Honorable Rick Scott, individually and in etc. v. Donald Hinkle , 259 So. 3d 982 ( 2018 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D18-966
    _____________________________
    HONORABLE RICK SCOTT,
    individually and in his capacity
    as Governor of Florida,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DONALD HINKLE,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction.
    November 30, 2018
    PER CURIAM.
    Donald Hinkle filed a complaint in circuit court challenging
    the annual financial disclosures that Florida Governor Rick Scott
    has filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics. The Governor
    moved to dismiss the circuit court case, arguing that only the
    Commission has jurisdiction to review his complaint. After the
    circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, the Governor sought a
    writ of prohibition in this court to prevent the circuit court from
    exercising jurisdiction. Because we agree that under article II,
    section 8(f) of the Florida Constitution, only the Commission has
    constitutional authority to investigate Mr. Hinkle’s complaint, we
    grant the petition.
    Background
    The “Ethics in government” provision in article II of the
    Florida Constitution provides that “[a] public office is a public
    trust.” Art. II, § 8, Fla. Const. It affords the people “the right to
    secure and sustain that trust against abuse.” 
    Id. One of
    the ways
    the Florida Constitution protects against abuse of the public trust
    is by requiring “[a]ll elected constitutional officers . . . [to] file full
    and public disclosure of their financial interests.” 
    Id. § 8(a).
    In
    disclosures made annually, public officers must report things like
    their net worth, the value of their assets and liabilities, their
    income and sources of income, and their business interests. See
    § 112.3144, Fla. Stat. (2018); Form 6 2017, Full and Public
    Disclosure of Financial Interests, FLA. COMM’N ON ETHICS,
    http://www.ethics.state.fl.us/financialdisclosure/downloadaform.a
    spx (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). Once a disclosure is filed with the
    Commission, it becomes subject to public scrutiny and possible
    complaints. See Search for Financial Disclosure Filers, FLA.
    COMM’N ON ETHICS, http://public.ethics.state.fl.us/search.cfm (last
    visited Oct. 29, 2018).
    This case involves a public complaint about financial
    disclosures made by the Governor. Mr. Hinkle asserts that the
    Governor reported to the Commission opaque revocable trusts and
    partnerships in a way that impedes meaningful public disclosure
    of his financial interests. Mr. Hinkle filed three complaints with
    the Commission in 2017 concerning the Governor’s disclosures.
    But the Commission dismissed each one as legally insufficient. See
    § 112.324(3), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 34-5.002. At that
    point, Mr. Hinkle filed his complaint about the Governor’s
    financial disclosures in circuit court. There, he sought a
    declaratory judgment that the Governor failed to disclose all his
    financial assets as constitutionally required, as well as injunctive
    relief.
    The Governor moved to dismiss the circuit court complaint,
    arguing that only the Commission has jurisdiction to review
    complaints involving financial disclosures under article II, section
    8(f) of the Florida Constitution. The issue reached this court after
    the circuit court denied the Governor’s motion, and the Governor
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    filed a writ of prohibition petition challenging the circuit court’s
    jurisdiction.
    Analysis
    The Florida Constitution gives this court authority to issue
    writs of prohibition. Art. V, §4(b)(3), Fla. Const. “Prohibition is an
    extraordinary writ by which a superior court may prevent an
    inferior court or tribunal, over which it has appellate and
    supervisory jurisdiction, from acting outside its jurisdiction.”
    Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 
    605 So. 2d 850
    , 853 (Fla. 1992).
    Subject matter jurisdiction is the “[p]ower of a particular court to
    hear the type of case that is then before it” or “jurisdiction over the
    nature of the cause of action and relief sought.” Fla. Star v. B.J.F.,
    
    530 So. 2d 286
    , 288 (Fla. 1988) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
    767 (5th ed. 1979)). It “means no more than the power lawfully
    existing to hear and determine a cause.” Malone v. Meres, 
    109 So. 677
    , 684 (Fla. 1926). Although a writ of prohibition is meant to be
    employed “with great caution and utilized only in emergencies,”
    English v. McCrary, 
    348 So. 2d 293
    , 296 (Fla. 1977), it “may be
    granted when a trial court acts outside of its jurisdiction. For
    example, prohibition is appropriate when another court or
    administrative body has jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
    Scott v. Francati, 
    214 So. 3d 742
    , 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), review
    denied sub nom. Francati v. Scott, No. SC17-730, 
    2017 WL 2991836
    (Fla. July 14, 2017). See also Roberts v. Brown, 
    43 So. 3d 673
    (Fla. 2010) (granting prohibition in a matter in which the
    Florida Supreme Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction); Dep’t of
    Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bonanno, 
    568 So. 2d 24
    , 29 (Fla. 1990)
    (granting prohibition to keep the circuit court from exercising
    jurisdiction over citrus canker cases within the exclusive
    jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer
    Services).
    This case turns on the role that the Florida Constitution
    assigns to the Florida Commission on Ethics. When reviewing
    constitutional provisions, “this Court must examine the actual
    language used in the Constitution. If that language is clear,
    unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be
    enforced as written.” Graham v. Haridopolos, 
    108 So. 3d 597
    , 603
    3
    (Fla. 2013) (quoting Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers,
    Inc., 
    978 So. 2d 134
    , 139-40 (Fla. 2008)).
    The Florida Constitution establishes the Commission with
    “independent” authority to investigate and report on “all
    complaints” involving public officer/public trust issues: “There
    shall be an independent commission to conduct investigations and
    make public reports on all complaints concerning breach of public
    trust by public officers or employees not within the jurisdiction of
    the judicial qualifications commission.” Art. II, § 8(f), Fla. Const.
    (emphasis added); see also § 8(i)(3) (identifying the commission
    referred to in (f) as the “Florida Commission on Ethics”).
    From this grant of authority, part III of chapter 112, Florida
    Statutes, implements article II, section 8 by setting forth detailed
    procedures under which the Commission is to investigate and
    report violations to the proper disciplinary official or body with the
    power to invoke the chapter’s disciplinary provisions. See
    §§ 112.317, 112.324, Fla. Stat. To carry out these duties, section
    112.322 provides the Commission with authority to conduct
    hearings, receive oral or written testimony, issue advisory
    opinions, subpoena and audit records, compel the attendance and
    testimony of witnesses, and administer oaths. See also Comm’n on
    Ethics v. Sullivan, 
    489 So. 2d 10
    , 11-13 (Fla. 1986) (discussing the
    Commission’s authority). With respect to the Governor in
    particular, if the Commission finds a violation and recommends a
    penalty, it must report its “findings and recommendation of
    disciplinary action to the Attorney General, who shall have the
    power to invoke the penalty provisions of [chapter 112].”
    § 112.324(7), Fla. Stat. Florida law thus makes the Commission
    the “guardian of the standards of conduct” with respect to the
    financial disclosure-related allegations in this case. § 112.320, Fla.
    Stat.
    In contrast with the explicit authority granted to the
    Commission over public trust-related complaints in the Florida
    Constitution and statutes, there is no secondary complaint-
    resolving authority granted to Florida’s circuit courts, or to any
    other entity. In fact, the only “Judicial review” provided for by law
    in this area is of a “final action by the commission . . . in a district
    court of appeal.” § 112.3241, Fla. Stat. See also Latham v. Fla.
    4
    Comm’n on Ethics, 
    694 So. 2d 83
    , 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    (recognizing the judiciary to have “no right to intervene” in chapter
    112 processes).
    For these reasons, we conclude that Florida law assigns
    exclusive jurisdiction to the Commission to review “all”
    complaints, including Mr. Hinkle’s complaint. “[A]ll complaints,”
    in article II, section 8(f), means all complaints. Cf. City of
    Clearwater v. BayEsplanade.com, LLC, 
    251 So. 3d 249
    , 255 (Fla.
    2d DCA 2018), reh’g denied (Aug. 21, 2018) (holding that “all lands”
    means “all lands”). When the Florida Constitution prescribes the
    manner of doing something, doing it in a different manner is
    prohibited. See Sullivan v. Askew, 
    348 So. 2d 312
    , 315 (Fla. 1977);
    Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 
    112 So. 253
    , 256 (Fla. 1927).
    And here, where the circuit court has assumed improper authority
    over a matter outside of its jurisdiction, and with another
    administrative body having been granted explicit jurisdiction by
    the Florida Constitution and the statutory scheme to review the
    complaint, it is appropriate to grant a writ of prohibition.
    Conclusion
    Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is GRANTED to
    preclude the circuit court from taking any further action other
    than to dismiss the proceedings below. We trust that the circuit
    court will comply with our direction and therefore withhold
    issuance of the writ.
    ROWE, OSTERHAUS, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Daniel E. Nordby, General Counsel, and Meredith L. Sasso,
    Deputy General Counsel, Executive Office of the Governor,
    Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Donald M. Hinkle, Hinkle & Foran, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
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