MAYRA JOLI, etc. v. TODD B. HANNON, etc. ( 2021 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed November 5, 2021.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D21-2068
    Lower Tribunal No. 21-21471
    ________________
    Mayra Joli, etc.,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Todd B. Hannon, etc.,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark
    Blumstein, Judge.
    Mayra Joli, in proper person.
    Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and John A. Greco, Deputy City
    Attorney, and Christopher A. Green and George K. Wysong, Senior
    Assistant City Attorneys, for appellee.
    Before EMAS, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.
    EMAS, J.
    Mayra Joli, a putative candidate for the office of Mayor of the City of
    Miami in the November 2, 2021 election, appeals from the trial court’s final
    judgment determining that she was not a qualified candidate for that office
    because she did not meet the requirement, set forth in the City of Miami
    Charter, that candidates must reside in the City of Miami for at least one year
    prior to qualifying for office. See City of Miami Charter, § 4(b) (“Candidates
    for mayor shall be residents of the city for at least one (1) year prior to
    qualifying and shall be electors therein.”) See also Miami Code, § 16-6(f)
    (providing that, under certain enumerated circumstances, the City of Miami
    Clerk is “authorized and directed to file and prosecute an appropriate action
    in the circuit court for Dade County, in the name of the city clerk, solely for
    the purpose of receiving a judicial determination with regard to the
    qualifications of the candidate. . . .”)
    On appeal, Joli does not contend that the final judgment is unsupported
    by competent substantial evidence. 1           Instead, she asserts that Todd
    1
    Indeed, our independent review of the record, including the transcript of the
    expedited evidentiary hearing held by the trial court, establishes that the trial
    court’s determination was amply supported by competent, substantial
    evidence. See Underwater Eng'g Servs., Inc. v. Util. Bd. of City of Key West,
    
    194 So. 3d 437
    , 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (providing: “In reviewing a judgment
    rendered after a bench trial, ‘the trial court's findings of fact come to the
    appellate court with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed
    unless they are clearly erroneous.’ Emaminejad v. Ocwen Loan Serv’g, LLC,
    2
    Hannon, Clerk of the City of Miami, lacked standing to commence the action
    in circuit court seeking a judicial determination of whether Joli was a qualified
    candidate. However, and as the City of Miami correctly points out, Joli did
    not raise this issue at any point during the proceedings below. In fact, Joli
    announced in open court she had no objection to a judicial determination of
    whether she met the requisite qualifications to run as a candidate for the
    office of Mayor of the City of Miami. Because appellant failed to raise any
    objection to the City Clerk’s standing, she is precluded from raising this claim
    for the first time on appeal. See Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political
    Comm., 
    625 So. 2d 840
    , 842 (Fla. 1993) (holding that appellant “waived the
    right to raise the issue of standing because this issue has been raised for the
    first time in her petition to this Court. The issue of standing should have been
    raised as an affirmative defense before the trial court, and Krivanek's failure
    to do so constitutes a waiver of that defense, precluding her from raising that
    issue now”); Republic of Ecuador v. Dassum, 
    255 So. 3d 390
    , 392 (Fla. 3d
    
    156 So. 3d 534
    , 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). Thus, they are reviewed for
    competent, substantial evidence.”)
    We further note that, notwithstanding the burden placed upon appellant to
    prepare and transmit an adequate record to ensure meaningful appellate
    review, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(e); Rose v. Hansell, 
    929 So. 2d 22
     (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2006), Joli failed to provide any record on appeal. The City’s answer
    brief, however, was accompanied by an appendix of nearly 800 pages,
    including a transcript of the evidentiary hearing.
    3
    DCA 2017) (noting it is “well-established that standing is an affirmative
    defense that must be raised by the defendant to avoid waiver.”) See also
    Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass'n v. Robbins, 
    914 So. 2d 925
    , 928 (Fla. 2005)
    (holding: “In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an
    issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument
    or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation
    if it is to be considered preserved” (quoting Tillman v. State, 
    471 So. 2d 32
    ,
    35 (Fla. 1985)); Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 
    731 So. 2d 638
    (Fla. 1999)(a claim not raised in the trial court will not be considered on
    appeal); Dober v. Worrell, 
    401 So. 2d 1322
     (Fla. 1981) (appellate court will
    not consider issues not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final
    judgment on the merits).
    Affirmed.
    4