Rickardo Stephens v. State , 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10112 ( 2014 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    January Term 2014
    RICKARDO STEPHENS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D12-4523
    [July 2, 2014]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    2012CF003790AXX.
    Rickardo Stephens, Arcadia, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney,
    Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    DAMOORGIAN, C.J.
    Rickardo Stephens appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro se motion
    to withdraw plea after sentencing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 3.170(l). Prior to the court’s ruling on Stephens’ motion, his
    counsel withdrew on the grounds of conflict. Although Stephens requested
    that the court appoint him conflict-free counsel in his motion, the court
    summarily denied it without appointing conflict-free counsel. We find
    error and reverse.
    Rule 3.170(l) provides for a motion to withdraw plea within thirty days
    after sentencing on grounds specified in Florida Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)a-e. A motion to withdraw plea is considered a
    critical stage of a criminal proceeding, and thus a defendant is entitled to
    counsel. Schriber v. State, 
    959 So. 2d 1254
    , 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
    Accordingly, the court erred in considering Stephens’ motion without first
    appointing conflict-free counsel.1 We reverse and remand, directing the
    trial court to appoint conflict-free counsel to assist Stephens in drafting
    his motion. The trial court may then determine whether to summarily
    deny the motion or to hold an evidentiary hearing.
    Reversed and Remanded.
    WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur.
    *         *          *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    1   Had Stephens’ counsel not withdrawn, our analysis would be different.
    Under such a scenario, so long as the motion alleged an adversarial relationship
    between Stephens and his counsel, the trial court would have been required to
    “hold a limited hearing” to determine whether “an adversarial relationship
    between counsel and the defendant has arisen” and thus whether Stephens was
    entitled to new, conflict-free counsel. Sheppard v. State, 
    17 So. 3d 275
    , 287 (Fla.
    2009); see also Nelfrard v. State, 
    34 So. 3d 221
    , 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4D12-4523

Citation Numbers: 141 So. 3d 701, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10112, 2014 WL 2957463

Judges: Damoorgian, Warner

Filed Date: 7/2/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024