Suzuki Motor Corporation, a foreign corporation v. Scott Winckler ( 2019 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D18-4815
    _____________________________
    SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION, a
    foreign corporation,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    SCOTT WINCKLER,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.
    August 29, 2019
    OSTERHAUS, J.
    Suzuki Motor Corporation seeks certiorari review of an order
    granting an application for a letter rogatory to take the
    examination of Mr. Osamu Suzuki, its current Chairman and
    former Chief Executive Officer. In the order, the trial court found
    that the “apex doctrine” does not apply outside the governmental
    context and that Mr. Suzuki was uniquely able to provide
    information relevant to this case. We deny the petition because the
    trial court’s decision does not depart from the essential
    requirements of law.
    I.
    Scott Winckler’s case alleges that on June 16, 2013, the brakes
    failed on his GSX-R series Suzuki motorcycle while he was riding
    it. The bike crashed and paralyzed Mr. Winckler from the waist
    down. Four months after the accident, Suzuki Motor Corporation
    issued a recall on the brakes of its GSX-R series motorcycles.
    Mr. Winckler filed a products liability suit against Suzuki
    Motor Corporation related to his accident and the brake issue. In
    the course of discovery, he sought a letter rogatory from the trial
    court seeking to take the examination of the Chairman of the
    Board of Suzuki Motor Corporation in Japan. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
    1.300(b). Mr. Winckler’s application stated that the Chairman
    “possesses unique knowledge about specific facts relevant to [the]
    allegations,” citing the Chairman’s involvement with a document
    addressing the brake issue and a related email.
    Suzuki Motor Corporation filed objections to the application
    and a motion seeking protection under the apex doctrine. Its
    position was that its top-level corporate manager should not be
    subject to examination when others within the corporation could
    testify to the relevant issues. ∗ It also filed a declaration from
    Chairman Suzuki in opposition to the application, stating that he
    has “no independent memory” of reviewing or signing the
    document regarding the brake issue and “no personal knowledge”
    of the details.
    After a hearing in October 2018, the trial court granted the
    motion for a letter rogatory. It found that the apex doctrine hadn’t
    been applied outside of the governmental context and couldn’t be
    applied to the corporate officer here. Besides rejecting the apex
    doctrine, the court found that that the Chairman had personal
    involvement and could uniquely provide case-relevant information
    due to having personal involvement with the brake issue. After the
    trial court granted the application, this petition for writ of
    certiorari followed.
    ∗
    Mr. Winckler’s counsel deposed Suzuki Motor Corporation’s
    corporate representative earlier this year but weren’t satisfied
    with some of his answers.
    2
    II.
    We review petitions for writ of certiorari for “(1) a departure
    from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in
    material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be
    corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San
    Perdido Ass’n, 
    104 So. 3d 344
    , 351 (Fla. 2012) (citations omitted).
    Our analysis focuses on the first prong—a departure from the
    essential requirements of the law. A departure from the essential
    requirements of the law is “a violation of a clearly established
    principle of law.” State v. Belvin, 
    986 So. 2d 516
    , 525-26 (Fla. 2008)
    (quoting Belvin v. State, 
    922 So. 2d 1046
    , 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2006)).
    Suzuki Motor Corporation argues that the trial court’s order
    granting a letter rogatory violates the apex doctrine. The problem
    with its argument is that the doctrine is only clearly established in
    Florida in the government context, with respect to high-ranking
    government officials. The essence of Florida’s apex doctrine is that
    “[an] agency head should not be subject to deposition, over
    objection, unless and until the opposing parties have exhausted
    other discovery and can demonstrate that the agency head is
    uniquely able to provide relevant information which cannot be
    obtained from other sources.” Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
    Broward Cty., 
    810 So. 2d 1056
    , 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    (emphasis added). “[A] party seeking to depose a . . . high-ranking
    governmental official must demonstrate the personal involvement
    of the official in a material way or the existence of extraordinary
    circumstances.” Horne v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 
    901 So. 2d
    238, 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (emphasis added). We highlight
    “agency head” and “governmental official” because we have noted
    before that “no Florida court has adopted the apex doctrine in the
    corporate context.” Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation v. Fla. Dep’t of
    Fin. Servs., 
    159 So. 3d 945
    , 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); see also
    Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC v. Southernmost House,
    Ltd., 
    206 So. 3d 764
    , 765 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). We emphasized
    in that case (though in dicta) “that the government context is
    distinguishable [from the corporate context] because of separation
    of powers concerns.” 
    Id. And so,
    it follows that because
    the apex doctrine hasn’t been adopted in the corporate context, the
    trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the
    3
    law by refusing to apply this doctrine to Suzuki Motor
    Corporation’s corporate officer.
    Moreover, trial court’s decision that the Chairman’s
    deposition was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
    admissible evidence provides no basis for us to quash the order
    below. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1) (allowing a party to discover
    any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject
    matter of the pending action or appears reasonably calculated to
    lead to the discovery of admissible evidence); Univ. of W. Fla. Bd.
    of Trs. v. Habegger, 
    125 So. 3d 323
    , 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). In
    deciding whether to grant a writ of common-law certiorari, we are
    not so much concerned with “the mere existence of legal error as
    much as with the seriousness of the error.” Combs v. State, 
    436 So. 2d
    93, 95-96 (Fla. 1983). The district court should grant a petition
    “only when there has been a violation of a clearly established
    principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Id.; see also
    Jones v. State, 
    477 So. 2d 566
    , 569 (Fla. 1985) (Boyd, C.J.,
    concurring specially) (noting that a “departure from the essential
    requirements of law . . . means an inherent illegality or
    irregularity, an abuse of judicial power, an act of judicial tyranny
    perpetrated with disregard of procedural requirements, resulting
    in a gross miscarriage of justice).” Here, we are mindful that trial
    courts have broad discretion in overseeing discovery and in
    protecting persons from whom discovery is sought. Fla. R. Civ. P.
    1.280(c); Rojas v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 
    641 So. 2d 855
    , 857
    (Fla. 1994). In this instance, the trial court’s order cited specific
    evidence supporting its conclusion that the Chairman was
    personally involved with recall-related corporate documents and
    uniquely able to provide relevant information. Cf. Remington
    Lodging & Hospitality, 
    206 So. 3d 764
    ; Racetrac Petroleum v.
    Sewell, 
    150 So. 3d 1247
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). With documentary
    support underlying its ruling, we cannot conclude that this
    situation is like the Habegger and General Star Indemnity Co. v.
    Atlantic Hospitality of Florida, LLC, 
    57 So. 3d 238
    (Fla. 3d DCA
    2011), cases where trial courts departed from the essential
    requirements of law by allowing depositions of high officials that
    were not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant
    evidence.
    4
    III.
    The petition for writ of certiorari is DENIED.
    ROWE, J., concurs; B.L. THOMAS, J., dissents with opinion.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    B.L. THOMAS, J., dissenting.
    This case involves a tragic accident that resulted in
    catastrophic injuries. Nevertheless, I must respectfully dissent
    because the apex doctrine is and must be equally applicable in the
    private sector as it is in the governmental context. And even
    assuming the doctrine’s basis in the governmental context is
    grounded in the separation of powers under article II, section 3 of
    the Florida Constitution, see Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation v. Fla.
    Dept. of Financial Services, 
    159 So. 3d 945
    , 952 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2015), the abusive discovery allowed here has no basis in law or
    fact and under traditional rules of relevancy, extraordinary relief
    must be granted. Allowing discovery not meant to ferret out the
    truth, but designed to create settlement pressures, threatens the
    proper operation of the commercial enterprise for no legitimate
    factfinding purpose.
    To answer the question by stating that the trial court’s ruling
    cannot be a departure from law because no law recognizes the apex
    doctrine in the corporate context is no answer at all, because
    otherwise the doctrine could never be applied. That is precisely why
    Florida courts permit extraordinary review of improper discovery
    orders by writs of certiorari under Art. V, section 4(b)(3), Fla.
    Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030 (b)(2)(A); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston,
    
    655 So. 2d 91
    , 94-95 (Fla. 1995). Here, we should grant the writ
    and quash the order.
    5
    Respondents persuaded the lower court to allow for the
    issuance of letters rogatory to take the deposition of Osamu
    Suzuki, former Chief Executive Officer and current chairman of
    Suzuki Motor Corporation and resident of Japan. This petition
    involves a challenge to a one-page document, one of more than
    250,000 pages of documents provided to Respondents, which
    provides a list of issues relevant to the suit involving a “GSX R
    series Front brake pressure loss.”
    Mr. Suzuki filed a “Declaration in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
    Application for Letter Rogatory” under penalty of perjury pursuant
    to section 95.525, Florida Statutes, that he has “no independent
    memory” of signing the document. And he “cannot recollect [his
    signature] even after reviewing the document” which he signed
    more than five years before he filed the statement in opposition.
    Most significantly, actions by the “Quality Countermeasure
    Committee” involving the allegedly defective front-brake pressure
    could not be ordered, rejected, or modified by Mr. Suzuki. Finally,
    Mr. Suzuki stated, again under penalty of perjury, that he “did not
    prepare the document, and even what I might have known about
    it in 2013 would have been told to me by someone else in the
    Corporation. I would have had at that time no personal knowledge
    of the details in that document.” (emphasis added.).
    To keep this case in context, it must also be noted that
    plaintiffs deposed the Suzuki Motor Company’s corporate
    representative for three days. It was not until Respondents
    amended their response to the petition before us that the court
    learned that this extensive discovery was purportedly
    unsatisfactory. Even more revealing, the Respondents have failed
    to set a single deposition of any member of the Quality
    Countermeasure Committee, the sole body with the authority to
    decide what measures if any to take regarding the allegedly
    defective product part.
    To allow this unjustified deposition is to allow Respondents to
    disrupt the functions of the Petitioner for no legitimate reason. Mr.
    Suzuki is “involved in governmental affairs in various countries
    [in which Suzuki] does business including domestically, ongoing
    financial matters, exchange rate issues, expanding and enhancing
    the multiproduct line of [Suzuki] products domestically and
    internationally. Accordingly, he is “chronically busy with
    6
    important and business management issues as [Suzuki]’s
    Chairman, meeting with other [Suzuki] high level executives. . . on
    [a] regular basis, meeting with government officials and
    representatives from all countries around the world in which
    Suzuki does business, regular speaking engagements to industry
    and business groups, making public appearances representing
    Suzuki, and regular meeting with major corporate stockholders on
    the status of Suzuki business.” Thus, if Mr. Suzuki is required to
    give testimony in this case, which would obviously result in being
    required to give testimony in hundreds of other cases, the
    deposition here would “substantially interfere with [his] job
    responsibilities as Chairman”.
    The trial court’s order allowing this discovery abuse cited no
    justification other than “it is appropriate for Plaintiff to be granted
    an opportunity to discover from the Chairman, Mr. Suzuki, his
    perspective on the contents of the Document and Email.” But in
    the face of sworn testimony that Mr. Suzuki has no recollection
    and had no authority to affect the decision regarding the recall or
    otherwise addressing the allegedly defective product, there can be
    only one logical conclusion: the discovery request of the top
    corporate chairman of a worldwide company with tens of
    thousands of employees who has provided an unrefuted statement
    of no involvement in the issue and a recitation of his extensive
    corporate leadership responsibilities can only be designed to
    harass and attempt to force a settlement to avoid significant
    corporate disruption. The trial court’s order is thus a departure
    from the essential requirements of law for which Suzuki has no
    adequate remedy on appeal. Horne v. School Bd. or Miami-Dade
    County, 
    901 So. 2d
    238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Dep’t of Agric. &
    Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cty., 
    810 So. 2d 1056
    , 1058 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2002).
    In Broward County, this court applied the apex doctrine to
    prohibit the deposition of Agriculture Commission Charles
    Bronson in a rule-challenge proceeding. We said this:
    We agree with the department that the ALJ abused
    his discretion in denying the motion for protective order.
    In circumstances such as these, the agency head should
    not be subject to deposition, over objection, unless and
    until the opposing parties have exhausted other discovery
    7
    and can demonstrate that the agency head is uniquely
    able to provide relevant information which cannot be
    obtained from other sources. To hold otherwise would, as
    argued by the department, subject agency heads to being
    deposed in virtually every rule challenge proceeding, to the
    detriment of the efficient operation of the agency in
    particular and state government as a 
    whole. 810 So. 2d at 1058
    (emphasis added).
    We reiterated and reaffirmed the rule in Horne v. School Bd.
    or Miami-Dade County, 
    901 So. 2d
    238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), when
    we applied the apex doctrine to former governmental officials. We
    noted that application would help ensure that qualified people do
    not seek elevated public positions for fear of post-public
    employment discovery entanglements.
    In Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation v. Fla. Dept. of Financial
    Services, 
    159 So. 3d 945
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), this court discussed
    the apex doctrine in more detail than in earlier cases and stated:
    The concern of setting such a precedent has been the
    foundation of this court's reasoning in cases in which it
    has precluded the deposition of agency heads. See Univ.
    of W. Fla. Bd. of Trustees v. Habegger, 
    125 So. 3d 323
    , 325
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), review denied, 
    143 So. 3d 918
    (Fla.
    2014) (“[C]ompelling the deposition of President Bense in
    this context could have future widespread ramifications
    and subject her to depositions in numerous other
    employment disputes.”); Dep't of 
    Agric., 810 So. 2d at 1058
        (“To hold otherwise would, as argued by the department,
    subject agency heads to being deposed in virtually every
    rule challenge proceeding, to the detriment of the
    efficient operation of the agency in particular and state
    government as a whole.”). The time spent preparing and
    testifying in this case will take away from the Insurance
    Commissioner's duties and responsibilities as an agency
    head for the state of Florida, and the precedent served by
    compelling him to testify will create “a significant
    deterrent to qualified candidates seeking public service
    positions.” 
    Horne, 901 So. 2d at 241
    . To allow an agency
    head to give speculative testimony concerning what
    8
    might have been done with accurate information would
    constitute a serious intrusion into the executive branch of
    government.
    For the foregoing reasons, we find the circuit court's
    order compelling the Insurance Commissioner to appear
    for a deposition is a departure from the essential
    requirements of the law that will cause irreparable harm
    that cannot be remedied on appeal. See 
    Horne, 901 So. 2d at 240
    (“Orders granting discovery requests have
    traditionally been reviewed by certiorari because once
    discovery is wrongfully granted, the complaining party is
    beyond 
    relief.”). 159 So. 3d at 952
    –53. This logic is clearly equally applicable in the
    corporate context albeit not based on Art. II, section three, Fla.
    Const.
    To allow meritless discovery depositions of corporate leaders,
    who have provided sworn statements that they have no
    discoverable knowledge of the issue at hand, or that such
    information can be obtained from persons with less corporate
    responsibilities, is to allow illegitimate disruption in the private
    sector that is forbidden in the public sector. While the separation
    of powers certainly compels the application of the apex doctrine in
    the public sphere, the rationale of the doctrine is equally applicable
    in the private sphere: the courts cannot countenance unjustified
    discovery of lead corporate executives for no legitimate reason.
    In Florida Office of Insurance Regulation v. Florida
    Department of Financial Services, we specifically stated we were
    not addressing the issue of whether it applied in the corporate
    context: “It is unnecessary for us to address whether the apex
    doctrine applies in the corporate context, and we specifically
    decline to do so in this 
    opinion.” 159 So. 3d at 951
    n.3. (Our note
    that we need not address the question implies that the doctrine
    could apply in the corporate context). But we recognized that:
    Some state and federal courts refer to this doctrine
    as the “apex” doctrine, in the context of both high-ranking
    government and corporate officials. See, e.g., State ex rel.
    Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 228 W.Va.
    749, 
    724 S.E.2d 353
    , 363 (2012) (adopting the “apex”
    9
    doctrine in the corporate context and noting that doctrine
    is “analogous to the approach this Court adopted for use
    when a party seeks to depose [a] high-ranking
    governmental official”); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v.
    Garcia, 
    904 S.W.2d 125
    (Tex.1995) (applying the “apex”
    doctrine to the deposition of a corporate 
    officer). 159 So. 3d at 950
    –51.
    Other state and federal courts have applied the apex doctrine
    in the corporate context. Sun Capital Partners, Inc. v. Twin City
    Fire Ins. Co., 
    310 F.R.D. 523
    , 527-29 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (prohibiting
    deposition of corporate co-founders); Alberto v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
    
    796 N.W.2d 490
    , 497 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (prohibiting
    depositions of Toyota executives in products-liability case where
    executives possessed no more than “generalized knowledge of
    Toyota’s unintended acceleration problems”); State ex rel. Mass.
    Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 
    724 S.E.2d 353
    , 364 (W. Va. 2012)
    (cited above); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 
    13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
    363, 367-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (adopting apex doctrine and
    prohibiting deposition of president of company with no knowledge
    of claims). We should apply it now to this case.
    Furthermore, whether the rationale for granting certiorari
    relief here is labeled the “apex doctrine” or we simply apply
    fundamental law applicable to prevent discovery abuse which “is
    not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
    evidence,” we should grant the writ:
    Certiorari is available to review a discovery order
    which departs from essential requirements of law and
    causes injury that has no adequate remedy in a
    subsequent appeal. Banc of Am. Inv. Servs. v. Barnett,
    
    997 So. 2d 1154
    , 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). The order
    departs from essential requirements of law because
    Atlantic Hospitality has not shown that the president's
    deposition is “reasonably calculated to lead to the
    discovery of admissible evidence” under Florida Rule of
    Civil Procedure 1.280. See Granada Ins. Co. v. Ricks, 
    12 So. 3d 276
    , 277 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). General Star has
    shown that its president is a manager, not an adjuster or
    10
    other employee with personal knowledge of the factual
    disputes involved in the lawsuit.
    Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Atl. Hosp. of Fla., LLC, 
    57 So. 3d 238
    , 239
    (Fla. 3rd DCA 2011). The facts here readily support granting
    extraordinary relief, where Respondents have failed to depose any
    member of the relevant corporate committee, spent three days
    deposing the corporate representative, and have no legitimate
    reason to depose Mr. Suzuki, and this will subject him to countless
    other illegitimate discovery requests.
    As the Third District noted in a very similar case of discovery
    abuse:
    The injury that cannot be remedied in a subsequent,
    plenary appeal is described by General Star's president
    in her affidavit:
    12. As President and Chief Executive Officer of
    General Star Management Company, my
    signature appears on every policy issued by
    General Star Indemnity Company in the State
    of Florida as a standard, pre-printed signature
    on all policies.
    13. Because of the size and nature of the
    insurance business the number of people
    insured by General Star, Genesis, and General
    Re, the insureds and reinsureds of these entities
    are involved in hundreds of lawsuits throughout
    the United States. If I were summoned as a
    deponent to testify in each of those cases, I
    would not have time to fulfill my duties as an
    executive officer of Genesis, General Star or
    General Re, as I could literally be in depositions
    every single day. It would be extremely
    disruptive to my responsibilities to any one of
    these companies and its policyholders if I were
    to give depositions in cases involving individual
    insureds, when I was not involved with their
    claims or policies, as is the case here.
    11
    I have not participated in the above-captioned
    litigation, or in the underlying insurance claim,
    or in the underwriting of the subject policy, and
    I am filing this affidavit in support of a motion
    for protective order.
    This is an obvious but compelling point. The job of the
    president of the company is to manage the company, not
    to fly around the United States participating in
    depositions about policy-related claim disputes of which
    the president has no personal knowledge. While the out-
    of-pocket costs of such an exercise can be calculated and
    shifted if appropriate at the conclusion of the case (or in
    a separate sanctions motion), the effect on the company
    is much more difficult to measure. If all claimants
    demand and obtain the same right, the chief executive
    officer manages his or her deposition schedule, not the
    
    company. 57 So. 3d at 239-40
    (emphasis added).
    Our facts here are almost identical. A chairman of a worldwide
    company, involved in hundreds of lawsuits, cannot be subjected to
    discovery which is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
    admission of relevant evidence where less intrusive means of
    obtaining relevant evidence in discovery have not been attempted,
    and the consequent disruption of corporate function cannot be
    remedied on appeal.
    We should grant the writ and order the trial court to grant the
    protective order. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
    _____________________________
    Raoul G. Cantero of White & Case LLP, Miami, and Larry M. Roth
    of Larry M. Roth, P.A., Winter Park, for Petitioner.
    Maegen Peek Luka and Celene H. Humphries of Brannock &
    Humphries, Tampa, for Respondent.
    12