DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
K.A., the Mother,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
and GUARDIAN AD LITEM,
Appellees.
No. 4D21-1514
[January 5, 2022]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Stacey Schulman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2020-1291DP.
Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil
Regional Counsel, and Richard G. Bartmon, Assistant Regional Counsel,
West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carolyn Schwarz,
Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Department of
Children and Families.
Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Sarah Todd
Weitz, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, Tallahassee, for appellee
Guardian ad Litem.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY QUESTIONS OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
PER CURIAM.
We deny Appellant’s motion for rehearing.
We grant the motion to certify questions of great public importance. As
we noted in V.S. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
322 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA
2021), “[t]he constitutionality of the 2014 amendment to section
39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, affects fundamental parental interests.”
Id.
at 1230. We once again certify the following question to the supreme
court:
DOES THE 2014 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 39.806(1)(f),
FLORIDA STATUTES, WHICH PROVIDES THAT NO PROOF
OF NEXUS BETWEEN EGREGIOUS CONDUCT TOWARDS
ONE CHILD IS REQUIRED TO TERMINATE THE PARENTAL
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD’S SIBLINGS, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
REMOVE THE STATE’S BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THE
EGREGIOUS CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF
HARM TO EACH SIBLING AND IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS OF PROTECTING THE SIBLING(S) FROM SERIOUS
HARM?
Moreover, we certify the following question concerning the
constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(l), Florida Statutes:
DOES THE 2008 ADDITION OF SUBPARAGRAPH (l) TO
SECTION 39.806(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHICH
PROVIDES FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
WHEN “ON THREE OR MORE OCCASIONS THE CHILD OR
ANOTHER CHILD OF THE PARENT OR PARENTS HAS BEEN
PLACED IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE . . . AND THE CONDITIONS
THAT LED TO THE CHILD’S OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
WERE CAUSED BY THE PARENT OR PARENTS,”
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY REMOVE THE STATE’S BURDEN TO
PROVE THAT THE PARENT’S OR PARENTS’ CONDUCT
POSES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF HARM TO THE CHILD OR
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS OF PROTECTING THE CHILD OR CHILDREN FROM
SERIOUS HARM?
CONNER, C.J., FORST and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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