Arthur Johnson v. State of Florida , 247 So. 3d 698 ( 2018 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D16-4862
    _____________________________
    ARTHUR JOHNSON,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    ___________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    Marianne L. Aho, Judge.
    May 25, 2018
    B.L. THOMAS, C.J.
    Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his
    motion to amend his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
    Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because Appellant’s
    new claims do not relate back to the claims raised in his original
    timely filed motion, the amended motion is time barred, and we
    affirm the postconviction court’s denial of his request to amend
    his motion. We reject Appellant’s further attempt to raise a new
    argument for the first time on appeal.
    Facts
    Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a charge of
    attempted first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced
    Appellant to 29 years in state prison, with a mandatory
    minimum of 25 years.        Appellant did not appeal, and his
    sentence became final. Appellant subsequently filed a timely
    motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 3.850, arguing, inter alia, that his trial
    counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of
    Appellant’s confession. The postconviction court ordered an
    evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance ground, and one
    week before the evidentiary hearing, Appellant filed a motion to
    amend his postconviction motion.
    The pertinent ground in Appellant’s initial motion alleged
    that his counsel should have moved to suppress his confession
    because it was given without a Miranda warning; Appellant
    moved to amend the motion to assert a claim that he may have
    received a Miranda warning, but because he was intoxicated
    when it was given, he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or
    intelligently waive his rights. The court ruled that, because
    Appellant’s sentence became final on December 12, 2009, the two-
    year window to file claims for postconviction relief closed in
    December 2011, five years prior to Appellant’s motion to amend.
    Analysis
    The standard of review for a trial court’s determination
    regarding a motion to amend a motion for postconviction relief
    pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 is whether
    there was an abuse of discretion. Huff v. State, 
    762 So. 2d 476
    ,
    481 (Fla. 2000) (citing McConn v. State, 
    708 So. 2d 308
    , 310 (Fla.
    2d DCA 1998)).
    “A trial court may properly deny an amended rule 3.850
    motion as untimely when it raises new claims and is filed outside
    of the two-year time period.” Lanier v. State, 
    826 So. 2d 460
    , 461
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). “The two-year time period, however, does
    not preclude the enlargement of issues which were raised in a
    timely filed motion for postconviction relief.” 
    Id. When an
    amended motion “actually raises new issues of ineffective
    assistance of counsel that were not raised in the previous
    motion,” the lower court does not err in denying a motion to
    amend. 
    Huff, 762 So. 2d at 481
    .
    2
    Appellant argues that his amendment was permitted outside
    the two-year window, because the amendment related to an
    existing claim that was timely filed, citing to Lanier. In Lanier,
    the appellant timely filed a rule 3.850 motion, and filed an
    amendment more than two years after his judgment and
    sentence became 
    final. 826 So. 2d at 461
    . The appellant’s initial
    motion claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
    raise the issue of entrapment, and his amendment stated that
    counsel knew there were witnesses whose testimony could show
    police misconduct which induced the appellant to commit the
    crime. 
    Id. This court
    held that, although the appellant’s
    amendment was untimely to the extent that it attempted to raise
    an ineffective assistance claim based on a new claim of police
    misconduct, it related back to the extent that the amended
    motion provided new information to support the original, timely
    filed claim. 
    Id. at 461-62.
    Here, Appellant’s motion to amend does not attempt to
    provide new information to support his original claim, but rather
    attempts to raise a new basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Appellant’s initial claim was that counsel was ineffective for
    failing to move to suppress a confession given without a Miranda
    warning, while his new claim is that he was intoxicated while the
    Miranda warning was given. The additional information that
    Appellant had been smoking and drinking at the time of
    detention does not enlarge the original claim that the Miranda
    warning was not given. Rather, it raises a new claim. Because
    Appellant’s amended motion was filed after the two-year window
    had closed, and the motion raised new claims not raised in
    Appellant’s original motion, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying the motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    WOLF and RAY, JJ., concur.
    3
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Arthur Johnson, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Michael L. Schaub,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee for Appellee.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4862

Citation Numbers: 247 So. 3d 698

Filed Date: 5/25/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2018