MICHELE PAGLIARO v. BRENT PAGLIARO , 264 So. 3d 196 ( 2019 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    MICHELE PAGLIARO,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BRENT PAGLIARO,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D18-702
    [February 6, 2019]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward    County;   Merrilee  Ehrlich,   Judge;   L.T.   Case    No.
    062016DR009832AXXXCE.
    Christopher R. Jette of Goldstein & Jette, P.A., West Palm Beach, for
    appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
    KUNTZ, J.
    The Former Wife appeals the circuit court’s order ratifying the terms
    and provisions of a mediation agreement. She argues the court erred when
    it ratified the agreement without allowing her to present testimony and
    without considering the best interest of the minor child. We agree with
    both arguments and reverse.
    Background
    At mediation, the Former Wife and the Former Husband signed an
    agreement that specifically contemplated additional negotiations and
    stated:
    The Respondent/Husband’s counsel, shall prepare a more
    formalized global Marital Settlement Agreement and Parenting
    Plan which outlines the terms and conditions set forth herein.
    Said Agreements shall be prepared within twenty days of the
    date of this Agreement. In the event the parties’ [sic] are
    unable or unwilling to execute a more formalized Marital
    Settlement Agreement and Parenting Plan, this Agreement
    shall be incorporated into, ratified and approved by the Court
    and made a part of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of
    Marriage.
    Later, the Former Wife moved to set aside the mediation agreement.
    The Former Wife stated that during mediation, the parties agreed that the
    Minor would reside in Pennsylvania with the Former Wife and with the
    Former Husband for one week during Christmas break and one week
    during the summer.
    Despite attempts to develop a more detailed timesharing plan, the
    Former Wife and Former Husband were unable to agree. During this time,
    the Former Wife discovered that the Former Husband allegedly committed
    “serious and violent acts against his current significant other,” resulting
    in his arrest and criminal charges of domestic battery by strangulation,
    false imprisonment, and tampering in a life capital felony proceeding. She
    argued any unsupervised visitation agreed-to in mediation was no longer
    in the Minor’s best interest.
    At the hearing on the Former Wife’s motion, the court stated that the
    allegations against the Former Husband were hearsay and that “criminal
    charges are just allegations.” After being informed that an alleged victim
    was in the courtroom and prepared to testify about one of the alleged
    criminal incidents, the court questioned the relevancy of the criminal
    charges to the Minor. The court then denied the motion:
    Okay. All we have is she’s heard that he’s been charged. And
    another party hearsay, you know, has these allegations. They
    haven’t been—Now, we have a lower standard than the
    criminal court. However, I don’t know if your witness, the
    witness you’d like to bring, has spoken to the State Attorney’s
    office about this before she comes in here, and she may have
    someone in the State Attorney’s office that’s a victim’s
    advocate. They may not want her to testify. I don’t know if they
    were noticed of today’s hearing.
    Under all of these circumstances, I am not going to accept
    testimony of an allegation that has nothing to do with the
    minor child.
    That being said, the victim is also alleged to be the mother,
    and they live in separate states, and they entered into a valid
    contract.
    2
    I’m denying the motion to set aside.
    I haven’t heard anything that would lead me to rule otherwise.
    The court issued a written order denying the Former Wife’s motion and
    ratifying the mediation agreement.
    Analysis
    The Former Wife raises two arguments on appeal. First, she argues the
    court erred when it denied her motion and ratified the mediation
    agreement without allowing her, or her witness, the opportunity to testify.
    Second, she argues the court erred when it ratified the mediation
    agreement, including a timesharing plan for the Minor, without
    considering the best interests of the Minor.
    i. Procedural Due Process
    We first consider the Former Wife’s argument that she was denied
    procedural due process. Procedural due process consists of notice and a
    meaningful opportunity to be heard. Keys Citizens For Responsible Gov’t,
    Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 
    795 So. 2d 940
    , 948 (Fla. 2001); Ferris v.
    Winn, 
    242 So. 3d 509
    , 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citation omitted); see also
    Cole v. Cole, 
    159 So. 3d 124
    , 125–26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“[T]he right to be
    heard includes the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and
    in a meaningful manner.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    For example, the Third District held that a court erred when it ended a
    proceeding at the end of one party’s presentation of evidence because of
    time constraints. In Munoz v. Salgado, 
    253 So. 3d 87
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2018),
    a mother moved to modify a timesharing agreement. Id. at 88. The court
    held a hearing and allowed the mother to testify and call a witness. Id.
    But, before the father could introduce evidence, the court ended the
    hearing because it had exceeded the allotted time. Id. The Third District
    held this violated the father’s procedural due process rights and reversed.
    Id.
    Similarly, in Douglas v. Johnson, 
    65 So. 3d 605
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), the
    father moved for an emergency order alleging the mother and grandmother
    impermissibly moved the child from Florida to Tennessee. 
    Id. at 606
    . The
    court held a hearing on the father’s motion and heard testimony from him
    and his other witnesses. 
    Id.
     The court then heard legal argument without
    allowing the mother to present evidence. 
    Id.
     The Second District held that
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    the court abused its discretion when it prevented the mother from
    presenting evidence or witnesses at the hearing. 
    Id. at 607
    .
    Here, because the court refused the Former Wife’s request to testify and
    to present the testimony of another witness, we reverse for a new hearing
    at which the court affords the Former Wife the opportunity to present
    evidence and witnesses.
    ii. The Best Interest of the Minor Child
    Next, we address the Former Wife’s argument that the court erred when
    it failed to consider the best interests of the Minor.
    While parents may agree about child custody, “a trial court’s
    responsibility to the child cannot be abdicated to any parent, [or] any
    expert,” and “a court is not bound by any agreement between parents, nor
    by the opinions of any expert or group of experts.” Lane v. Lane, 
    599 So. 2d 218
    , 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (citing Sedell v. Sedell, 
    100 So. 2d 639
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Bolton v. Gordon, 
    201 So. 2d 754
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1967));
    see also Trang Ngoan Le v. Tung Phuong Nguyen, 
    98 So. 3d 600
    , 601 (Fla.
    5th DCA 2012).
    Similarly, in Wayno v. Wayno, 
    756 So. 2d 1024
     (Fla. 5th DCA 2000),
    the Fifth District held that the circuit court did not err when it denied a
    motion to enforce a mediation agreement, because “it is at least implicit in
    the rule [governing mediation in family law cases] and certainly the better
    practice for the judge to not approve either custody or support before being
    fully informed about the welfare of the children.” 
    Id. at 1025
    .
    In another case, the mother argued the court erred when it refused to
    set aside a mediation agreement. Feliciano v. Feliciano, 
    674 So. 2d 937
    ,
    937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In denying the motion to set aside the
    agreement, the circuit court did not admit evidence about the best interest
    of the children because it believed that those “portions of the mediation
    agreement were subject to the same enforceability test as the alimony and
    marital property provisions.” 
    Id.
     We reversed and remanded for the court
    to hold an evidentiary hearing and consider the evidence when
    determining the best interest of the children. 
    Id.
    Here, neither the hearing transcript nor the court’s order shows the
    court considered the best interests of the Minor. On remand, even if the
    court ultimately ratifies the mediation agreement, the court must
    independently determine whether the agreement about child custody is in
    the best interest of the Minor.
    4
    Conclusion
    We reverse the court’s order ratifying the mediation agreement and
    remand the case for a new hearing at which both the Former Wife and the
    Former Husband are afforded the opportunity to present testimony and
    evidence. Additionally, any order determining timesharing of the Minor
    must consider the best interest of the Minor.
    Reversed and remanded.
    WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
    *        *       *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    5