Zavon Deshawn Taylor v. State of Florida , 185 So. 3d 1281 ( 2016 )


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  •                                        IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    ZAVON DESHAWN TAYLOR,                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Appellant,                       DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                     CASE NO. 1D14-3435
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed February 26, 2016.
    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    James H. Daniel, Judge.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Wendy S. Loquasto, Special Assistant
    Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthew Pavese, Assistant Attorney
    General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    Zavon DeShawn Taylor appeals from his judgment and sentence for
    unarmed carjacking. Although the circuit court attempted to strike certain costs
    pursuant to Taylor’s request in a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
    3.800(b)(2), the circuit court did so after its jurisdiction under that rule expired.
    Therefore, we must declare the corrected judgment and sentence a nullity and
    remand for re-entry of that order. See Calidonio v. State, 
    951 So. 2d 87
    , 88 (Fla.
    1st DCA 2007) (explaining that an order entered after the expiration of the time for
    ruling on a motion under Rule 3.800(b)(2) is a nullity); Sessions v. State, 
    907 So. 2d
    572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We also reverse as to an error in the separate
    order of probation. The circuit court improperly imposed a condition requiring
    Taylor to “obtain” a GED or high school diploma. See Rodriguez v. State, 
    768 So. 2d
    1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), overruled on other grounds as stated in Mier
    v. State, 
    58 So. 3d 319
    , 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We remand for the court to
    modify this condition to conform to the requirements of section 948.037(1),
    Florida Statutes (2012), which would require Taylor to make a “good faith effort”
    to achieve such skills or diploma. We affirm as to Taylor’s remaining arguments.
    As the acts required by this opinion are ministerial in nature, Taylor need not be
    present for the court to undertake them.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
    WETHERELL, RAY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1D14-3435

Citation Numbers: 185 So. 3d 1281

Judges: Kelsey, Per Curiam, Ray, Wetherell

Filed Date: 2/25/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024