Howarth v. Department of Corrections , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5947 ( 2017 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    MARK HOWARTH,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                    Case No. 5D16-3598
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    AND STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellees.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed April 28, 2017
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Orange County,
    Janet C. Thorpe, Judge.
    Mark Howarth, Milton, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee,  and    Rebecca    Rock
    McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General,
    Daytona Beach, for Appellee, State of
    Florida.
    No appearance for other appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    Mark Howarth (the defendant) seeks review of the trial court's order dismissing his
    petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
    The defendant filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the
    information filed against him suffered from incurable defects inasmuch as it charged
    lengthy timeframes with respect to the commission of each offense, making it impossible
    for him to formulate a defense.
    The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that the defendant failed to serve
    his petition on the State within 120 days of filing, as mandated by Florida Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.070. However, the defendant's petition was properly filed pursuant to the
    provisions of section 79.01of the Florida Statutes (2015), and rule 1.630 of the Florida
    Rules of Civil Procedure (2015). Specifically, rule 1.630 provides that a petitioner is not
    required to serve the respondent with the petition, but rather, upon determining that a
    habeas corpus petition demonstrates a prima facie case for relief, the trial court issues
    the writ of habeas corpus. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d); Bard v. Wolson, 
    687 So. 2d 254
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630 and Chapter 79, Florida
    Statutes, specify the procedure to be followed in habeas corpus proceedings before the
    trial court.").
    In Moore v. Ake, 
    693 So. 2d 697
     (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the Second District reversed
    the trial court's order dismissing the appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus based on
    the failure to serve the respondents within 120 days.           Writing for the court, Judge
    Altenbernd explained:
    The trial court dismissed Kevin Moore's petition for writ of
    mandamus because he failed to serve the respondents within
    120 days. We reverse because the trial court had an
    obligation under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630 to
    review Mr. Moore's complaint when it was filed, decide
    whether it established a prima facie case, and issue an
    alternative writ of mandamus if the petition was facially
    adequate. Staton v. McMillan, 
    597 So. 2d 940
     (Fla. 1st DCA
    1992). The petitioner was not required to serve the
    respondent with the complaint and could not serve the
    alternative writ until the trial court had performed the tasks
    required of it under the rule.
    2
    Id. at 697-698. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the defendant's habeas corpus
    petition due to his purported failure to ensure that process was served upon the State
    within 120 days.
    However, such error was harmless because the defendant's petition was properly
    dismissed, albeit for a different reason: the defendant previously raised his challenge to
    the purportedly defective nature of the information in both his direct appeal and his rule
    3.850 proceeding and, thus, he is improperly trying to use the vehicle of habeas corpus
    "to seek a second appeal or to litigate issues that . . . were raised in a motion under rule
    3.850." Baker v. State, 
    878 So. 2d 1236
    , 1241 (Fla. 2004). See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850.
    Accordingly, we affirm the instant dismissal order because the trial court reached
    the correct result, but for the wrong reason. See Sullivan v. State, 
    913 So. 2d 762
    , 763
    (Fla. 2005) ("Even though the lower court erred in its finding of exceptional circumstances,
    we conclude that we should affirm under the 'tipsy coachman' rule because the trial court
    reached the right conclusion.").
    AFFIRMED.
    SAWAYA, PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case 5D16-3598

Citation Numbers: 220 So. 3d 485, 2017 WL 1534817, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5947

Judges: Sawaya, Palmer, Torpy

Filed Date: 4/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024