NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JAMES MICHAEL BRADY, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D18-117
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed November 22, 2019.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk
County; William D. Sites, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and
Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public Defender,
Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Michael Schaub,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
LaROSE, Judge.
James Michael Brady challenges his judgment and sentences for
(1) domestic battery, (2) shooting into a building, (3) attempted second-degree murder
with a firearm, and (4) tampering with a witness. See §§ 775.087, 777.04, 782.04(2),
784.03, 790.19, 914.22, Fla. Stat. (2015). We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(1)(A). Because the issues before us warrant no relief, we affirm in all respects.
We write, however, to address Mr. Brady's concern with an incomplete jury instruction
for excusable homicide.
I. A Brief Factual Background
The charges arise from an incident in September 2015. Mr. Brady went to
his nephew's house to watch football on the television. They grilled food and drank
bourbon. When Mr. Brady's wife, Sherry Wiker, arrived, the couple argued about
whether Mr. Brady should drive home drunk. Ms. Wiker went home alone. Later, Mr.
Brady's niece drove him home. Mr. Brady went into a bedroom and retrieved his
shotgun. The shotgun discharged, spewing pellets through the bedroom door and into
Ms. Wiker's arm.
At trial, Mr. Brady argued that the shooting was an accident, his failed
attempt at suicide. The State argued that Mr. Brady intentionally attempted to kill his
wife. The jury convicted Mr. Brady of the lesser included offense of battery for count
one and as charged for the remaining three counts. The trial court sentenced Mr. Brady
to time served on count one, and concurrent terms of fifteen years in prison on count
two and life in prison on counts three and four.
II. Incomplete Jury Instruction for Excusable Homicide
Mr. Brady argues that "[t]he trial court committed fundamental error in
failing to include a jury instruction on excusable homicide." He contends that the
evidence demonstrated that the offense was committed "in the heat of passion" while
Mr. Brady tried to kill himself. The State sees no error because, in its view, Mr. Brady
conceded that the attempted murder was neither justifiable nor excusable.
Section 782.03, Florida Statutes (2015), defines excusable homicide as
follows:
-2-
Homicide is excusable when committed by accident and
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual
ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent, or by
accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any
sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden
combat, without any dangerous weapon being used and not
done in a cruel or unusual manner.1
The State maintains that none of the three circumstances constituting excusable
homicide existed because "[s]uicide is not a lawful act, heat of passion caused by
provocation, or sudden combat."
In attempted murder cases, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the
definitions of justifiable and excusable homicide. Sams v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly
D967, D967 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 12, 2019); Van Loan v. State,
736 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla.
2d DCA 1999) ("A trial court must read the definitions of excusable and justifiable
homicide in all murder and manslaughter cases.").
Typically, and absent a contemporaneous objection, failure to give these
instructions is fundamental error where the defendant was convicted of attempted
manslaughter or a greater offense not more than one step removed, "regardless of
whether the evidence could support either [justifiable or excusable homicide]." State v.
Spencer, 216 So. 3d 481, 486 (Fla. 2017); see also Pena v. State,
901 So. 2d 781, 787
(Fla. 2005) ("If the jury is not properly instructed on the next lower crime, then it is
impossible to determine whether, having been properly instructed, it would have found
the defendant guilty of the next lesser offense. However, when the trial court fails to
1Cf.,e.g., Nicholson ex rel. Gollott v. State, 672 So. 2d 744, 753 (Miss.
1996) (holding excusable homicide instruction inapplicable to fatal shooting which
allegedly occurred during unlawful attempt to commit suicide); People v. Chrisholtz,
285
N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (holding homicide was not excusable by virtue
of an accident or misfortune because suicide and discharging a firearm were unlawful
acts).
-3-
properly instruct on a crime two or more degrees removed from the crime for which the
defendant is convicted, the error is not per se reversible, but instead is subject to a
harmless error analysis.").
In these circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court has carved out two
situations where the defendant cannot successfully assert fundamental error: (1) "where
defense counsel affirmatively agreed to or requested an incomplete instruction," or
(2) "where the defendant expressly conceded that the homicide or attempted homicide
was not justified or excusable."2 Spencer, 216 So. 3d at 486, 488; see, e.g., Gomez v.
State,
274 So. 3d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (holding that the first situation
applied where defense counsel "affirmatively agreed on the record and to the court that
she was not seeking [the justifiable and excusable attempted homicide] instruction").
The second situation does not apply here. Contrary to the State's
assertion, Mr. Brady never conceded that the attempted homicide was not excusable.
See Spencer, 216 So. 3d at 487-88 (stating that "Spencer did not expressly concede
that the attempted homicides were neither justified nor excusable" where defense
counsel did not mention "the presence or absence of excusable or justifiable attempted
homicide" during closing statements and "contended that the State had failed to sustain
its burden of proof"). He always maintained that the shooting was an accident.
2The second situation embodies the principle that fundamental error
occurs where the trial court fails to instruct the jury on a material element in dispute.
See Spencer, 216 So. 3d at 487 (deriving the second situation from the principle "that a
defendant may concede an element of a crime such that it is no longer in dispute for
purposes of a fundamental error analysis").
-4-
Accordingly, we look only at whether defense counsel agreed to the erroneous and
incomplete instruction.3
Defense counsel's failure to object to the omission of an instruction is not
equivalent to an affirmative waiver of the complete instructions. Fletcher v. State,
828
So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (citing Ortiz v. State,
682 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 5th DCA
1996)). Similarly, defense counsel's acquiescence to an incomplete instruction is not an
affirmative waiver. Sams, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D967; see also McNeal v. State,
662 So.
2d 373, 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ("Although defense counsel repeatedly expressed
satisfaction with the proposed instruction that was given by the court, failure to give the
correct instruction is fundamental error.").
An affirmative waiver requires counsel to know of the omission before
agreeing to the incomplete instruction. Van Loan, 736 So. 2d at 804 ("Before this
exception applies, defense counsel must be aware of the omission, alteration, or
incomplete instruction and affirmatively agree to it."); see also Pignataro v. State, 834
So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("Here, as in Van Loan, the record contains no
indication that trial counsel had prior knowledge of the omission and agreed to it.");
Moore v. State, 114 So. 3d 486, 490-91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ("This court has held that
knowledge of the error is necessary to waive fundamental error."). But see Calloway v.
State, 37 So. 3d 891, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (discussing acquiescence to incorrect
3The record does not show that Mr. Brady requested the incomplete
instruction. See Armstrong v. State,
579 So. 2d 734, 734-35 (Fla. 1991) (holding that
no fundamental error occurred where defense counsel requested the trial court give a
limited instruction on the definition of excusable homicide and omit the portions of the
definition not relevant to the case); Sams, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D967 (ruling that
defense counsel's active involvement "in shaping the content of the instructions" was
not "the equivalent of requesting that the court give incomplete instructions—at least not
in the sense the supreme court has employed that exception").
-5-
jury instructions without mentioning the knowledge component). Further, a waiver
depends on the totality of circumstances. Knight v. State,
267 So. 3d 38, 46 (Fla. 1st
DCA), review granted, No. SC18-309,
2018 WL 3097727 (Fla. June 25, 2018).
At Mr. Brady's trial, the trial court specifically directed the parties to the
missing definitions of justifiable and excusable homicide in the jury instructions.
Defense counsel acknowledged the omission. Yet, she agreed to the incomplete jury
instructions without objection. Under the circumstances, Mr. Brady affirmatively waived
any claim to assert fundamental error. See Spencer, 216 So. 3d at 486; Van Loan,
736
So. 2d at 804; see, e.g., Knight, 267 So. 3d at 49 ("conclud[ing] that the facts
established a waiver of the fundamental error" where, "[o]f particular weight was the fact
that the trial court expressly directed defense counsel's attention to the intent element
as a potential error, and counsel agreed to using the language anyway because it was
in the standard instructions").
III. Certified Question of Great Public Importance
We acknowledge that some courts, including this court, have
questioned—without making any definitive ruling on the matter—whether waiver further
requires the record to reflect that counsel knew the omission itself was erroneous. See
Sams, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D967 (certifying, "Is it fundamental error to convict a
defendant under an altered or incomplete lesser included charge where counsel
affirmatively agrees to the instruction, but the record does not show that counsel was
aware of the alteration or omission and affirmatively agreed to it and is it also necessary
for the record to demonstrate that counsel was aware that the instruction, as altered,
was erroneous" (emphasis added)); Knight, 267 So. 3d at 50 (certifying whether counsel
must be aware the instruction was erroneous to waive fundamental error). Such a
-6-
question may necessarily require the consideration of counsel's obligation to stay
abreast of developments in the law and to maintain the requisite legal knowledge and
skill in counsel's practice area. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.1, Competence ("A
lawyer must provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."); see also Knight, 267 So. 3d at 47-48 (recognizing
counsel's obligation to remain informed). With this in mind, we certify the same
question we certified in Sams, as one of great public importance:
IS IT FUNDAMENTAL ERROR TO CONVICT A
DEFENDANT UNDER AN ALTERED OR INCOMPLETE
LESSER INCLUDED CHARGE WHERE COUNSEL
AFFIRMATIVELY AGREES TO THE INSTRUCTION, BUT
THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT COUNSEL WAS
AWARE OF THE ALTERATION OR OMISSION AND
AFFIRMATIVELY AGREED TO IT AND IS IT ALSO
NECESSARY FOR THE RECORD TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT COUNSEL WAS AWARE THAT THE INSTRUCTION,
AS ALTERED, WAS ERRONEOUS?
44 Fla. L. Weekly at D967; see also Knight, 267 So. 3d at 49-50 (certifying similar
question of great public importance).
Affirmed; question of great public importance certified.
MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
-7-
