Florida Agricultural And Mechanical University, etc. v. United Faculty of Florida ( 2019 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-2405
    _____________________________
    FLORIDA AGRICULTURE AND
    MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY,
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
    Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED FACULTY OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
    Charles W. Dodson, Judge.
    October 11, 2019
    ON APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
    PER CURIAM.
    United Faculty of Florida (UFF) moves to dismiss this appeal
    for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that it is a mere republication of a
    previous final judgment that Florida Agriculture and Mechanical
    University, Board of Trustees (FAMU) appealed and then
    abandoned. We agree and grant the motion.
    I.
    After FAMU discharged a faculty member, UFF challenged
    this discharge in an arbitration proceeding, and the arbitrator
    ruled that the discipline imposed must be modified and the
    employee was entitled to certain back pay. FAMU moved for the
    circuit court to vacate the arbitration award, while UFF
    requested the award be confirmed.
    The trial court entered an order denying FAMU’s motion,
    confirming the award, ordering the payment of back pay, and
    concluding that “JUDGMENT is entered for [UFF].” FAMU filed
    a notice of appeal and we issued an order to show cause,
    indicating that the order did not appear to be final and citing
    SSA Sec. Inc. v. Pierre, 
    44 So. 3d 1272
    , 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010),
    which found that an administrative order requiring the payment
    of back pay, but reserving jurisdiction to set the amount, was not
    final and thus not appealable. In response, FAMU moved for
    voluntary dismissal and we dismissed the appeal. 1
    The parties returned to the trial court and obtained another
    order, this one titled “Final Judgment.” This order contained the
    same language regarding back pay, so we issued another order to
    show cause, again citing SSA Sec. Inc. This time, FAMU
    responded that the trial court did not reserve jurisdiction and
    there was no dispute as to the back pay ordered, thus the order
    was final. After considering the response, we discharged our show
    cause order. After briefing, UFF filed this motion to dismiss the
    appeal.
    II.
    Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b) requires a
    notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of rendition of a final
    order. This deadline to appeal is jurisdictional, see Johnston v.
    State, 
    202 So. 3d 976
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and failure to comply
    may not be cured by obtaining a subsequent order. After
    rendition, an “amendment or modification of an order or
    judgment in an immaterial way does not toll the time within
    which review must be sought.” St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 
    249 So. 2d 27
    , 28 (Fla. 1971); see also Demming v. Demming, 
    251 So. 3d 284
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (holding that an earlier dissolution
    order was an appealable order, so that a later dissolution order
    1  See Fla. Agric. & Mech. Uni., Bd. of Trs. v. United Faculty
    of Fla., No. 1D17-1249 (Fla. 1st DCA May 10, 2017).
    2
    was untimely); Campos v. Campos, 
    230 So. 3d 553
    , 555 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2017) (“[T]he trial court’s repeating the same ruling in the
    later order denying the motion to vacate cannot revive an appeal
    period.”); Caldwell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    980 So. 2d 1226
    , 1229
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“An untimely appeal cannot be revived by
    obtaining a new order to the same effect as the original and then
    filing the notice of appeal within thirty days of the more recent
    order.”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Strickland, 
    913 So. 2d 1227
    , 1228
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that the second final judgment “was
    a mere republication of the earlier order and did not restart the
    time for filing an appeal”).
    FAMU’s response to our second order to show cause eased
    any concern we had that the final judgment was not final unless
    a specific back pay award was determined. However, that
    concern, rationale, and conclusion were equally applicable to the
    first order that entered judgment. Thus, the first order was a
    final and appealable order. FAMU admits that the second order
    “was substantially the same” as the first. Because the second
    order repeated the same ruling from the first order without any
    material changes, it did not affect the 30-day window to appeal;
    FAMU’s second appeal was more than 30 days after rendition of
    the initial order and thus untimely, and we do not have
    jurisdiction to review the order.
    FAMU asserts jurisdiction on three grounds, none of which
    we find persuasive. First, it argues that St. Moritz Hotel and
    similar cases involve situations where the challenging parties did
    not appeal the initial order and subsequently attempted to appeal
    a republished second order. We reject the argument that the time
    limit in Rule 9.110(b) becomes inapplicable so long as a party
    initially timely appeals an order and then dismisses the appeal.
    See Hale v. McNeil, 
    988 So. 2d 1123
    , 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
    (finding the appeal untimely under Rule 9.330 when the
    appellant timely appealed an order, voluntarily dismissed the
    appeal, and attempted to subsequently appeal the order again).
    Second, FAMU argues that the second order resolved a “genuine
    ambiguity” present in the first order. 2 Specifically, after our
    2 See St. Moritz Hotel, 
    249 So. 2d at 28
     (“Only when the
    lower Court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine
    3
    initial order to show cause, the parties questioned whether the
    first order contained sufficient indicia of finality and whether a
    separate order titled “Final Judgment” was required, and the
    second order titled “Final Judgment” resolved this question.
    However, we saw no ambiguity over whether the order—
    including the language “JUDGMENT is entered for [UFF]”—
    contained sufficient language of finality, 3 but only questioned
    whether a specific amount of back pay needed to be determined.
    Third, FAMU asserts that dismissal would be inequitable
    because UFF acted disingenuously and with unclean hands by
    conferring with FAMU and suggesting that a second order could
    resolve the issue, a suggestion FAMU agreed with before moving
    to dismiss its appeal. However, “parties cannot confer jurisdiction
    where none exists,” Demming, 251 So. 3d at 286, and there is no
    indication in the correspondence FAMU submitted with its
    response that UFF acted with malicious intent; the fact that
    UFF’s motion to dismiss was not filed until after this case could
    have been decided on the merits weighs against this accusation.
    III.
    FAMU appealed an order that it correctly believed to be
    final. When we issued an order to show cause regarding whether
    back pay must be determined, FAMU opted to voluntarily
    dismiss its appeal, waiting until we issued the same order to
    show cause following the second appeal to explain that the order
    was final without a specific determination as to back pay.
    However, the second order was a republication of the first and
    FAMU’s appeal of it did not begin a new window to file an appeal.
    Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
    ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period
    within which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari
    filed begin to run anew.” (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
    Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 
    344 U.S. 206
    , 211 (1952))).
    3  See Holland v. Holland, 
    140 So. 3d 1155
    , 1156 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2014) (“While an order must contain ‘unequivocal language
    of finality,’ an order or judgment of a court does not need to
    contain any particular or ‘magic’ words to make it final.”).
    4
    DISMISSED.
    LEWIS, B.L. THOMAS, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Robert E. Larkin, III and Matthew D. Stefany of Allen, Norton &
    Blue, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Thomas W. Brooks and Patricia A. Draper of Meyer, Brooks,
    Demma & Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    5