was listed as the
    broker on the transaction.
    During a walk-through of the apartment with Goihman, the Muchnicks
    pointed out cosmetic issues with the unit – scuffed floors; paint touch ups – which
    Goihman assured them would be addressed prior to them moving in. But the
    issues were not resolved, and when the Muchnicks moved in, they discovered that
    the problems were greater and more serious than they first realized.           Most
    significantly, leaks in the bathroom resulted in water damage and mold in the
    2
    ventilation system. The mold, according to the Muchnicks, affected their children’s
    health and required that they be put on medication. The Muchnicks communicated
    primarily with Goihman regarding issues with the unit because the owner lived
    abroad. Due to the mounting repairs and Goihman’s failure to quickly resolve the
    issues, the Muchnicks terminated the lease about six months early and, in February
    2014, filed suit against Goihman and the owner of the apartment.
    The complaint alleged the following against Goihman: fraud in the
    inducement; breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment of the premises; breach of
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; and negligence.
    Goihman moved for summary judgment on all counts, which the trial court
    granted. The Muchnicks appeal only the trial court’s summary judgment on their
    fraud in the inducement and negligence claims.
    Standard of Review
    “The determination of duty, as an element of negligence, is a question of
    law, and is therefore subject to de novo review. We also review de novo a trial
    court’s granting of summary judgment.” Chirillo v. Granicz, 
    199 So. 3d 246
    , 248-
    49 (Fla. 2016) (citations omitted).
    Discussion
    We affirm without discussion the summary judgment on the fraud claim, but
    reverse summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on the negligence
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    claim. In their complaint, the Muchnicks alleged that Goihman “owed a duty . . .
    to maintain a secure and mold free home, and when necessary, to repair or replace
    areas of the home to ensure the quiet enjoyment by the Muchnicks.” Goihman
    breached this duty, they alleged, by: “failing to protect their home from damaging
    water intrusion”; “failing to repair the corrosion with the plumbing throughout the
    apartment”; “failing to take quick measures to remedy”; “failing to remedy the
    long term effects of water intrusion into the home and throughout the common
    elements creating an environment conducive to the spread of harmful algae, spores
    and mold”; and “failing to provide a habitable home for the Muchnicks and
    maintain the home in a manner conducive to healthy living.”
    Goihman moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim because:
    (1) he was acting in the scope of his employment with Fortune International
    Realty, and thus, was not a proper party; and (2) Goihman owed no duty to the
    Muchnicks. Not knowing from the trial court’s unelaborated order on what basis it
    granted summary judgment, we will address both summary judgment arguments.1
    1 In addition to his proper party and duty arguments, Goihman says we must affirm
    because there is no transcript of the summary judgment hearing in the appellate
    record. We rejected the same contention in Seal Products v. Mansfield, 
    705 So. 2d 973
     (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), explaining:
    Where the appeal is from a summary judgment, the appellant must
    bring up the summary judgment record, that is, the motion, supporting
    and opposing papers, and other matters of record which were pertinent
    to the summary judgment motion. Those are the portions of the
    record essential to a determination whether summary judgment was
    4
    Proper Party
    Goihman argued that he was not liable for negligence, and not a proper
    party, because he was acting in the scope of his employment, and not in his
    individual capacity, in his dealings with the Muchnicks. But just because Goihman
    was acting in the scope of his employment when he rented the apartment, promised
    to fix it, and managed the repairs, doesn’t mean that he was shielded from personal
    liability under all circumstances. “[O]fficers or agents of corporations may be
    individually liable in tort if they commit or participate in a tort, even if their acts
    are within the course and scope of their employment. All that needs to be alleged
    is that the agent or officer personally participated in the tort, even if the
    complained of action was because of and entirely within the scope of his or her
    employment.” Vesta Const. & Design, L.L.C. v. Lotspeich & Assocs., Inc., 
    974 So. 2d 1176
    , 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (Lawson, J.) (citations and quotations
    omitted).
    properly entered. However, the hearing on the motion for summary
    judgment consists of the legal argument of counsel, not the taking of
    evidence. Consequently, it is not necessary to procure a transcript of
    the summary judgment hearing, although it is permissible and often
    helpful to do so.
    Id. at 975 (citation omitted). Here, as in Mansfield, we have Goihman’s motion for
    summary judgment, the Muchnicks’ response, and the evidence they relied on.
    While a transcript would have been helpful, it is not necessary for our de novo
    review of whether there’s a genuine issue of material fact on the Muchnicks’
    negligence claim.
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    Here, the summary judgment evidence showed that Goihman personally
    participated in the negligence.     Mr. Muchnick testified in his deposition that
    Goihman promised the problems in the apartment would be taken care of before
    the Muchnicks moved in. Mr. Muchnick testified that after his family moved into
    the apartment, and there were continued problems, Goihman again promised to fix
    them. Mr. Muchnick testified that Goihman made some arrangements to fix the
    mold and water intrusion issues, but the issues were not resolved. This precludes
    summary judgment on whether Goihman was the proper party.
    Duty
    Goihman contends that because he was not the owner or landlord of the
    apartment, he owed no duty of reasonable care to the Muchnicks. But once
    Goihman made the promise to fix the problems in the apartment, and managed the
    repairs, he had a duty through the undertaker’s doctrine to exercise reasonable care
    in making the repairs.
    The Florida Supreme Court has described the “undertaker’s doctrine” this
    way: “Whenever one undertakes to provide a service to others, whether one does
    so gratuitously or by contract, the individual who undertakes to provide the service
    – i.e., the ‘undertaker’ – thereby assumes a duty to act carefully and to not put
    others at an undue risk of harm.” Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 
    873 So. 2d 1182
    , 1185 (Fla. 2003). “The undertaker is subject to liability if: (a) he or she fails
    6
    to exercise reasonable care, which results in increased harm to the beneficiary; or
    (b) the beneficiary relies upon the undertaker and is harmed as a result.” Limones
    v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cty., 
    161 So. 3d 384
    , 388 n.3 (Fla. 2015).
    Goihman had a duty of reasonable care to the Muchnicks when he
    voluntarily undertook to fix the problems with the apartment. In Mr. Muchnick’s
    deposition, he testified that “[Goihman] promised that he would take care of the
    issues while we were living there” and that he “made it very clear that since []
    [they] lived in the building together that if there were any issues, to let him know,
    and he would be on top of it.” Mr. Muchnick testified that Goihman was the “go-
    to guy” for purposes of addressing issues with the apartment both before and after
    his family moved in. According to Muchnick, Goihman repeatedly told him that he
    would take care of the repairs and yet Goihman never resolved the issues. By
    undertaking the responsibility for the repairs throughout the time the Muchnicks
    lived in the apartment, Goihman “assume[d] a specific, legally recognized duty to
    act with reasonable care.” Pascual v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 
    911 So. 2d 152
    , 154
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
    Mootness
    Goihman finally argues that the case is moot because the Muchnicks agreed
    to a final judgment against the codefendant for $82,000, and filed a satisfaction as
    7
    to the codefendant. According to Goihman, because the claims and damages
    against him are the same, the satisfaction also released him from liability.
    Goihman assumes one important fact: that the settlement amount covered
    the entire amount of the Muchnicks’ damages. There is nothing in the record to
    indicate that the $82,000 paid by the codefendant covered all of their repair costs,
    the replacement costs of a new apartment, moving expenses, and medical bills for
    their children, among other expenses. Mid-litigation monetary settlements are
    often less than the total amount of damages that the plaintiff was claiming. Each
    side gives up something when they settle, including some of the plaintiff’s
    potential monetary damages award.
    The final judgment against the codefendant appears to be that kind of
    settlement. It provided that the $82,000 is for “partial” rent reimbursement and
    out-of-pocket expenses. The final judgment did not say it was in full satisfaction
    of the Muchnicks’ damages, and it didn’t mention the other expenses the family
    had as a result of Goihman’s alleged negligence.
    Ultimately, we don’t know at this point of the litigation what the Muchnicks
    total damages will be.     Damages were not an issue in Goihman’s summary
    judgment motion. Without evidence of the amount of the Muchnicks’ damages,
    we cannot say that the settlement with the codefendant extinguished or mooted the
    claim against Goihman.
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    Conclusion
    We, therefore, affirm the summary judgment in favor of Goihman on the
    Muchnicks’ fraud in the inducement claim, and reverse on the negligence claim.
    We remand for further proceedings on the negligence claim only.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 17-0122

Filed Date: 5/2/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/2/2018