Michael A Crews, Secretary, etc. v. Samuel Strother , 209 So. 3d 595 ( 2014 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
MICHAEL A. CREWS, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections,
Appellant,
v. CASE NO. 1D13-4714
SAMUEL STROTHER,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed September 11, 2014.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Charles A. Francis, Judge.
Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee; Pamela
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Susan A. Maher, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Corrections Litigation, Lance Eric Neff and C. Ian Garland, Assistant Attorneys
General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Samuel Strother, pro se, Appellee.
OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
THOMAS, J.
This cause is before us on Appellant's Motion For Rehearing Or
Clarification. We grant the motion and, accordingly, withdraw our former
opinion filed on June 11, 2014, and substitute this opinion in its place.
Factual Background
Appellee initially filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Lafayette
County Circuit Court. That mandamus petition asserted that section 57.085(5),
Florida Statutes, allows DOC to withdraw money from an inmate’s trust account to
pay a lien only when the balance of the trust account exceeds $10 and, because
Appellee only had $10 in his account, DOC was without statutory authority when,
on January 19, 2011, it removed $9.50 and imposed a 50¢ processing fee. The
Lafayette County Circuit Court denied Appellee’s mandamus petition, finding that
Appellee misread section 57.085(5) and DOC was correct in its interpretation of
the statute. Appellee sought review of this order by filing a petition for certiorari
in this court in case number 1D11-2345. This court issued an order informing
Appellee that the lower court’s denial of his mandamus petition was properly
reviewable by appeal and providing Appellee the opportunity to file an initial brief,
but noting that failure to file a brief could result in dismissal. Appellee failed to
file an initial brief in case 1D11-2345 and, on August 12, 2011, this court
dismissed the converted appeal without reaching the merits of the statutory
interpretation issue.
Approximately six months later, Appellee filed another petition for writ of
mandamus in Lafayette County, which was transferred to Leon County. This
second mandamus petition, the basis for this appeal, again asserted that DOC
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violated section 57.085(5) by removing the $10 balance in Appellee’s inmate trust
account after he received another $10 deposit on December 12, 2011. DOC
asserted that Appellee misinterpreted the statute. DOC filed a motion for
sanctions, asserting that Appellee had raised the same issue in its previous
mandamus petition, and arguing that Appellee’s current mandamus petition should
be dismissed as frivolous and sanctions should be imposed for his attempt to re-
litigate the issue. DOC’s motion did not reference the doctrine of res judicata, but
argued that the petition should be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to section
57.085(9)(c), (d).
The Leon County Circuit Court entered an order granting mandamus relief,
agreeing with Appellee’s interpretation of section 57.085(5). DOC filed a motion
for rehearing, asserting that the court failed to address why res judicata did not bar
Appellee from re-litigating the same issue from his previous case, which was
adversely decided against him and in favor of the opposing party. In response, the
lower court entered an amended order granting mandamus relief, but did not
address DOC’s res judicata argument and only amended its original order to
reflect that Appellee should be refunded $9.50 from the clerk of court and the 50¢
processing fee from DOC.
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Analysis
Before addressing the statutory interpretation issue, this court will address
DOC’s argument that the lower court erred in interpreting section 57.085, as the
doctrine of res judicata barred Appellee from re-litigating the issue after being
denied relief in another court. Whether the application of res judicata was proper
is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945
So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006).
“Res judicata bars a subsequent lawsuit when there is: (1) identity of the
thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and
(4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made.”
AMEC Civil, LLC v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 41 So. 3d 235, 239-40 (Fla. 1st DCA
2010).
Here, because DOC has failed to establish that all four elements have been
met, we find that res judicata does not apply. In particular, the identity of the thing
sued for has not been established, as Appellee’s second mandamus petition was not
based upon DOC’s removal of the same $10 from his inmate trust account as in the
previous proceeding. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 94 So. 3d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012) (holding that a second petition to authorize treatment and administration of
psychotropic medication was for a different 90-day period and was therefore not
the same thing sued for previously and res judicata did not apply).
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Merits
“Matters of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” State v.
Joseph, 94 So. 3d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d
408, 410 (Fla. 2004)).
Here, we have reconsidered our prior interpretation of section 57.085(5) and
find that the lower court’s interpretation of the statute is erroneous. Section
57.085, Florida Statutes (2012), states in pertinent part:
(5) When the clerk has found the prisoner to be indigent, the court
shall order the prisoner to make monthly payments of no less than
20 percent of the balance of the prisoner's trust account as payment of
court costs and fees. When a court orders such payment, the
Department of Corrections or the local detention facility shall place a
lien on the inmate's trust account for the full amount of the court costs
and fees, and shall withdraw money maintained in that trust account
and forward the money, when the balance exceeds $10, to the
appropriate clerk of the court until the prisoner's court costs and fees
are paid in full.
DOC’s original briefing of this issue asserted that the clause “when the
balance exceeds $10” gave effect to when DOC shall forward to the appropriate
clerk of court the money “already withdrawn” from an inmate’s account, and did
not, as interpreted by the lower court, give effect to when DOC shall withdraw
funds from an inmate’s trust account. We originally held that this argument
ignores the plain language of the statute, and that the only mention of a “balance”
or an “account” is in reference to the inmate’s trust account, and not some
unreferenced account that DOC has created for holding up to $10 in funds that
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have been removed from the inmate’s trust account, to be held until the balance is
more than $10 and then forwarded to the appropriate clerk of court. DOC’s motion
for rehearing, however, asserted that this Court’s opinion was founded upon a
misapprehension of how the inmate trust fund operates. Based upon DOC’s
clarification of its argument in its motion for rehearing, we find that our previous
opinion was based upon a misunderstanding regarding how DOC interpreted the
applicable statute, and we are now persuaded by DOC’s interpretation. In
particular, although throughout its briefs DOC referenced funds “already
withdrawn,” it has clarified that it does not withdraw funds from an inmate’s trust
account when the balance is under $10 and hold the funds in a separate location
before forwarding to the applicable clerk of court once it exceeds $10. Instead,
DOC has made clear that it simply places a hold on the account and, once there is
$10 in the account, the funds are withdrawn and forwarded to the appropriate clerk
of court.
DOC also bolstered its interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “when the
balance exceeds $10” by directing this Court’s attention to the first sentence of
section 57.085(5), which provides that a court, in assessing court costs and fees,
enters an order for DOC to place a lien for the “prisoner to make monthly payment
of no less than 20 percent of the balance of the prisoner’s trust account as payment
of the court costs and fees.” We agree with DOC that this language does not
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provide a maximum that DOC may remove from an inmate’s account, nor does it
provide that an inmate may retain $10 in the account that may not be collected for
payment against the inmate’s lien. As such, we conclude that the full balance of an
inmate’s trust account may be withdrawn by DOC and forwarded to the applicable
clerk of court when the balance exceeds $10.
With these clarifications of DOC’s argument in mind, we agree with DOC’s
argument from its briefs that when section 57.085(5) is read in pari materia with
section 945.215(1)(f), Florida Statutes, that the legislature authorized DOC to
prevent an inmate from accessing his or her trust account to spend personal funds
on items from the prison canteens when that inmate still has a lien against his
individual account. Specifically, section 945.215(1)(f), provides:
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, inmates with
sufficient balances in their individual inmate bank trust fund accounts,
after all debts against the account are satisfied, shall be allowed to
request a weekly draw of up to an amount set by the Secretary of
Corrections, not to exceed $100, to be expended for personal use on
canteen and vending machine items.
§ 945.215(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to section
945.215(1)(f), DOC may prevent an inmate from requesting a weekly draw for
personal use on canteen and vending machine items when all debts against the
inmate’s account are not satisfied by placing a hold on the balance of the inmate’s
account.
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Here, as Appellee still has an unsatisfied debt, i.e. a lien on his account
pursuant to section 57.085, DOC may place a hold on his inmate trust account.
Read in accordance with section 57.085(5), DOC may hold the funds in Appellee’s
account, withdrawing and forwarding to the applicable clerk of court the balance of
Appellee’s inmate trust account when it exceeds $10. Accordingly, we reverse the
lower court’s order granting mandamus relief.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
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