Victoria A. Reid v. State , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3905 ( 2017 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
VICTORIA A. REID,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5D17-241
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
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Opinion filed March 23, 2017
Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
Jeffrey Mahl, Judge.
Gregory W. Eisenmenger, of Eisenmenger,
Blaue & Peters P.A., Viera, for Petitioner.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Victoria A. Reid (“Petitioner”) petitions for issuance of a writ of prohibition to
prevent her from being tried for aggravated battery with a firearm while inflicting great
bodily harm. This case arose after Petitioner shot her husband, James Wesley Reid
(“Reid”), in the leg during a domestic dispute. Petitioner argues that she is immune from
prosecution pursuant to section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2016), commonly referred to
as “Stand Your Ground.” This section provides in pertinent part that “[a] person who uses
or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified
in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution.” § 776.032(1), Fla. Stat.
(2016). Section 776.012, Florida Statutes (2016), further provides that “[a] person is
justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when
and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to
defend himself or herself against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” §
776.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). There is no duty to retreat under these circumstances. §
776.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). Petitioner contends that she was in reasonable fear that
Reid was reaching for a firearm when she shot him.
An evidentiary hearing was held regarding Petitioner’s Stand Your Ground
immunity. The State called as its only witnesses Reid and the 911 operator who took the
emergency call placed by Petitioner at the time of the shooting. In addition, the State
introduced the tape of the 911 call. Petitioner was the only other witness who testified
during the hearing. The evidence and testimony reveal the following facts. At the time of
the shooting, Petitioner and Reid had been married for over fourteen years. For the first
eight years of their marriage, Reid suffered from alcohol abuse issues. During this time,
he engaged in multiple acts of physical violence against Petitioner. On several occasions,
Reid held a firearm to Petitioner’s head. Reid became sober for five years but began to
drink again shortly before the shooting occurred. Petitioner testified that Reid’s
resumption of drinking frightened her.
Petitioner and Reid kept firearms in every room of their home, including one under
the cushion of the love-seat in the living room and one in a wooden case on the coffee
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table. On the evening in question, Petitioner and Reid entered into a discussion about
their marriage that escalated into a heated argument. Reid reached in the direction of the
love-seat cushion. Petitioner testified that he verbally threatened to shoot her and that
she believed he was reaching for the gun to kill her.
Petitioner grabbed the firearm on the coffee table, which discharged and struck
Reid in the leg. She testified that the firearm went off accidentally. Reid also testified
that he believed the gun discharged accidentally because it had no safety. Petitioner
immediately called 911. The transcript of the call reveals that Petitioner told the 911
operator, “My husband, he is injured. He threatened to shoot me and I shot him.”
Reid initially filed a petition with the trial court to prevent contact with Petitioner.
However, he later testified that he believed Petitioner thought he was moving towards the
firearm, although he was reaching for their dog. Reid stated that the shooting occurred
solely because Petitioner feared he was about to harm her. For example, the record
reveals that he was specifically asked, “Do you have any reason to believe that this
incident occurred in any way other than a result of your wife’s fear that you were about to
do bodily harm by threatening her?” Reid answered, “No.” He further testified that any
statements he had made to the contrary were the result of the heavy pain medication he
had been given following the shooting. Any statements Reid had previously made about
the incident were not admitted into evidence at the hearing.
Despite the parties’ testimony, the trial court entered an order denying Stand Your
Ground immunity to Petitioner. In the order, the trial court found that both Petitioner and
Reid agreed in their testimony that Petitioner “believed [Reid] was reaching for a gun that
was located near the parties” at the time Reid was shot. Nevertheless, the trial court
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concluded that the greater weight of the evidence presented at the hearing indicated that
Petitioner shot Reid because of the argument rather than out of fear that he was reaching
for a firearm.
We conclude that the trial court erred in denying Stand Your Ground immunity to
Petitioner because no factual disputes were raised in this case. See Peterson v. State,
983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“[W]hen immunity under this law is properly raised
by a defendant, the trial court must decide the matter by confronting and weighing only
factual disputes.”). Both parties testified that Petitioner was afraid that Reid was reaching
for a firearm when she shot him. They also testified that Reid had committed acts of
domestic violence against Petitioner while he was under the influence of alcohol and that
he had resumed drinking shortly before the shooting. The statements made by Petitioner
during the 911 call were consistent with the testimony presented at the hearing and
indicated that she believed Reid was about to shoot her.
Accordingly, because the evidence presented to the trial court at the Stand Your
Ground hearing established that Petitioner reasonably believed that her conduct was
necessary to defend herself against Reid’s imminent use of unlawful force and because
there were no factual disputes regarding that issue, we grant the petition for writ of
prohibition.
PETITION GRANTED.
SAWAYA, COHEN, and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
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