Hala M. Farid v. Claude Rabbath , 273 So. 3d 221 ( 2019 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-4173
    _____________________________
    HALA M. FARID,
    Appellant,
    v.
    CLAUDE RABBATH,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
    Dawn Caloca-Johnson, Judge.
    May 16, 2019
    PER CURIAM.
    Hala M. Farid, the former wife, appeals an order
    redistributing property and finding both parties in violation of the
    equitable distribution terms in the final judgment. Because the
    trial court’s order is an impermissible modification of the final
    judgment in an enforcement proceeding, we reverse.
    A Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was issued on
    November 29, 2007, and a Supplemental Final Judgment entered
    in 2010. As part of the equitable distribution, the former husband,
    Claude Rabbath, was awarded personal property shipped from
    Kuwait, which the court valued at $100,000. The former husband
    was then ordered to pay the former wife $111,357.80 over the
    following four years at a rate of $2,319.95. monthly.
    On March 16, 2016, the former wife filed a Verified Motion for
    Civil Contempt and Enforcement, alleging the former husband had
    willfully failed to comply with the final order by not making any
    payments toward the equitable property distribution. Thereafter,
    on May 13, 2016, the former husband filed a Verified Motion for
    Enforcement, Contempt and Attorney’s Fees and Costs. The
    former husband requested the former wife be held in contempt for
    failing to deliver the $100,000 in personal property he was
    awarded.
    At the enforcement hearing, the trial court found that both
    parties had violated the terms of the final judgment. However,
    instead of enforcing the final judgment, the trial court changed the
    terms of distribution. The former wife was awarded ownership of
    the personal property shipped from Kuwait, and the former
    husband a $100,000 credit for the property awarded to the former
    wife against his equitable distribution equalization payment of
    $111,357.80. The former husband was ordered to pay the balance,
    $11,357.80, plus interest, and minus alimony and child support
    overpayment.
    This Court reviews orders on motions for enforcement for
    abuse of discretion. See Dugan v. Dugan, 
    498 So. 2d 989
    , 991 (Fla.
    1st DCA 1986). However, where a trial judge fails to apply the
    correct legal rule, the action is erroneous as a matter of law.
    Kennedy v. Kennedy, 
    622 So. 2d 1033
    , 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
    “A party’s property rights, if determined by a final judgment
    of dissolution of marriage, are fixed as a matter of law by the
    judgment, unless there is a reservation of jurisdiction.” Fort v.
    Fort, 
    951 So. 2d 1020
    , 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); see also Bridges
    v. Bridges, 
    848 So. 2d 403
    , 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reversing the
    lower court when, in an attempt to enforce the final judgment of
    dissolution of marriage, the lower court changed the former wife’s
    award of tangible property into an award of money damages);
    Janovic v. Janovic, 
    814 So. 2d 1096
    , 1100-01 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    (“A trial court may not, in the guise of enforcement proceeding
    readdress the distribution of property when the property has been
    previously distributed . . .”). Once the final judgment becomes
    final, the lower court does not retain the power to modify the
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    equitable distribution of property. McEachin v. McEachin, 
    154 So. 2d
    894, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
    Here, the parties’ interest in the property was set when the
    final judgment was entered—the former wife had a property
    interest in the $111,357.80 equalization payment; and the former
    husband had a property interest in the personal property shipped
    from Kuwait. Thus, unless there was a reservation of jurisdiction
    over the distribution of property by the final judgment of
    dissolution, the final judgment establishing property rights could
    not be modified. See Fort, 
    951 So. 2d 1020
    (reversed finding the
    lower court improperly “shuffled” property rights, which were
    settled at final judgment, where there was no reservation of
    jurisdiction). The final judgment states, “This Court reserves
    jurisdiction to modify and enforce terms [of] this final judgment . .
    . .” However, a “blanket reservation of jurisdiction for any
    modification of the final judgment is erroneous as a matter of law
    and legally unnecessary.” Knecht v. Palmer, 
    252 So. 3d 842
    , 847
    (Fla. 5th DCA 2018); see also Daoud v. Daoud, 
    153 So. 3d 312
    , 312
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“the general reservation of jurisdiction for the
    enforcement of its dissolution judgment does not empower a trial
    court to address or redistribute vested property between the
    parties.”); Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 
    877 So. 2d 960
    , 963 (Fla.
    5th DCA 2004) (“At the time a judgment of dissolution of marriage
    becomes final, the parties’ property rights, if determined by the
    judgment, are fixed as a matter of law . . . [and] a trial court lacks
    jurisdiction . . . to determine property rights, unless the final
    judgment reserves jurisdiction for a specific purpose regarding
    identified property.”). Thus, because the reservation of rights here
    is nothing more than a blanket reservation of jurisdiction, it fails
    to provide the lower court the jurisdiction needed to modify the
    final judgment. Therefore, the trial court erred when it “shuffled”
    the property interests previously determined in the final judgment
    when neither party had properly plead for modification, and we
    reverse this portion of the order on appeal.
    The trial court’s finding that the former wife violated the final
    judgment is supported by competent, substantial evidence; thus,
    we affirm this issue. The remaining issues raised by the former
    wife are rendered moot by this opinion.
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    Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and
    REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ROWE, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Summer N. Boyd of the Law Office of Summer Boyd, Jacksonville,
    for Appellant.
    Claude Rabbath, pro se, Appellee.
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