Antoine Robinson v. State of Florida , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 16573 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    ANTOINE ROBINSON,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D13-1679
    [November 4, 2015]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Martin J. Bidwill, Judge; L.T. Case No. 11015902
    CF10A.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson,
    Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R.
    Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC
    KLINGENSMITH, J.
    We grant, in part, Antoine Robinson’s motion for rehearing, deny
    rehearing en banc, and withdraw our previous opinion. We hereby
    substitute the following:
    Antoine Robinson (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction and sentence
    for robbery with a firearm. Although Defendant presents several issues
    on appeal, we confine our opinion to the following question: whether the
    trial court erred in overruling Defendant’s objection to a detective’s
    testimony at trial regarding the termination of an interview with
    Defendant. We find no error in overruling Defendant’s objection, and we
    affirm on all other issues raised.
    At trial, the State played a recording of Defendant’s initial interview
    with the investigating detective. The end of the recording was redacted
    because Defendant invoked his right to silence. After the recording was
    played, the State asked the detective on direct examination:
    Q: You now, I know we touched upon this before, but we
    heard it in the tape. [Defendant], as he was – as you were
    going through the rights waiver form and acknowledging
    everything, he also confirms his ability to leave or stop the
    interview at any time?
    A:   That’s correct.
    Q: And of course you – if he was providing any pertinent
    information or continuing to provide you any pertinent
    information, you wouldn’t have terminated the interview,
    would you?
    A:   Correct.
    Thereafter Defendant made the following objection:
    But what you said, he is essentially leaving it hanging
    there that – putting information that’s being on – that
    pertinent information is being obtained and because
    pertinent information isn’t being obtained, he cut the
    interview off, or the detectives cut it off because they felt as
    though they weren’t getting any further pertinent
    information. I mean, it’s – the jury doesn’t know that. So I
    think that I have to bring out in my cross examination to get
    out from this witness that [Defendant] is the one that
    invoked his right to silence.
    The objection was whether this question improperly insinuated that
    pertinent information was initially being obtained, and once Defendant
    stopped sharing information, the detective ended the interview. Defense
    counsel thought that he would have to cross-examine the witness on the
    fact that it was Defendant invoking his right to silence. The prosecutor
    suggested that he was asking about the interview only to establish
    Defendant’s admission that he was in the vicinity of the robbery on the
    date and time of the robbery. The court overruled the objection but
    warned that if defense counsel wanted to cross examine the detective
    about Defendant’s invocation of his rights in the interview, the court
    would need to have a colloquy with Defendant as to this line of
    2
    questioning. The defense did not elicit any questions in this regard on
    cross-examination.
    During closing argument, defense counsel addressed the fact that
    Defendant terminated the interview. Defendant claims he was forced to
    address this issue in closing to mitigate the situation created when the
    court overruled the prior objection. In closing, defense counsel also
    advised the jury that there was nothing wrong with Defendant’s
    termination of the interview, and that he should not be criticized for
    exercising his rights. In response, without objection, the State asked the
    jury in its closing to consider the fact that Defendant decided to
    terminate the interview only when the detectives told him they had him
    on the surveillance video.
    In asking the question the State insinuated (albeit wrongly) that the
    detective -- not Defendant -- ended the interview. In the context of this
    case, although the question was misleading, the issue of who ended the
    interview was irrelevant to any material issue. It did not call for the
    defense to explain in closing argument the termination of the interview
    by Defendant as an exercise of his right to remain silent. For all the jury
    knew the detective was not receiving pertinent information during the
    interview, because Defendant was claiming innocence of the crime. The
    harm, if any, to the defense came not from the State’s question but from
    defense counsel’s attempt to mitigate it by directly addressing
    Defendant’s right to remain silent.
    This case is not like Melendez v. State, 
    700 So. 2d 791
    (Fla. 4th DCA
    1997), relied on by Defendant.       There, our court found that the
    admission of a letter written by the defendant to the police department
    accusing the detective investigating the defendant’s case of criminal
    activity was irrelevant and immaterial and could mislead the jury as to
    the defendant’s motives, thus suggesting his involvement in the crime.
    We conclude that the issue in this case of who terminated the interview
    is not similar to suggesting involvement in the crime. In fact, suggesting
    that the detective terminated the interview because he was not getting
    material information would suggest that Defendant was not involved in
    the crime.
    As to Defendant’s other issues involving the State’s use of allegedly
    improper evidence at trial and improper arguments during closing, no
    objections to such comments and evidence were made, nor do they rise
    to the level of fundamental error requiring reversal of Defendant’s
    conviction. See Thompson v. State, 
    88 So. 3d 322
    , 324 (Fla. 4th DCA
    3
    2012) (holding that when allegedly improper prosecutorial comments are
    “unobjected to by the defense, reversal is proper only if the prosecutor’s
    statements constituted fundamental error”).
    Affirmed.
    WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4D13-1679

Citation Numbers: 180 So. 3d 1056, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 16573

Judges: Klingensmith, Warner

Filed Date: 11/4/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024