Chestnut v. Nationstar Mortgage , 255 So. 3d 397 ( 2018 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed August 15, 2018.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D17-1752
    Lower Tribunal No. 14-8913
    ________________
    Rodney Chestnut,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Nationstar Mortgage LLC,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces,
    Judge.
    The Law Office of Eric Scott Brumfield, Esq., and Eric Scott Brumfield, for
    appellant.
    McGuireWoods LLP, and Sara F. Holladay-Tobias, Emily Y. Rottmann, and
    Jason R. Bowyer (Jacksonville), for appellee.
    Before LAGOA, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.
    LAGOA, J.
    Appellant, Rodney Chestnut (“Chestnut”), appeals from the trial court’s
    order denying his Motion to Quash Service of Process. Because Chestnut waived
    his right to contest service of process, we affirm.
    I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Of significance to this appeal, Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”)
    sought leave of court to add as additional defendants to a foreclosure action the
    “unknown heirs, beneficiaries, devisees and all other parties claiming an interest”
    in the Estate of Charles Chestnut, the deceased owner of the property at issue in the
    foreclosure action. On July 8, 2015, the trial court granted Nationstar’s motion,
    thereby adding Chestnut, an heir to the Estate of Charles Chestnut, as a defendant
    to the foreclosure action.
    On February 25, 2016, Chestnut, through his counsel, filed a Motion to
    Dismiss solely challenging Nationstar’s standing.1      The trial court denied the
    motion and directed Chestnut to answer the Amended Complaint. On February 13,
    2017, Chestnut filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses and asserted as an
    affirmative defense for the first time that he had “never been served with a copy of
    the complaint.”
    On July 26, 2017, Chestnut filed a Verified Motion to Quash Service of
    Process. The trial court denied the motion to quash without a hearing, stating that
    1The Motion to Dismiss was filed on behalf of both Chestnut and another heir,
    Darryl Chestnut, who did not file a notice of appeal.
    2
    “Defendant appeared in the case and waived any issue regarding service.”
    Subsequently, the trial court entered a written order denying Chestnut’s motion to
    quash. This appeal ensued.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as “[a]n order on a motion
    to quash service of process is one that determines personal jurisdiction and is thus
    appealable.” Vaughn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    153 So. 3d 969
    , 970 n.1 (Fla. 5th
    DCA 2015). “The determination of whether the trial court properly ruled on a
    motion to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction is a question of
    law, which we review de novo.” Mecca Multimedia, Inc. v. Kurzbard, 
    954 So. 2d 1179
    , 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b) provides that a party waives certain
    defenses, such as insufficiency of service of process, if not asserted either in a pre-
    answer motion or, if no pre-answer motion is filed, the answer itself. See Dolan v.
    Dolan, 
    81 So. 3d 558
    , 559-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding that the wife waived
    insufficiency of service of process when she filed a motion to dismiss without
    raising this defense in that motion and could not resurrect insufficiency of service
    of process in a second motion to dismiss after first motion had been denied);
    Lennar Homes, Inc. v. Gabb Constr. Servs., Inc., 
    654 So. 2d 649
    , 651 (Fla. 3d
    3
    DCA 1995) (finding that “[a] defendant who fails to contest the sufficiency of
    service of process at the inception of the case, whether by motion or responsive
    pleading, has waived this defense once he or she has entered a general
    appearance”); Parra v. Raskin, 
    647 So. 2d 1010
    , 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    (holding that mortgagor’s failure to raise service of process defense in pre-answer
    motion to dismiss waived that defense); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
    Weinroth, 
    422 So. 2d 330
    , 331 (Fla 5th DCA 1982) (“A defendant wishing to
    contest personal jurisdiction must do so in the first step taken in the case, whether
    by motion or in a responsive pleading, or that issue is waived and defendant has
    submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction.”).
    Here, Chestnut filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss solely challenging
    Nationstar’s standing to bring suit. Chestnut’s motion to dismiss, however, failed
    to raise the sufficiency of service of process.       The trial court then denied
    Chestnut’s motion to dismiss and ordered Chestnut to answer the complaint. Cf.
    Cepero v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 
    189 So. 3d 204
    , 205, 207 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2016) (holding that the defendants did not waive their claim of insufficiency
    of service of process as they amended their motion to dismiss to raise, for the first
    time, insufficiency of service of process prior to the trial court ruling on their
    amended motion to dismiss). By failing to raise service of process in his pre-
    4
    answer motion to dismiss, Chestnut submitted himself to the trial court’s
    jurisdiction and thus waived his right to later assert that defense.
    Accordingly, we find that Chestnut waived his right to challenge service of
    process and affirm the trial court’s order denying Chestnut’s motion to quash
    without an evidentiary hearing.2
    Affirmed.
    2   To the extent the trial court’s ruling was based on Chestnut’s motion for
    extension of time to respond to the complaint, filed prior to Chestnut’s motion to
    dismiss, we find that this ruling was erroneous. As Nationstar properly and
    commendably concedes, “‘a motion for extension of time does not constitute a
    general appearance’” and therefore is not a waiver. Green Emerald Homes, LLC
    v. PNC Bank, N.A., 
    207 So. 3d 1027
    , 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting
    DiGiovanni v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 
    83 So. 3d 934
    , 935-36 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 2012)); accord Byers v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 
    82 So. 3d 1166
    , 1168 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2012). We nonetheless affirm, as the trial court correctly found that
    Chestnut waived the right to challenge insufficiency of service of process by filing
    his pre-answer motion to dismiss without raising this defense.
    5