Baker v. State , 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 20934 ( 2014 )

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 31, 2014.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D14-1110
Lower Tribunal No. 13-1330-K
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Jerry Thomas Baker,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Wayne M. Miller,
Judge.
Jerry Thomas Baker, in proper person.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Marlon J. Weiss, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SUAREZ, LAGOA and SCALES, JJ.
SCALES, J.
Jerry Thomas Baker (Baker), appeals from an order of the Monroe County
Circuit Court that transferred his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Leon
County Circuit Court. We vacate the order transferring venue and remand with
instructions that the Monroe County Circuit Court dismiss Baker’s petition.
In 1995, Baker was charged in Monroe County with, inter alia, armed
robbery. After a jury trial, in 1996, Baker was found guilty and sentenced to life in
prison. At all times pertinent to this appeal, Baker has been incarcerated at the
Apalachee Correctional Institution East located in Jackson County.
Since his conviction, Baker has filed a direct appeal of his conviction and a
multitude of post-conviction motions and habeas petitions—all of which were
affirmed, denied, or dismissed without published opinion.1
On December 11, 2013—more than fifteen years after a mandate was issued
upon Baker’s unsuccessful direct appeal—Baker filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Monroe County Circuit Court challenging the charging document
associated with his 1996 conviction. There is no allegation of newly discovered
evidence in the petition.
1 See Baker v. State, 705 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (Table); Baker v.
Singletary, 728 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (Table); Baker v. Singletary, 729
So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1999) (Table); Baker v. State, 766 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000) (Table); Baker v. State, 812 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Table); Baker
v. State, 814 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Table); Baker v. State, 816 So. 2d
627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Table); Baker v. State, 845 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA
2003) (Table); Baker v. State, 896 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (Table); Baker
v. State, 95 So. 3d 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (Table).
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Without ruling on the merits of Baker’s petition, on January 24, 2014, the
Monroe County Circuit Court transferred Baker’s petition to the Second Judicial
Circuit in Leon County.2
The Leon County Circuit Court reviewed Baker’s petition, determined that
Baker was actually attempting to collaterally attack the underlying conviction, and,
on February 11, 2014, dismissed Baker’s petition. In its order of dismissal, the
Leon County Circuit Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
Baker’s claims seeking post-conviction relief.
Baker then filed the instant appeal seeking review of the Monroe County
Circuit Court’s January 24, 2014 order transferring venue.
In his appeal, Baker seems to concede that his petition seeks post-conviction,
rather than habeas corpus, relief. Baker argues: (1) the Monroe County Circuit
Court has jurisdiction over his habeas petition; and (2) the Monroe County Circuit
Court should have construed his habeas petition as a motion for post-conviction
relief and adjudicated same.
2 The cases cited in support of the order transferring venue are distinguishable from
the instant case. In those cases, prisoners sought mandamus relief against the
Department of Corrections (DOC), and the courts determined that the proper venue
was Leon County, where the DOC has its headquarters. See Stovall v. Cooper, 860
So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Barber v. State, 661 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Both parties in the instant case believe Baker’s petition was transferred under the
Monroe County Circuit Court’s mistaken belief that Baker was incarcerated in
Leon County.
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Baker’s first argument is correct. The Monroe County Circuit Court, the
court of conviction, has jurisdiction over Baker’s habeas petition because the
petition challenges the sufficiency of the charging document which amounts to a
collateral attack on Baker’s 1996 conviction. See Richardson v. State, 918 So. 2d
999, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[T]he general rule [is] that a petition for writ of
habeas corpus should be filed in the circuit court where the defendant is detained . .
. . But there is an exception . . . ‘[w]hen a petitioner attacks the validity of the
conviction . . . jurisdiction in habeas proceedings lies with the trial court that
imposed the sentence and rendered the judgment of conviction.’”) (citation
omitted).
Baker’s second argument, however, is incorrect. The Monroe County Circuit
Court did not err by failing to construe the habeas petition as a motion for post-
conviction relief. The grounds raised by Baker are inappropriate for a habeas
petition because they could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. See
Price v. State, 937 So. 2d 702, 702-03 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Moore v. State, 817
So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Additionally, if these grounds were asserted
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, they are time-barred. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b).
Generally, “[i]f a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated
as if the proper remedy had been sought; provided that it shall not be the
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responsibility of the court to seek the proper remedy.” See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c)
(applicable to the circuit court in this case, Fla. R. App. P. 9.010 & 9.030(c)(3));
Zuluaga v. State, Dep’t. of Corrs., 32 So. 3d 674, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
In certain instances, however, dismissal rather than treatment as a Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion, is the appropriate remedy when a
habeas petition challenges the judgment and sentence. See Baker v. State, 878 So.
2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004) (“Accordingly, from now on, we will dismiss as
unauthorized, habeas corpus petitions filed by noncapital defendants that seek the
kind of collateral postconviction relief available through a motion filed in the
sentencing court, and which (1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for
postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims that could have been raised
at trial or, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or
(3) would be considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that either
fails to allege new or different grounds for relief, or alleges new or different
grounds for relief that were known or should have been known at the time the first
motion was filed.”); Richardson, 918 So. 2d at 1004 (“[W]e emphasize that when a
habeas petition is filed raising inappropriate issues that fall within one of the three
categories enumerated in Baker, the appropriate disposition is dismissal. Treating
the petition as a rule 3.850 motion and deciding the issues on the merits based on
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attendant hearings before the trial court is indeed a waste of valuable judicial
resources.”).
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s January 24, 2014 order transferring
venue, and remand with instructions that the Monroe County Circuit Court dismiss
Baker’s petition.
Remanded with instructions.
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