Terry Marshall III v. State of Florida , 241 So. 3d 969 ( 2018 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-2763
    _____________________________
    TERRY MARSHALL III,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Petition Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel—
    Original Jurisdiction.
    March 29, 2018
    PER CURIAM.
    Terry Marshall III robbed an acquaintance at gunpoint. After
    Marshall was convicted of armed robbery, the trial court sentenced
    him to thirty-three years in prison as a habitual violent offender
    pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes. As part of that
    sentence, the court imposed a fifteen year mandatory-minimum
    term. See § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that a
    habitual violent felony offender convicted of a first-degree felony
    “shall not be eligible for release for 15 years”). Because the jury
    found Marshall was in actual possession of a firearm during the
    robbery, the court also imposed a ten year mandatory-minimum
    term. See § 775.087(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that an
    offender who actually possessed a firearm during certain offenses,
    including robbery, “shall be sentenced to a minimum term of
    imprisonment of 10 years”). Over defense counsel’s objection, the
    court orally imposed the two mandatory-minimum terms
    consecutively. Marshall’s direct appeal, which only challenged an
    evidentiary ruling during trial, resulted in affirmance without
    opinion. Marshall v. State, 
    166 So. 3d 772
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    (table).
    Marshall now files a petition alleging ineffective assistance of
    appellate counsel. He claims his appointed attorney should have
    contested the consecutive mandatory-minimum terms. He
    correctly contends the consecutive sentences were not permitted
    by law. * See Jones v. State, 
    667 So. 2d 349
    , 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    (“[O]n the authority of the recent decision of the Florida Supreme
    Court in Jackson v. State, 
    659 So. 2d 1060
     (Fla. 1995), we hold that
    the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive three-year
    minimum mandatory sentence for the use of a firearm together
    with a 15-year habitual violent felony offender sentence for
    offenses that arose out of a single criminal episode.”). The State
    argues that Marshall cannot demonstrate the required prejudice
    to be entitled to relief, see Rutherford v. Moore, 
    774 So. 2d 637
    , 643
    (Fla. 2000), because the written judgment and sentence imposed
    the two mandatory-minimum terms concurrently. But the oral
    pronouncement controls, Ashley v. State, 
    850 So. 2d 1265
     (Fla.
    2003), and Marshall is currently serving an unlawful sentence.
    We conclude Marshall’s appellate counsel was ineffective for
    failing to move to correct the sentence and, if unsuccessful, raising
    the issue on direct appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(e) (providing
    that a sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless first
    brought to the attention of the lower court at the time of sentencing
    or by a rule 3.800(b) motion); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b) (2)
    (permitting appellate counsel to file a motion to correct a
    sentencing error while a direct appeal is pending); Anderson v.
    State, 
    988 So. 2d 144
    , 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (finding appellate
    counsel ineffective for failing to file a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion
    challenging an illegal reclassification of the degree of felony).
    * Marshall raises a second ineffective assistance claim which
    we reject without discussion.
    2
    Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct the trial court to
    resentence Marshall. See 
    id.
     (“[W]here a second appeal would be
    redundant or unnecessary, it is appropriate to simply grant
    petitioner the relief to which he would have been entitled had the
    issue been raised in the original appeal.”).
    PETITION GRANTED.
    WOLF, OSTERHAUS, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Terry Marshall III, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel B. Steinberg,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2763

Citation Numbers: 241 So. 3d 969

Filed Date: 3/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/29/2018