A.M. v. State ( 2014 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed August 6, 2014.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D14-1259
    Lower Tribunal No. 14-1717
    ________________
    A.M., a juvenile,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    The State of Florida, et al.,
    Respondents.
    A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Billie Jan Goldstein, Assistant
    Public Defender, for petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney
    General, for respondents.
    Before SUAREZ, EMAS and SCALES, JJ.
    EMAS, J.
    A.M., a juvenile, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking release
    from custody and asserting that he is being unlawfully held in secure detention
    because his offense was improperly designated a violent third-degree felony. The
    question presented is whether the charge of robbery by sudden snatching is a
    violent third-degree felony or a non-violent third-degree felony for purposes of
    determining whether A.M. met the criteria for secure detention. For the reasons
    that follow, we hold that, under the facts of the instant case, the offense of robbery
    by sudden snatching should properly have been designated a non-violent third-
    degree felony.
    A.M. was arrested on May 22, 2014, and charged with robbery by sudden
    snatching, a third-degree felony. The arrest report included the following factual
    narrative in support of the arrest:
    [Victim] was walking in the park when the def. ran up behind him and
    snatched the cell phone which was in his hand. The def. fled from the
    park. [Witness] was with the def. when it happened and provided
    information on the def. and identified the def. from photograph. The
    def. was located at his residence and was arrested. Def. taken to the
    JAC [Juvenile Assessment Center] via [Police] Station 6.
    A detention hearing was held the following day. At that detention hearing,
    the court is required to utilize the results of the Detention Risk Assessment
    Instrument (“Risk Assessment”) in determining the need for continued detention,
    or the appropriate conditions for release pending an adjudicatory hearing. See §§
    985.255(3)(a), 985.245(1)-(2), Florida Statutes (2014). The Risk Assessment is a
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    point-based system which assigns points based upon, for example, the nature of the
    juvenile’s current offense and any prior or pending offenses.         If the Risk
    Assessment results in a score of twelve points or more, a juvenile may continue to
    be held in secure detention.
    Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the Department of Juvenile
    Justice (“the Department”) prepared the Risk Assessment, as provided by section
    985.245, Florida Statutes (2014), and designated the robbery by sudden snatching
    as a violent third-degree felony which, together with A.M.’s other pending
    offenses, resulted in a qualifying score for secure detention. However, had the
    robbery by sudden snatching been designated a non-violent third-degree felony,
    A.M.’s score would not have qualified him for secure detention and would have
    resulted in his release on home detention.1
    In 1999, the Florida Legislature enacted section 812.131, Florida Statutes,
    entitled “Robbery by Sudden Snatching.” It provides in pertinent part as follows:
    (1) “Robbery by sudden snatching” means the taking of
    money or other property from the victim's person, with
    intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim
    or the owner of the money or other property, when, in the
    1 It is unnecessary to address the other aspects of the Risk Assessment that were
    relied upon in ordering secure detention, because the dispositive question here is
    whether the instant offense should have been scored as a violent third-degree
    felony or a non-violent third-degree felony. The parties agree that if the robbery
    by sudden snatching was a violent third-degree felony, A.M. qualifies for secure
    detention; if it was a non-violent third-degree felony, A.M. would have been
    released on home detention.
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    course of the taking, the victim was or became aware of
    the taking. In order to satisfy this definition, it is not
    necessary to show that:
    (a) The offender used any amount of force beyond that
    effort necessary to obtain possession of the money or
    other property; or
    (b) There was any resistance offered by the victim to the
    offender or that there was injury to the victim's person.
    (2)(a) If, in the course of committing a robbery by sudden
    snatching, the offender carried a firearm or other deadly
    weapon, the robbery by sudden snatching is a felony of
    the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082,
    s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
    (b) If, in the course of committing a robbery by sudden
    snatching, the offender carried no firearm or other deadly
    weapon, the robbery by sudden snatching is a felony of
    the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
    775.083, or s. 775.084.
    §812.131, Fla. Stat. (2014).
    The statute does not require that the offender use or threaten to use any force
    or violence in order to commit the crime of robbery by sudden snatching. In fact,
    no force whatsoever is required “beyond that effort necessary to obtain possession
    of the money or other property.” The only elemental difference between a robbery
    by sudden snatching and a theft is that robbery by sudden snatching requires proof
    that “in the course of the taking, the victim was or became aware of the taking.” §
    812.131(1). This can be further established by comparing the jury instructions for
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    grand theft (Fla. Std. J. Instr. (Crim.) 14.1) and robbery by sudden snatching (Fla.
    Std. J. Instr. (Crim.) 15.4):
    14.1 THEFT
    § 812.014, Fla. Stat.
    To prove the crime of Theft, the State must prove the
    following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
    1.    (Defendant) knowingly and unlawfully [obtained or
    used] [endeavored to obtain or to use] the (property
    alleged) of (victim).
    2.    [He] [She] did so with intent to, either temporarily or
    permanently,
    a.    [deprive (victim) of [his] [her] right to the property or
    any benefit from it.]
    b.    [appropriate the property of (victim) to [his] [her] own
    use or to the use of any person not entitled to it.]
    15.4 ROBBERY BY SUDDEN SNATCHING
    § 812.131, Fla. Stat.
    To prove the crime of Robbery by Sudden Snatching, the
    State must prove the following four elements beyond a
    reasonable doubt:
    1.    (Defendant) took the (money or property described in
    charge) from the person of (person alleged).
    2.    The property taken was of some value.
    3.    The taking was with the intent to permanently or
    temporarily deprive (victim) or the owner of [his] [her]
    right to the property.
    4.    In the course of the taking, (victim) was or became aware
    of the taking.
    It is the last element above that, for our purposes, differentiates theft from
    robbery    by     sudden   snatching;   a   theft,   accompanied   by   the   victim’s
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    contemporaneous awareness of the taking, makes the theft a robbery by sudden
    snatching. The robbery by sudden snatching jury instruction further provides:
    It is not necessary for the State to prove that the
    defendant used any amount of force beyond that effort
    necessary to obtain possession of the money or other
    property, that there was any resistance offered by the
    victim or that there was any injury to the victim’s person.
    Fla. Std. J. Instr. (Crim.) 15.4
    Given the plain language of the statute, echoed in the provisions of the
    standard jury instructions, we conclude that robbery by sudden snatching is not, by
    its statutory elements, a violent third-degree felony and should not have been
    designated as such in the instant case when scoring A.M.’s offense under the Risk
    Assessment. See Thomas v. State, 
    983 So. 2d 746
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding
    the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual is not a
    statutory element of the crime of robbery by sudden snatching). See also T.K. v.
    State, 
    125 So. 3d 970
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)(holding that, given the plain language
    of the term “violent,” the crime of aggravated fleeing and eluding was not a violent
    second-degree felony for purposes of the Risk Assessment).
    We have considered the case relied upon by Respondent, J.W. v. Leitner,
    
    801 So. 2d 295
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In J.W., the juvenile was confined in secure
    detention following his commitment and pending placement in a high-risk
    residential program. Such detention is authorized under section 985.214(10)(c),
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    Florida Statutes (2014), and requires a score of twelve or more points on a risk
    assessment instrument. The risk assessment established that the juvenile was
    initially charged with robbery by sudden snatching, which was scored as nine
    points, clearly below the twelve-point minimum. The issue directly addressed in
    J.W. was not whether robbery by sudden snatching was properly scored as a
    violent third-degree felony, but whether the trial court could rely upon other
    information provided by the Department (but not authorized for consideration
    under the statute) in determining whether the juvenile met the criteria for secure
    detention. The Second District held that “a child awaiting placement in a high-risk
    residential program may not be held in secure detention unless they meet detention
    criteria” under section 985.215(10)(c).
    In a footnote, the J.W. court did state that the offense of robbery by sudden
    snatching was correctly scored as a violent third-degree felony. 
    Id.
     at 297 n. 1.
    However, this statement is not necessary to the holding in J.W. We consider it
    dicta and, based upon our analysis, respectfully disagree with our sister court’s
    conclusion in this regard. See Puryear v. State, 
    810 So. 2d 901
     (Fla. 2002) (noting
    statements not necessary to the holding constitute dicta.)
    We hold that, in light of the statutory elements of the crime, and the factual
    allegations in this case,2 the offense of robbery by sudden snatching should not
    2At a detention hearing, the court is required, in part, to determine “the existence
    of probable cause to believe the child has committed a delinquent act.” See Fla. R.
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    have been scored as a violent third-degree felony. However, in light of petitioner’s
    release during the pendency of this cause, we dismiss the petition as moot.3
    Juv. P. 8.010(g). We need not and therefore do not decide whether a court could
    find a robbery by sudden snatching constitutes a “violent third-degree felony”
    where the factual allegations of the particular crime support a finding of probable
    cause that the juvenile in fact used or threatened to use force or violence. See
    T.K., 
    125 So. 3d at 972
     (considering both the statutory elements of the crime and
    the factual allegations of the particular crime in assessing whether it could be
    considered a “violent” offense for purposes of the Risk Assessment).
    3 Because the petitioner was released from secure detention during the pendency of
    this cause, Respondent suggested we need not reach the merits of the petition.
    Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to do so, since this issue has arisen in the
    past and is likely to recur. Holly v. Auld, 
    450 So. 2d 217
    , 218 n. 1 (Fla. 1984).
    Juvenile detention issues, such as the one raised here, are capable of repetition yet
    evading review, given their frequent resolution before the appellate court can
    complete its review and render a merits decision. C.J. v. Rolle, 
    608 So. 2d 117
    (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); J.L.B. v. Kelly, 
    93 So. 3d 1137
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); K.E. v.
    Department of Juvenile Justice, 
    963 So. 2d 864
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); T.T. v.
    Esteves, 
    828 So. 2d 449
     (Fla 4th DCA 2002).
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