Delgado v. State ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    HECTOR DELGADO,                           )
    )
    Appellant,                  )
    )
    v.                                        )      Case No. 2D16-1035
    )
    STATE OF FLORIDA,                         )
    )
    Appellee.                   )
    )
    Opinion filed October 6, 2017.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for
    Hillsborough County; Samantha L.
    Ward, Judge.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
    and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant
    Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Susan M. Shanahan,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
    Appellee.
    ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
    Hector Delgado appeals his judgment and sentences entered after a jury
    found him guilty of the lesser included offense of principal to felony battery causing
    great bodily harm (count two), see §§ 777.011, 784.041(1), Fla. Stat. (2015), and
    conspiracy to deliver less than twenty grams of cannabis (count four), see §§ 777.04(3),
    893.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2015). We reject without further discussion Delgado's challenge to
    the trial court's admission of the firearm discovered outside of the home where Delgado
    and codefendant Samuel Frazier Lenker were arrested. And although we also reject
    Delgado's argument that the court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of
    acquittal on count two, we agree that the court erred in denying his motion for a
    judgment of acquittal on count four because there is no competent, substantial evidence
    that he agreed with anyone to deliver cannabis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
    and sentence as to count two but reverse the judgment and sentence as to count four.
    I. Background
    Delgado and Lenker were charged with attempted second-degree murder
    while carrying a firearm and discharging a firearm causing great bodily harm (count
    one), see §§ 775.087(1)(b), (2)(a)(3), 777.04(1), 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2015);
    aggravated battery causing great bodily harm while carrying a firearm and discharging a
    firearm causing great bodily harm (count two), see §§ 775.087(1)(b), (2)(a)(3),
    784.045(1)(a)(1); shooting at, within, or into a vehicle (count three), see § 790.19, Fla.
    Stat. (2015); and conspiring to deliver a controlled substance (cannabis) (count four),
    see §§ 777.04(3), 893.03(1)(c)(7), .13(1)(a)(2). After severing Delgado's and Lenker's
    cases for trial, the State nolle prossed counts one and three against Delgado and
    announced that it would proceed to trial on count two as charged and on count four on
    the lesser included offense of conspiring to deliver less than twenty grams of cannabis.
    See §§ 777.04(3), 893.13(3).
    -2-
    The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
    established the following:
    Devin Creech suffers from a debilitating medical condition that he eases
    by smoking cannabis. Consequently, in the early morning hours of July 27, 2015,
    Creech called and arranged, he thought, to purchase twenty dollars' worth of cannabis
    from Lenker. Creech enlisted a friend, Henry Manriquez, to give him a ride, and
    Creech's mother, Tangela Campbell, insisted on accompanying them.
    En route to Lenker's general location, Creech twice had to call Lenker to
    find out where exactly they were to meet. Ultimately, Lenker directed Creech to a
    specific location; Manriquez parked the car there, and he, Creech, and Campbell sat
    waiting for Lenker.
    After five or six minutes, Creech called Lenker again. Lenker told Creech
    to get out of the car and walk to meet him. Suspicious, Creech refused and told Lenker
    to come to him. A few minutes after that, Lenker and another person, later identified as
    Delgado, came slowly down the sidewalk on foot towards the car. Creech gave
    Campbell the twenty dollars, and she rolled down the window and waved the money at
    Delgado and Lenker as they approached. The men ignored Campbell, however, and
    instead went to the rear passenger's side of the car, where Creech was sitting.
    Cracking the door open, Creech attempted to direct Lenker's attention to the purchase
    money and asked where the cannabis was. Lenker patted his pockets, looked around,
    and responded, "[M]y homeboy's got it."
    Delgado approached with a square piece of paper, momentarily attracting
    Creech's attention. When Creech saw that the paper did not contain cannabis,
    -3-
    however, he again became suspicious and pulled the door closed. Almost immediately
    after that, Lenker pulled a gun out of his waistband and pointed it at the back window of
    the car. Creech told Campbell and Manriquez that Lenker had a gun, told Manriquez to
    drive, and sought cover.
    Campbell saw everything unfold from the front seat. Once she saw the
    gun, she turned around to push Creech's head down. Manriquez, who had not been
    paying attention until that point, tried to drive away, but they only made it a few feet
    before Lenker fired, shooting Campbell in the face and causing serious permanent
    injuries.
    Responding officers and a K-9 unit tracked Delgado and Lenker to a
    nearby house. Several other people were also at the house. After officers obtained a
    search warrant, one officer recovered what appeared to be cannabis from an unlocked
    drawer in one of the bedrooms, but he did not know how long it had been there.
    Officers also recovered the gun, which had been stashed in a bag in a tree in the front
    yard.
    In moving for a judgment of acquittal as to count two, Delgado argued that
    the State failed to prove that he had acted with the intent necessary to convict him as a
    principal. As to count four, he argued that the State proved nothing more than his mere
    presence at the scene and, therefore, failed to prove an agreement between him and
    anyone else to deliver cannabis. The State responded that the conspiracy could be
    inferred from the circumstances surrounding the drug transaction. The trial court denied
    the motion without explanation. The jury subsequently found Delgado guilty on count
    two of the lesser included offense of principal to felony battery causing great bodily
    -4-
    harm, see §§ 777.011, 784.041(1), and on count four (as amended) of conspiracy to
    deliver less than twenty grams of cannabis, see §§ 777.04(3), 893.13(3).
    Post verdict, Delgado unsuccessfully renewed his motion for judgments of
    acquittal. The trial court sentenced him as a youthful offender to thirty-six months'
    imprisonment on count two and to time served on count four.1 This appeal followed.
    II. Analysis
    "In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant admits all the facts
    introduced into evidence and all fair and reasonable inferences from them which must
    be viewed in the light most favorable to the State." Williams v. State, 
    110 So. 3d 59
    , 61
    (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). The trial court should deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal
    when the State has presented legally sufficient evidence of each element of the offense.
    See Poczatek v. State, 
    213 So. 3d 1065
    , 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). This court reviews
    the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo and will not reverse if, upon
    viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
    State, competent, substantial evidence supports the verdict. See Walls v. State, 
    184 So. 3d 1151
    , 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); 
    Williams, 110 So. 3d at 61-62
    .
    A. Principal to Aggravated Battery
    To establish Delgado's guilt as a principal to the battery offense that
    Lenker physically committed, the State had to prove that Delgado intended for Lenker to
    commit the offense and did some act that assisted Lenker to actually commit it. See
    1The  written judgment and sentence incorrectly identifies count four as
    charging conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, see § 893.13(1)(a)(2), which was
    the original charge, rather than conspiracy to deliver less than twenty grams of
    cannabis, see § 893.13(3), which was the amended charge. Our disposition, however,
    obviates the need to correct this mistake on remand.
    -5-
    State v. Tovar, 
    110 So. 3d 33
    , 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("[I]n order to be a principal in a
    crime, one must have a conscious intent that the crime be done and must do some act
    or say some word which was intended to and does incite, cause, encourage, assist, or
    advise another person to actually commit the crime." (alteration in original) (quoting
    L.J.S. v. State, 
    909 So. 2d 951
    , 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))). "The elements of aiding and
    abetting—assisting the actual perpetrator in some way and intent to participate—'may
    be proven by a combination of surrounding circumstances from which a jury can
    reasonably infer a defendant's guilt.' " Salter v. State, 
    77 So. 3d 760
    , 763 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2011) (quoting Parker v. State, 
    795 So. 2d 1096
    , 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).
    Delgado argues that competent, substantial evidence failed to establish
    that he either intended for Lenker to commit aggravated battery or did any act to assist
    Lenker in committing it. We disagree. From the evidence, the jury reasonably could
    infer that Lenker set up the cannabis sale with Creech as a ruse so that Lenker could
    commit a different offense, which ultimately resulted in the battery on Campbell. And
    from Lenker and Delgado's closely coordinated conduct, the jury reasonably could infer
    that Delgado was on board with Lenker's ruse the whole time. When Creech refused to
    get out of the car at Lenker's urging, Lenker and Delgado approached the car together.
    They both ignored the obvious opportunity to consummate a cannabis sale when they
    walked right past Campbell, who was waving the purchase money at them. Then, they
    acted in tandem and in quick succession to distract Creech: Lenker patted his pockets
    as if he were trying to find the cannabis and then directed Creech's attention to
    Delgado, who gave Lenker time to retrieve his firearm by distracting Creech with a piece
    of paper that clearly did not contain cannabis.
    -6-
    The quick succession in which these events occurred established that this
    was a preplanned, coordinated effort in which Delgado intended to participate.
    Moreover, it certainly refutes Delgado's contention that he was "merely present" at the
    scene. Cf. A.D. v. State, 
    106 So. 3d 67
    , 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("Mere presence at the
    scene of the crime, knowledge of the crime, and even flight from the scene are
    insufficient to show that a defendant was an aider and abettor."). Therefore, the trial
    court did not err in denying Delgado's motion for a judgment of acquittal on count two.
    B. Conspiracy to Deliver Cannabis
    To establish that Delgado conspired to deliver less than twenty grams of
    cannabis, the State had to prove (1) that Delgado intended that cannabis be delivered
    and (2) that Delgado agreed, conspired, combined, or confederated with another person
    to cause cannabis to be delivered. See § 777.04(3); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 5.3;
    see also Bell v. State, 
    111 So. 3d 199
    , 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reciting elements of
    criminal conspiracy to deliver cocaine). Although Delgado's intent and the existence of
    an agreement may be established through circumstantial evidence, see Schlicher v.
    State, 
    13 So. 3d 515
    , 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), we agree with Delgado that the State
    introduced no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Delgado had intended to deliver
    cannabis to Creech or that he had agreed with Lenker to cause the delivery of cannabis
    to Creech.
    Our analysis on count two requires such a conclusion on this count. The
    evidence proving that Delgado acted as a principal on count two establishes that what
    Creech had believed to be a drug transaction was actually just a ruse to allow Lenker,
    with Delgado's help, to commit some other offense. See 
    id. ("Logic demands
    that the
    -7-
    agreement that constitutes the conspiracy must be an agreement to commit the same
    criminal offense."). There was no cannabis on the paper that Delgado held out to
    Creech, and the State failed to present any other evidence of an intent on Delgado's
    part to deliver cannabis or of an agreement between Delgado and Lenker (or anyone
    else) to deliver cannabis.2
    III. Conclusion
    Although competent, substantial evidence established Delgado's guilt on
    count two, it did not establish his guilt on count four, and the trial court, therefore, erred
    in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on that count. Accordingly, we affirm
    Delgado's conviction for felony battery but reverse his conviction for conspiracy to
    deliver cannabis.
    Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
    WALLACE and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
    2The suspected cannabis found in the drawer of the house where officers
    later found Delgado and Lenker cannot support Delgado's conspiracy conviction
    because there was no evidence demonstrating that it belonged to either Delgado or
    Lenker, and any link to them would be tenuous at best.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2D16-1035

Filed Date: 10/6/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/6/2017