LAWRENCE T. REID, JR. v. GUARDIANSHIP OF MARGARET REID ( 2019 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    LAWRENCE T. REID, JR.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    GUARDIANSHIP OF MARGARET REID and JAMES P. DILLON,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D15-3532
    [July 10, 2019]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Janis Brustares Keyser, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    502014GA000267XXXXMB.
    Lawrence T. Reid, Jr., Boca Raton, pro se.
    Beverly A. Pohl, P.A. of Broad and Cassel LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and
    Holly O’Neill of Broad and Cassel, West Palm Beach, for appellee James P.
    Dillon.
    ON MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER ON PETITION FOR ORDER
    AUTHORIZING PAYMENT OF APPELLATE ATTORNEY’S FEES
    WARNER, J.
    Appellant has filed a motion to review the trial court’s order awarding
    appellate fees in this case. This court granted appellate fees to the former
    guardian in an appeal of an order granting attorney’s fees. On remand,
    the trial court held a hearing and awarded $17,125 for appellate attorney’s
    fees. Because the trial court failed to consider the nature and value of the
    guardianship estate in determining the reasonableness of the fee pursuant
    to section 744.108(2), Florida Statutes (2018), we grant review, reverse the
    order of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
    In the appeal which generated the appellate fees, the appellant had
    challenged the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to the then-
    guardian of appellant’s mother. This court affirmed the award and granted
    appellate attorney’s fees based upon section 744.108(8), which allows
    attorney’s fees for the review of orders determining an attorney’s fee in a
    guardianship. In other words, contrary to other types of proceedings, the
    legislature has specifically allowed the collection of “fees on fees.” These
    fees are assessable against the guardianship estate, unless the court finds
    them “substantially unreasonable” after a determination under section
    744.108(2).
    At the hearing on fees, both appellant and the current guardian
    objected to the appellate fees. The appellate attorney, a board-certified
    appellate attorney, testified as to her experience and hourly rate, which
    she stated was reasonable for persons with her qualifications and the
    practice in which she engaged. She also testified as to the hours expended.
    On cross-examination, she explained several of the hourly entries. The
    guardian (through counsel) asked whether the appellate attorney had
    reviewed any information regarding the guardianship’s assets, and she
    had not. During closing argument, the guardian noted that the nature
    and extent of the guardianship’s assets must be considered, and that the
    attorney has a responsibility to look at the size of the estate and consider
    the assets available in determining the extent of representation. The
    guardian asked the court to take judicial notice of the file as to the assets
    in the estate, which she claimed was bankrupt. The court took the matter
    under advisement.
    In its order awarding fees, the court found the hourly rate to be
    reasonable, as well as the hours expended, and determined the fee to be
    $17,125 for the appellate representation. It specifically stated that it did
    not consider the nature and value of the guardianship estate because no
    evidence had been presented as to it. Appellant seeks review of this order.
    Section 744.108(2), Florida Statutes, provides the criteria that the court
    shall consider in determining a reasonable fee in a guardianship
    proceeding:
    (2) When fees for a guardian or an attorney are submitted to
    the court for determination, the court shall consider the
    following criteria:
    (a) The time and labor required;
    (b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and
    the skill required to perform the services properly;
    2
    (c) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular
    employment will preclude other employment of the
    person;
    (d) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
    services;
    (e) The nature and value of the incapacitated person’s
    property, the amount of income earned by the estate,
    and the responsibilities and potential liabilities
    assumed by the person;
    (f) The results obtained;
    (g) The time limits imposed by the circumstances;
    (h) The nature and length of the relationship with the
    incapacitated person; and
    (i) The experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the
    person performing the service.
    Whether the fees claimed are reasonable requires an evaluation of all of
    the foregoing criteria. In re Guardianship of Shell, 
    978 So. 2d 885
    , 890
    (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“[T]he legislature has prescribed certain factors that
    the probate court must consider when determining whether the fee
    requested by the guardian is reasonable[.]”). The requesting party must
    establish the reasonableness of the fees, and thus the criteria required in
    the statute. 
    Id. Here, that
    burden was on the party requesting the fees. While there
    was no evidence presented at the hearing, the guardian asked the court to
    take judicial notice and to review the file, which would provide an inventory
    and enable the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the request in light
    of the amount of assets. The court did not consider the nature and value
    of the guardianship assets. The court had an obligation to do so and factor
    the nature and value of the estate into its calculation of the reasonableness
    of the fee. It seems to us that it would be entirely unreasonable to award
    a substantial fee against the guardianship estate when it has no
    appreciable assets.
    We have established in Romano v. Olshen, 
    153 So. 3d 912
    , 918-19 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2014) (alterations in original), that the most important part of
    guardianship law is the protection of the ward:
    3
    The “overwhelming” public policy of guardianship law “is the
    protection of the ward.” Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson,
    
    952 So. 2d 498
    , 505 (Fla. 2006). Part of the expressed
    legislative intent of Chapter 744 is to assist a ward “in meeting
    the essential requirements for [his] physical health and safety,
    in protecting [his] rights, in managing [his] financial
    resources, and in developing or regaining [his] abilities to the
    maximum extent possible.” § 744.1012, Fla. Stat. (2012).
    Chapter 744 is to be “liberally construed to accomplish this
    purpose.” 
    Id. By approving
    the reasonableness of fees, regardless of ability of the estate
    to pay fees and to provide the basic care of the ward, the protection of the
    ward may have taken a back seat to the attorney’s compensation in
    violation of the public policy of the guardianship law.
    Consideration of the nature and value of the guardianship property is
    mandatory in determination of the fees in a guardianship case. The court
    erred in setting the reasonableness of the fees without this information.
    We thus reverse the order and remand for further consideration.
    GROSS and FORST, JJ., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-3532

Filed Date: 7/10/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/10/2019