Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 20, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-1281
Lower Tribunal No. 20-121 AP
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Florida International University,
Petitioner,
vs.
Samantha Ramos,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Appellate Division, Daryl E. Trawick, Lisa Walsh, and Maria de
Jesus Santovenia, Judges.
Marrero & Wydler, and Oscar E. Marrero and Lourdes Espino Wydler,
for petitioner.
Andrew M. Kassier, P.A., and Andrew M. Kassier, for respondent.
Before MILLER, LOBREE, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Petitioner, Florida International University, seeks second-tier certiorari
relief from an opinion rendered by the appellate division of the Circuit Court
of Miami-Dade County in favor of respondent, Samantha Ramos. In its
decision, the lower court quashed a disciplinary order rendered by the
Student Conduct Committee (the “SCC”) following a final academic
misconduct hearing. The opinion concluded Ramos was deprived of due
process because she was denied the opportunity to elicit evidence of the
bias and motive of a critical witness. The primary issue raised in the petition
is whether the circuit court erroneously expanded Ramos’s due process
rights, in contravention of the governing Student Code of Conduct (the
“Code”). Constrained by our standard of review, we deny relief.
BACKGROUND
The relevant chronology is undisputed. Ramos, a member of the
University’s Honors College and Quantifying Biology in the Classroom
Program, submitted organic chemistry laboratory reports bearing striking
similarities to those submitted by current and past students. Suspecting
plagiarism, the laboratory teaching assistant reported her conduct to a
professor, who, in turn, submitted an academic misconduct report,
accompanied by several laboratory reports and documentation detailing
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plagiarism-related concerns, to the Office of Student Conduct and Academic
Integrity.
Following an investigation, Ramos and two other students were
charged with plagiarism and provided with different alternatives for resolution
of the charges. Ramos elected to proceed before the SCC. A hearing was
convened in accordance with the Code, and, during the hearing, Ramos
sought to question the teaching assistant regarding incidents bearing on bias
and motive.
Ramos alleged she and others observed students potentially cheating
on an exam. She reported the matter to the teaching assistant, and,
according to Ramos, he responded by stating, “You are going to ruin my
entire career, and you know that. I am going to ruin yours.” Because this
encounter preceded the plagiarism allegations, Ramos contended she was
the victim of retaliation. For further support of her theory, she relied upon
the fact that she received satisfactory grades throughout the semester on
other laboratory reports. Finally, she contended the teaching assistant had
tampered with a necessary witness to the disciplinary proceedings,
rendering him recalcitrant. Despite the proffer, the hearing officer prohibited
any inquiry into these areas.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found Ramos was
“responsible for plagiarism” and assigned a written reprimand, grade
reductions to zero on the three laboratory reports, and an ethics-related
educational activity. Ramos unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the
University’s Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs. She then sought
certiorari review in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. In the
first-tier certiorari proceedings, Ramos contended she was deprived of due
process. The circuit court granted relief and quashed the decision below,
finding “[the University] violated Ramos’s due process rights in failing to
follow its own rules.” This petition ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Second-tier certiorari is not an opportunity for a second appeal.
Instead, “[a]s a practical matter, the circuit court’s final ruling in most first-tier
cases is conclusive, for second-tier review is extraordinarily” narrow. Fla.
Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania,
761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 2000). Our
“‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due
process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as
otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law.” Custer
Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co.,
62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting
Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs,
658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995)); see also
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Nader v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,
87 So. 3d 712, 725
(Fla. 2012) (“[T]he district court must determine whether the decision of the
circuit court . . . is a departure from the essential requirements of law
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In the instant petition, the University contends the governing
administrative documents compel the conclusion the hearing officer properly
exercised discretion in prohibiting questioning into bias or motive. Thus, it
reasons, the circuit court departed from the procedures in quashing the
disciplinary decision. We are not so persuaded.
We note at the onset that, despite an assertion to the contrary, the
University is not entitled to any deference in the interpretation of its governing
rules. See Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. (“In interpreting a state statute or rule, a
state court or an officer hearing an administrative action pursuant to general
law may not defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of such statute
or rule, and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo.”). In the
context of second-tier certiorari, “[c]learly established law can be derived not
only from case law dealing with the same issue of law, but also from ‘an
interpretation or application of a statute, a procedural rule, or a constitution
provision.’” State Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Edenfield, 58
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So. 3d 904, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Kaklamanos,
843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003)). Certiorari relief, however, “is
not available when we might be confronted by simple legal error or when we
might disagree with the appellate division’s interpretation of applicable law.”
Gables Ins. Recovery v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co.,
159 So. 3d 863, 865 (Fla.
3d DCA 2014).
Fundamental to due process is that the ultimate decision in any hearing
be based upon evidence presented, which the accused has sufficient
opportunity to refute. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). To fulfill
these requirements, a party is entitled to both “notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.” Pena v. Rodriguez,
273 So. 3d 237, 240 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2019); see also Amend. XIV, U.S. Const.; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.
Against these principles, in the context of student disciplinary
proceedings, due process is satisfied by affording “adequate notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and substantial evidence to support the penalty.”
Student Alpha ID No. Guja v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty.,
616 So. 2d 1011,
1012 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In this regard, students are not afforded the same
safeguards as criminal defendants.
Id. Rather, “[t]he due process
requirement of a student administrative proceeding is that the proceeding
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must be ‘essentially fair.’” Matar v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
944 So. 2d 1153, 1160
(Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Student Alpha ID No. Guja,
616 So. 2d at 1013).
In Florida, institutions within the Florida College System are required
to publish certain minimum due process protections in their respective codes
of conduct. § 1006.60, Fla. Stat. (2021). As pertinent to this case, such
protections shall include “[t]he right to present relevant information and
question witnesses.” § 1006.60(3)(e), Fla. Stat. In accord with these edicts,
here, under the Code, the accused is permitted to present “relevant
[w]itnesses and information at the hearing.” Further, the student may
question witnesses “in accordance with the Hearing Procedures.” As
relevant to this issue, the hearing officer is authorized to “place limits on the
length of testimony” and “advise to the scope, direction or tone of
questioning.”
Our highest court has held “[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to
exploration . . . and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and
affecting the weight of his testimony.’” Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974) (quoting 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev.
1970)). Consequently, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses as to
bias and motive is a minimum requirement of due process. Morrissey v.
Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 471 (1972).
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In the instant case, the incidents alleged by Ramos involving the
teaching assistant were indubitably relevant to both bias and motive. The
line of questioning was therefore authorized by the Code.
The University, argues, however, that under the Code, the SCC
hearing officer had the discretion to “place limits on the length of testimony,
and also, [could] advise to the scope, direction or tone of questioning.” While
this is a correct recitation of the Code, it cannot be read in isolation. Instead,
the provision must be harmonized with the right of the accused to present
relevant information and cross-examine witnesses.
Here, the testimony of the teaching assistant played a pivotal role in
the proceedings. Consequently, evidence bearing on his bias and motive to
fabricate charges may have influenced the minds of the factfinders as to
whether he should be deemed credible. Under these circumstances, in
concluding the refusal by the hearing officer to allow Ramos to develop her
theory of defense undermined basic tenets of due process, the circuit court
did not run afoul of clearly established law.
Accordingly, and mindful of the narrow scope of our review, we
conclude certiorari relief is improvident. Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
774 So. 2d
679, 682 (Fla. 2000); see Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and
Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 233, 235 (2009)
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(“When used properly, standards of review require appellate judges to
exercise self-restraint and in so doing, act to create a more respected and
consistent body of appellate law and a more efficient judicial system.”);
Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723 (quoting Heggs,
658 So. 2d at 526 n.4) (“[A]ppellate
courts must exercise caution not to expand certiorari jurisdiction to review
the correctness of the circuit court’s decision. This would deprive litigants of
the finality of judgments reviewed by the circuit court and ignore ‘societal
interests in ending litigation within a reasonable length of time and
eliminating the amount of judicial labors involved in multiple appeals.’”); see
also Edenfield, 58 So. 3d at 906 (“[A] misapplication or an erroneous
interpretation of the correct law does not rise to the level of a violation of a
clearly established principle of law.”); Hous. Auth. of Tampa v. Burton,
874
So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“Unlike application of incorrect law,
misapplication of correct law by a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity
generally does not constitute a violation of clearly established law resulting
in a miscarriage of justice.”).
Petition denied.
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