ROSITA JESSER v. MARIE BECKELL ( 2021 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed November 3, 2021.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D20-1587
    Lower Tribunal No. 12-16964
    ________________
    Rosita Jesser, et al.,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    Marie Beckell,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Oscar
    Rodriguez-Fonts, Judge.
    The Law Office of Niles B. Whitten, PLLC, and Niles B. Whitten
    (Gainesville), for appellants.
    No appearance, for appellee.
    Before EMAS, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellants Rosita Jesser, Lorena Attalah and Yolanda Kenny, appeal
    the trial court’s order denying their motion, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
    Civil Procedure 1.540(b), to vacate or set aside a partial summary judgment.
    Upon our review of the record, we conclude appellants have failed to
    establish that the trial court abused its discretion—much less grossly abused
    its discretion—in denying the motion to vacate. See Deutsche Bank Nat.
    Trust Co. v. Del Busto, 
    254 So. 3d 1050
    , 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
    (observing: “This Court generally reviews a trial court's ruling on a rule
    1.540(b) motion for relief from judgment for abuse of discretion”); Barco
    Holdings, LLC v. Terminal Inv. Corp., 
    967 So. 2d 281
    , 295 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2007) (noting: “Our standard of review of an order ruling on a motion for relief
    from judgment filed under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) is whether
    there has been an abuse of the trial court's discretion”) (quotation omitted);
    LPP Mortg., Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 
    826 So. 2d 462
    , 463-64 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2002) (holding that a “trial court's ruling [on a motion for Rule 1.540
    relief] should not be disturbed on appeal absent a gross abuse of discretion”)
    (citing Schwab & Co. v. Breezy Bay, Inc., 
    360 So. 2d 117
    , 118 (Fla. 3d DCA
    1978) for the proposition that “[t]he discretion reposed in the trial judge by
    Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 is of the broadest scope and in order to reverse a judge's
    ruling thereunder, there must be a showing of a gross abuse of discretion”).
    2
    See also Benefit Admin. Sys., LLC v. W. Kendall Baptist Hosp., Inc., 
    274 So. 3d 480
    , 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding: “Because the circumstances
    constituting excusable neglect are not precisely defined, ‘the facts of each
    case are of singular importance in determining whether relief should be
    granted.’ A court has discretion to set aside a default judgment if the moving
    party establishes: ‘(1) excusable neglect in failing to timely file a response;
    (2) a meritorious defense; and (3) due diligence in seeking relief after
    discovery of the default.’ Failure to satisfy any one of these elements will
    result in denial of the motion to vacate.”) (quotations omitted).
    3