DISTRICT ADVISORY BOARD OF THE SOUTHERN FLORIDA DISTRICT, CHURCH OF NAZARENE, INC., etc. and BRIAN WILSON v. CENTRO DE ALABANZA OASIS WEST PALM BEACH, INC. and IGLESIA DEL NAZARENO BELEN, INC. ( 2022 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    DISTRICT ADVISORY BOARD OF THE SOUTHERN FLORIDA
    DISTRICT, CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, INC., and BRIAN WILSON,
    Appellants,
    v.
    CENTRO DE ALABANZA OASIS WEST PALM BEACH, INC., and
    IGLESIA DEL NAZARENO BELEN, INC.,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D21-756
    [May 25, 2022]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; John S. Kastrenakes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2016-CA-
    011985-XXXX-MB.
    Dane E. Leitner of Ward Damon PL, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
    Elaine Johnson James of Elaine Johnson James, P.A., Palm Beach
    Gardens, for appellees.
    CONNER, C.J.
    Appellants, District Advisory Board of the Southern Florida District,
    Church of the Nazerene, Inc. (“the District”) and Brian Wilson (collectively
    “Appellants”), appeal the final summary judgment entered below in favor
    of appellees, Centro De Alabanza Oasis West Palm Beach, Inc. (“Oasis,
    Inc.”) and Iglesia Del Nazareno Belen, Inc. (“Iglesia, Inc.”) (collectively
    “Appellees”). This dispute concerns ownership of real property operating
    a church. Appellants contend that pursuant to the “ecclesiastical
    abstention doctrine,” a lay court cannot adjudicate who, within a church,
    is authorized to run that church. Appellants further contend that to
    resolve the dispute of ownership of real property in this case, a court would
    necessarily need to decide which faction within the church controls the
    church. Because we determine a genuine issue of material fact exists as
    to Iglesia, Inc.’s affiliation with the Church of the Nazarene, and thereby,
    the District, summary judgment was inappropriate and we reverse.
    Background
    Throughout this litigation, the parties presented opposing views of their
    relationship. According to Appellants, the District is an entity created by
    the General Assembly of the Church of the Nazarene (“the Church of the
    Nazarene”) and is made up of interdependent local churches in the South
    Florida area. Appellants contended that appellee, Iglesia, Inc. is one such
    interdependent local church under the umbrella of the District and the
    Church of the Nazarene, and that the subject property dispute was
    ecclesiastic in nature. However, Appellees maintained that this was not a
    dispute between a parent church and a local church. Instead, Appellees
    asserted that Iglesia, Inc. is not a local church, but simply a Florida non-
    profit organization and a separate entity altogether.
    Galo E. Poveda was ordained as a minister by the Church of the
    Nazarene, and founded the Iglesia Church, serving as its pastor. In 1995,
    Poveda formed Iglesia, Inc. and served as its president and director, with
    his daughter, Roxana Poveda-Mendoza, also serving as a director of the
    company. The summary judgment evidence below reflected that the
    bylaws of Iglesia, Inc. were the Manual of the Church of the Nazarene (“the
    Manual”), which is the governing document of the Church of the Nazarene.
    In 2003, Iglesia, Inc. sought to purchase real property in West Palm Beach
    but could not qualify for a mortgage, so the District agreed to co-sign for
    the mortgage. Title to the subject property was then conveyed to the
    District at the sale closing.
    By 2007, the District had been assessed over one million dollars in fines
    for municipal code violations on the property. The District then recorded
    a warranty deed transferring title and fee simple ownership of the property
    to Iglesia, Inc. Notably, the warranty deed’s language contained no
    restrictions or reversionary rights in favor of the District, and simply
    conveyed title to the property to Iglesia, Inc. in fee simple. Shortly
    thereafter, the District’s lawyer wrote a letter to the city of West Palm
    Beach seeking an extension of time for Iglesia, Inc. to obtain funds in order
    to bring the property up to code and stating that title had just been
    transferred to Iglesia, Inc.
    In 2014, Iglesia, Inc. resolved to withdraw from the Church of the
    Nazarene, formalizing a corporate resolution stating that Iglesia, Inc.
    would take all necessary action required by the Manual to withdraw from
    the Church of the Nazarene. Specifically, the corporate resolution
    provided that at a meeting of Iglesia, Inc.’s corporate directors, the
    following action was authorized:
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    TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTION REQUIRED BY THE
    MANUAL OF THE CHURCH OF [THE] NAZARENE TO
    WITHDRAW IGLESIA DEL NAZARENO BELEN, INC. FROM
    THE CHURCH OF [THE] NAZARENE INCLUDING, THE
    EXECUTION OF ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEET ALL
    REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE
    WITHDRAWAL.
    (emphasis added).
    Thereafter, the District voted to declare Iglesia, Inc. as a “church in
    crisis” per the Manual, to remove the names of the local church board
    members as the corporate officers and appoint replacement persons as the
    local church’s governing board, and to transfer the subject property to the
    District from Iglesia, Inc. As such, Wilson, the then president of the
    District, filed an annual report on behalf of Iglesia, Inc. identifying himself
    as the president of Iglesia, Inc. and also listing the newly appointed
    individuals as officers and directors of Iglesia, Inc. In October 2015,
    Wilson signed and recorded a warranty deed in his capacity as the
    president of Iglesia, Inc., which purported to transfer ownership and title
    to the subject property back from Iglesia, Inc. to the District (“the October
    2015 Warranty Deed”).
    After discovering Wilson’s annual report filing, Poveda filed an
    amendment to Iglesia, Inc.’s articles of incorporation, deleting all
    references to the persons listed therein. On behalf of Iglesia, Inc., Poveda
    then attempted to quitclaim the property to another entity, Oasis, Inc., for
    which Poveda also served as president since its incorporation in 2014.
    Subsequently, additional competing annual reports were filed purportedly
    on behalf of Iglesia, Inc. in which Wilson again claimed to be the president
    thereof, while Poveda deleted Wilson and his cohorts as officers and
    directors of Iglesia, Inc.
    The Litigation
    Appellees filed suit in 2016 against the District and Wilson, alleging
    they fraudulently filed the October 2015 Warranty Deed and annual
    reports in violation of section 817.535, Florida Statutes (2021). Appellees
    sought to quiet title to the subject property against the District asserting
    that Iglesia, Inc. acquired fee simple ownership and title to the subject
    property in 2007 from the District and that Wilson was never authorized
    to act on Iglesia, Inc.’s behalf, such that the October 2015 Warranty Deed
    he signed and recorded was fraudulent and clouded Iglesia, Inc.’s title to
    the property.
    3
    In response, Appellants asserted that the subject dispute related to
    ownership of church property such that the dispute was purely ecclesiastic
    in nature and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
    religious matter. Appellants also brought their own counterclaim for quiet
    title, asserting the District was duty-bound to protect all District and
    church property from being diverted to any personal or corporate use other
    than for the church and to certify the withdrawal of any local church from
    the Church of the Nazarene for the purpose of implementing the transfer
    of title to real property.
    The parties eventually filed competing motions for summary judgment,
    asserting the same positions taken in the complaint and answer.
    At the summary judgment hearing, the parties disputed whether the
    Church of the Nazarene was a hierarchical church such as to enable it to
    invoke the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Notably, the trial court
    acknowledged that if resolving the case required it to interpret provisions
    of the Manual, then that would not be an appropriate matter for the court
    to decide because that is something that would be reserved to the church.
    Specifically, the trial court acknowledged that the issue of what occurred
    when the church was declared to be “in crisis,” and how the board was
    overtaken, presented circumstances very similar to cases in which the
    courts do not get involved, as such cases appear to relate to internal
    decisions dealing with subordinate churches.
    However, the trial court reasoned that in this case, whether the church
    was hierarchical or congressional was not relevant to the ruling on the
    competing summary judgment motions. Rather, the trial court stated that
    it had not considered the Manual’s provisions, and instead had based its
    judgment on the application of neutral principles of Florida real estate and
    corporate law to real estate transactions between two non-profit Florida
    corporations. In doing so, the trial court ruled in favor of Appellees,
    concluding that the District and its president, Wilson, were not members,
    directors, or officers of Iglesia, Inc. and were unauthorized to transfer title
    from Iglesia, Inc. back to the District, such that the October 2015
    Warranty Deed was materially false, unauthorized, null and void.
    Subsequently, Appellants gave notice of appeal.
    Appellate Analysis
    The granting of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
    Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 
    760 So. 2d 126
    , 130 (Fla.
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    2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). The burden is on the moving
    party to show “conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material
    fact and the court must draw every possible inference in favor of the party
    against whom a summary judgment is sought.” Moore v. Morris, 
    475 So. 2d 666
    , 668 (Fla. 1985). “If the evidence raises any issue of material fact,
    if it is conflicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it
    tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a question
    of fact to be determined by it.” 
    Id.
    On appeal, Appellants contend that the trial court should have
    dismissed the suit pursuant to the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.”
    Appellants assert that pursuant to this doctrine, a lay court cannot
    adjudicate who, within a church, is authorized to run that church,
    maintaining that to resolve the dispute of ownership of real property in
    this case, a court would necessarily need to decide which faction within
    the church controls it. See Eglise Baptiste Bethanie De Ft. Lauderdale, Inc.
    v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
    321 So. 3d 245
    , 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
    In our recent decision in Eglise, a non-profit corporation, conducting
    business as a Baptist church, sued two banks for negligently granting
    control of the church’s bank accounts to the widow of the deceased pastor.
    
    Id. at 246
    . The trial court granted the banks’ motion to dismiss for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction, based upon the ecclesiastical abstention
    doctrine. 
    Id.
     On appeal, we affirmed, reasoning:
    [A]lthough the Church’s negligence claims against the Banks
    involve a question of control over bank accounts, in order to
    resolve those claims the court would necessarily have to decide
    which faction within the Church controls the bank accounts.
    The only way for the court to make this determination is for it
    to consider the Church’s internal governance structure.
    “[Q]uestions    of   church     governance    are    manifestly
    ecclesiastical.” 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
    dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
    
    Id. at 247
     (second alteration in original) (emphasis added).
    Notably, Appellants point out that “Florida has made the decision to
    apply the deference to church authority approach when resolving church
    property disputes.” Townsend v. Teagle, 
    467 So. 2d 772
    , 775 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 1985).
    5
    The deference approach, as stated in Watson v. Jones, [
    80 U.S. 679
     (1871),] requires the civil courts to defer to the decisions
    of church authorities on church matters where the church’s
    ecclesiastical government is hierarchical in structure. The
    civil courts must defer to any decision rendered by the church
    authorities in matters of “discipline[,] or of faith, or
    ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.” [Watson, 80 U.S. at 727].
    The decision of “the highest of these church judicatories to
    which the matter has been carried” must be accepted as final
    and binding by legal tribunals. Id.
    Id. (emphasis added). “The fact that the dispute involves title to real
    property or that it involves a conflict among heretofore nonschismatic
    church members in no way operates to permit the circuit court’s
    intervention.” Id.
    Appellants argue that the trial court was required to make a two-
    pronged inquiry whereby it was to first determine whether the Church of
    the Nazarene is hierarchical in nature and then determine whether Iglesia,
    Inc. was affiliated with the church to an extent that it was part of, and a
    subordinate to, that hierarchical structure. See New Jerusalem Church of
    God, Inc. v. Sneads Cmty. Church, Inc., 
    147 So. 3d 25
    , 26 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2013).
    New Jerusalem involved an interchurch dispute regarding which of two
    churches owned a piece of property. 
    Id.
     There, a mother church self-
    identified as a hierarchical church and asserted it owned the property of a
    local church whose deed did not conform to the requirements of the
    church’s governing document. 
    Id.
     The local church went on to convey the
    property to another church prompting suit by the mother church. 
    Id.
    After a jury trial, final judgment was entered quieting title in favor of the
    new church and the mother church appealed. 
    Id.
     On appeal, the First
    District held:
    To allow the trial court or, in this case, the jury to determine
    whether [the mother church] was hierarchical allows the
    finder of fact to delve into matters of religious doctrine and
    polity—an inquiry that is clearly prohibited. As such, the trial
    court was obligated to defer to [the mother church]’s self-
    characterization and to recognize, as a matter of law, that [the
    mother church] is a hierarchical church.
    
    Id. at 29
     (emphasis added). The First District then explained:
    6
    Upon determining, as a matter of law, that [the mother
    church] is a hierarchical church, it would follow then that [the
    mother church] controls the property of its local affiliates. See
    Bethel AME Church of Newberry, Fla. v. Domingo, 
    654 So. 2d 233
     (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that Mills [v. Baldwin, 
    362 So. 2d 2
    , 7 (Fla. 1978)], requires that church property remain
    with the parent church where the church is hierarchical in
    structure). While this is the general rule in Florida, this rule
    does not end our inquiry. To simply conclude that local
    church property automatically flows to the mother church by
    virtue of a hierarchical church’s claim of ownership could lead
    to unfair results. Rather, we find that a second layer of inquiry
    is relevant here to determine property ownership. That is
    whether [the local church] was affiliated with [the mother
    church] such that it was a part of, and subordinate to, the
    hierarchical structure.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added). The First District noted that the evidence which had
    been presented at trial demonstrated that while the local church’s position
    was that its affiliation with the mother church was “loose,” such
    characterization of the relationship was at odds with the clear evidence of
    mutual assent to the hierarchical relationship with the mother church,
    which included the local church’s financial contributions to the mother
    church, attendance at annual conferences, and receipt of guidance from
    the mother church as well as use of its name. 
    Id. at 30
    . As such, the First
    District determined that the local church was clearly affiliated with the
    mother church, which was a hierarchical church, such that according to
    the church’s governance, as well as the case law, the property properly
    belonged to the mother church.         
    Id.
     (citing Full Gospel Temple of
    Tallahassee v. Redd, 
    82 So. 2d 589
    , 590 (Fla. 1955) (holding that, when
    the appellants withdrew from the parent church, they “carried nothing but
    their membership with them; the parent church retained title to the
    properties.”)).
    In the instant case, Appellants are correct that the deference approach
    required the trial court to follow the two-part inquiry set forth in New
    Jerusalem. As to the first inquiry, the trial court was obligated to defer to
    Appellants’ characterization of the Church of the Nazarene as hierarchical
    in nature and to recognize, as a matter of law, that it is a hierarchical
    church.
    As to the second inquiry, whether Iglesia, Inc. was affiliated as a
    subordinate to the hierarchical structure of the church, Appellants argue
    7
    that the Appellees have admitted their dispute is ecclesiastic in nature
    such that their divorce must be governed under the same principles. In
    this regard, the summary judgment evidence reflected that both Poveda
    and Mendoza acknowledged that Iglesia, Inc.’s 2014 corporate resolution
    stated that Iglesia, Inc. would take all necessary action required by the
    Manual to withdraw from the Church of the Nazarene. Therefore,
    summary judgment evidence in the record reflects that Iglesia, Inc. was
    not just a non-profit corporation, but to some extent, part of the Church
    of the Nazarene, such that it needed to abide by the Manual’s provisions
    for withdrawal from the Church of the Nazarene. Indeed, Mendoza’s
    deposition testimony confirmed both that the church board of Iglesia, Inc.
    resolved to withdraw from the Church of the Nazarene, and that Iglesia,
    Inc. was a part of the Church of the Nazarene before that resolution.
    Mendoza further admitted that the Manual represents Iglesia, Inc.’s
    bylaws.
    Therefore, because some summary judgment evidence indicates that
    Iglesia, Inc. was affiliated with the Church of the Nazarene, and that its
    withdrawal from the Church of the Nazarene would need to meet the
    Manual’s requirements, the question of whether the process by which the
    District took control over the Iglesia, Inc. board after declaring it a “church
    in crisis” would arguably be a question of church governance and require
    interpretation of the Manual’s withdrawal procedures. In other words, to
    the extent that Iglesia, Inc. was affiliated with the Church of the Nazarene,
    the determination of control over the Iglesia, Inc. board would be subject
    to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
    Appellees’ argument that Iglesia, Inc. was merely a non-profit
    organization separate and apart from the Church of the Nazarene relies on
    contradictory evidence, and thus fails to justify affirmance of summary
    judgment in their favor. Moreover, to the extent Appellees rely on the
    assertion that Poveda used his own personal savings in making the initial
    purchase of the subject property, the record indicates that subsequent
    mortgage payments were purportedly derived from parishioners’ tithes to
    the church.        Appellees’ assertion that the District was outwardly
    representing that it no longer had interest in this property by sending a
    letter to the city in 2007, advising that title to the property had just been
    transferred to Iglesia, Inc., was also qualified by Appellees’ admission that
    the District’s purpose for sending this letter was to obtain an extension of
    time for Iglesia, Inc. to be able to obtain funds in order to bring the property
    up to code. Likewise, testimony that the District itself had not made any
    financial contributions to Iglesia, Inc., and that since 2007, the District
    had not provided any support to Iglesia, Inc. or the Iglesia Church, in
    support of the argument that Iglesia, Inc. was unaffiliated with the Church
    8
    of the Nazarene, conflicts with the testimony of both Poveda and Mendoza
    acknowledging Iglesia, Inc.’s subsequent 2014 corporate resolution to
    withdraw from the Church of the Nazarene, as well as deposition testimony
    that prior to the 2014 corporate resolution, Iglesia, Inc. was a part of the
    Church of the Nazarene and the Manual represents Iglesia, Inc.’s bylaws.
    Finally, Appellees’ argument that Appellants had admitted that a Nazarene
    Church Board, as defined by its Manual, is a different entity than the
    board of a Florida Corporation, inaccurately characterizes the record.
    Conclusion
    The conflicting summary judgment evidence of Iglesia, Inc.’s affiliation
    with and subordination to the Church of the Nazarene precluded summary
    judgment. Therefore, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand
    for further proceedings for the trial court to conduct the two-prong inquiry
    set forth in New Jerusalem. If the trial court determines that Iglesia, Inc.
    is affiliated with the Church of the Nazarene, and thereby the District, as
    a subordinate, then deference to the District’s determination is required
    and the trial court is precluded by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
    from interfering with a matter of church governance.
    Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    GERBER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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