JOSHUA SARGEANT v. STATE OF FLORIDA , 242 So. 3d 439 ( 2018 )


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  •          DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    JOSHUA SARGEANT,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Respondent.
    No. 4D17-3753
    [April 4, 2018]
    Petition for writ of prohibition to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Edward Harold Merrigan, Judge; L.T. Case No. 17-
    10817CF10A.
    Howard Finkelstein, Public Defender, and Sarah Sandler, Assistant
    Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine
    Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    GROSS, J.
    Joshua Sargeant challenges his prosecution in Broward adult circuit
    court for burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, a third-degree felony
    allegedly committed when he was fourteen years old. His case was
    transferred to adult court based on an unrelated and pending prosecution
    as an adult in St. Lucie County, which is in a different judicial circuit. He
    contends that, under section 985.557(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2017),
    transfer to adult court is authorized only if adult charges are pending in
    the same circuit. We reject this argument and deny prohibition. 1
    1 Sargeant filed this case as a petition for writ of certiorari following a circuit court
    order denying his motion to dismiss. We elected to treat this case as a petition
    for writ of prohibition under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), based
    on case law recognizing that prohibition lies in disputes on the issue of
    jurisdiction between juvenile and adult divisions of the circuit court. See, e.g.,
    Alton v. Conkling, 
    421 So. 2d 1108
    , 1110 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Robidoux v. Coker,
    
    383 So. 2d 719
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State ex rel. Register v. Safer, 
    368 So. 2d 620
     (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
    The legislature has given subsection 985.557(3) a name—“EFFECT OF
    DIRECT FILE.” Subsection 985.557(3)(a) implements the policy “once
    sentenced as an adult, always an adult.” Subsection (a) provides that once
    a juvenile has “been transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to an
    information and has been found to have committed the presenting offense
    or a lesser included offense,” the juvenile “shall be handled thereafter in
    every respect as if an adult for any subsequent violation of state law,
    unless the court imposes juvenile sanctions under s. 985.565.” (Emphasis
    added). The statute does not tie its impact to the same circuit where the
    juvenile was prosecuted and sentenced as an adult because adult
    treatment is mandated for “any” subsequent state prosecution.
    Consistent with the treatment of a juvenile sentenced as an adult in
    subsection (3)(a), subsection 985.557(3)(b) describes the treatment of a
    juvenile “who is transferred for criminal prosecution as an adult” and who
    has other pending cases—the child must be prosecuted as an adult for all
    outstanding felony charges.
    (b) When a child is transferred for criminal prosecution as an
    adult, the court shall immediately transfer and certify to the
    adult circuit court all felony cases pertaining to the child, for
    prosecution of the child as an adult, which have not yet
    resulted in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or in which a
    finding of guilt has not been made. If a child is acquitted of
    all charged offenses or lesser included offenses contained in
    the original case transferred to adult court, all felony cases
    that were transferred to adult court as a result of this
    paragraph shall be subject to the same penalties to which
    such cases would have been subject before being transferred
    to adult court.
    § 985.557(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). Once again, the
    statute is not circuit-specific; transfer to “adult court” is required of “all
    felony cases,” wherever their geographic location may be.
    Applying the plain language of section 985.557, the transfer of the
    Broward case to adult court was authorized because of Sargeant’s pending
    prosecution as an adult in St. Lucie County.
    We reject the application of State v. A.C., 
    714 So. 2d 617
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    1998), and Medina v. State, 
    732 So. 2d 1153
     (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), because
    those cases construed the 1997 version of the statute, which was
    -2-
    substantially different. 2 The statute was amended to its current form in
    1999. See Ch. 99-284, § 26, Laws of Fla.
    A.C. involved juveniles who had committed offenses and were
    adjudicated delinquent before October 1, 1997, which is when the transfer
    provision in the statute first went into effect. The juveniles opposed
    transfer arguing that subjecting them to adult sanctions would increase
    the punishment for their offenses and violate ex post facto laws. 
    714 So. 2d at 618
    . A.C. interpreted the 1997 statute and concluded that its
    “objective” was to have “all pending delinquency and criminal proceedings
    before the same court at the same time.” 
    Id.
     A.C. held that no ex post
    facto violation occurred because the only effect of the transfer provision
    was “to alter which division of the circuit court has jurisdiction of those
    pending dispositions.” 
    Id. at 619
    .
    Similarly, Medina construed the 1997 version of the statute and
    believed that the purpose of transferring postadjudicatory juvenile cases
    to the adult court was to promote efficiency. 
    732 So. 2d at 1155
     (“The
    apparent intent of the statute is to promote efficiency by having all open
    juvenile cases transferred to the felony division handling the direct-filed
    cases.”). Medina held that “[o]nce transferred, however, post-adjudicatory
    juvenile cases retain their juvenile status. The only effect is to alter which
    division of the circuit court is responsible for the pending cases.” 
    Id.
    The effect of the 1999 amendment was to clarify that only felony cases,
    “which have not yet resulted in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or in
    which a finding of guilt has not been made,” would be transferred but that
    2   The 1997 version of the statute provided:
    When a child is transferred for criminal prosecution as an adult,
    the court shall immediately transfer and certify to the appropriate
    court all preadjudicatory cases that pertain to that child which are
    pending in juvenile court, including, but not limited to, all cases
    involving offenses that occur or are referred between the date of
    transfer and sentencing in adult court and all outstanding juvenile
    disposition orders. The juvenile court shall make every effort to
    dispose of all predispositional cases and transfer those cases to the
    adult court prior to adult sentencing. It is the intent of the
    Legislature to require all cases occurring prior to the sentencing
    hearing in adult court to be handled by the adult court for final
    resolution with the original transfer case.
    § 985.227(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).
    -3-
    those cases lose their juvenile status. The transfer provision was amended
    as follows:
    (b) When a child is transferred for criminal prosecution as
    an adult, the court shall immediately transfer and certify to
    the adult circuit appropriate court all felony preadjudicatory
    cases pertaining to the child, for prosecution of the child as
    an adult, which have not yet resulted in a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere or in which a finding of guilt has not been made.
    If a child is acquitted of all charged offenses or lesser included
    offenses contained in the original case transferred to adult
    court, all felony cases that were transferred to adult court as
    a result of this paragraph shall be subject to the same
    penalties to which such cases would have been subject before
    being transferred to adult court that pertain to that child
    which are pending in juvenile court, including, but not limited
    to, all cases involving offenses that occur or are referred
    between the date of transfer and sentencing in adult court and
    all outstanding juvenile disposition orders. The juvenile court
    shall make every effort to dispose of all predispositional cases
    and transfer those cases to the adult court prior to adult
    sentencing. It is the intent of the Legislature to require all
    cases occurring prior to the sentencing hearing in adult court
    to be handled by the adult court for final resolution with the
    original transfer case.
    Ch. 99-284, 26, Laws of Fla. (amending section 985.227(3)(b), Fla. Stat.
    (1997)). 3
    The amended statute makes clear that transferred cases regain juvenile
    status only if the child is acquitted in the original direct file case. The
    intent of the statute as amended is not simply to promote efficiency as was
    suggested in A.C. and Medina. Nelson v. State, 
    757 So. 2d 622
    , 623–24
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (explaining that “the [1999] amendment simply
    clarified the legislative intent that when a juvenile commits an offense that
    qualifies for direct filing in the criminal division or otherwise qualifies for
    transfer for criminal prosecution in adult court, any felony charges for
    which the child has not yet entered a plea or where findings of guilt have
    not yet been made are to be transferred for prosecution as an adult.”).
    3 The statute was subsequently renumbered to its present location in
    985.557(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2017), but the language remains the same.
    -4-
    The plain language of the amended statute describes the state-wide
    effect of a direct file of adult charges against a juvenile. The transfer of
    felony cases, “which have not yet resulted in a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere or in which a finding of guilt has not been made,” to the adult
    court “for prosecution of the child as an adult” is not limited to felony cases
    pending within the same circuit. § 985.557(3)(b).
    Petition for writ of prohibition denied.
    GERBER, C.J., and DAMOORGIAN, J., concur.
    *         *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    -5-