Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed June 29, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-834
Lower Tribunal No. 21-2381
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William Hamilton Arthur Architect, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
Jeffrey C. Schneider,
Respondent.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos
Lopez, Judge.
The Solomon Law Group, P.A., and Stanford R. Solomon and Laura
H. Howard (Tampa), for petitioners.
Alvarez, Feltman, Da Silva & Costa, PL, and Paul B. Feltman; Law
Offices of Robert P. Frankel, P.A., and Robert P. Frankel (Plantation), for
respondent.
Before SCALES, HENDON and GORDO, JJ.
SCALES, J.
Petitioner William Hamilton Arthur, IV, a co-defendant below, 1 seeks
certiorari review of an April 19, 2022 order that requires Arthur to: (i) produce
for in camera inspection certain communications between Arthur and his
legal counsel; and (ii) permit respondent Jeffrey C. Schneider, the plaintiff
below, to make a digital copy of Arthur’s electronic device so that the trial
court can review in camera Arthur’s internet searches. We have jurisdiction. 2
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Arthur hired a new lawyer to defend Arthur against Schneider’s
architectural malpractice claims, Arthur sent a funeral flower arrangement to
Schneider’s counsel, accompanied by an unsigned note that read, “Please
be advised that I am changing counsel, and accept my belated birthday gift”:
1
Co-petitioner William Hamilton Arthur Architect, Inc., the other co-defendant
below, is Arthur’s professional corporation. For sake of ease, the co-
petitioners will be referred to together herein as “Arthur.”
2
See Coffey-Garcia v. S. Miami Hosp., Inc.,
194 So. 3d 533, 536 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2016) (recognizing an appellate court has certiorari jurisdiction to quash
an order that requires a party to disclose communications protected by the
attorney-client privilege); Holland v. Barfield,
35 So. 3d 953, 955 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2010) (recognizing an appellate court has certiorari jurisdiction to quash
an order that – without proof there is no less intrusive method of obtaining
the information – permits the respondent to examine the petitioner’s
computer hard drive).
2
Upon receiving the floral arrangement, Schneider’s lawyer allegedly
felt threatened and not only filed a police report, but also, on behalf of
Schneider, filed below “Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants
as a Result of Defendant, William Hamilton Arthur, IV’s Disturbing and
Deranged Litigation Misconduct” (“the contempt motion”). In response,
Arthur filed an affidavit wherein Arthur attested, among other things, that “I
thought my name would be included on the delivery” and “[t]he flowers were
not selected because of any funeral overtones.” Arthur’s affidavit gave a
detailed account of the internet searches Arthur allegedly performed to
identify the local flower shop’s website, claiming that he had selected the
“Peaceful Pink Heart Wreath” arrangement arbitrarily based on the website’s
3
picture and a generic description of the arrangement. Further, Arthur attested
that he put the “belated birthday gift” comment in the note that accompanied
the flowers because Arthur knew that Schneider’s attorney had recently had
a birthday.
Following a non-evidentiary hearing on the contempt motion, the trial
court entered an order setting an evidentiary hearing for Arthur to show
cause as to why Arthur should not be held in contempt and subject to
sanctions (“the show cause hearing”). In addition, the trial court entered the
challenged April 19, 2022 order that required Arthur, prior to the show cause
hearing, to: (i) produce to the trial court for in camera review “all
communications with [Arthur’s] counsel and insurance carrier” regarding
Arthur’s ordering of the flowers; and (ii) permit Schneider “to take an image
of the device [Arthur] used (whether cell phone, laptop, computer, or other
device) to purchase the flowers at issue so the Court can review in camera
[Arthur’s] Google searches and the results thereof.” Finally, the challenged
order prohibited Arthur from directly communicating with Schneider or
Schneider’s counsel.
Arthur then filed the instant petition in this Court asserting that (i) the
portion of the challenged order requiring the production of communications
between Arthur and his counsel violated the attorney-client privilege, and (ii)
4
the portion of the challenged order requiring Arthur to turn his electronic
device over to Schneider violated Arthur’s privacy rights. 3 We stayed the
order and we now quash the challenged portions of the order.
II. ANALYSIS
Over fifty years ago, The Rolling Stones promulgated a guide to when,
how, and under what circumstances to send flowers to an adversary:
And you can send me dead flowers every morning
Send me dead flowers by the mail
Send me dead flowers to my wedding
And I won't forget to put roses on your grave. 4
Notably absent from these protocols is a party sending flowers to opposing
counsel as a means of providing notice that the party has hired a new
attorney.
To be clear, we certainly do not condone Arthur’s odd actions.
Depending upon the trial court’s findings at the show cause hearing, Arthur’s
conduct may very well result in the imposition of sanctions. Indeed, at the
3
As detailed more specifically in footnote 6, infra, Arthur does not challenge
that portion of the order requiring Arthur to produce communications solely
between Arthur and his insurance carrier. Nor does Arthur challenge that
aspect of the order requiring Arthur to have no direct communications with
Schneider or Schneider’s counsel.
4
THE ROLLING STONES, Dead Flowers, on STICKY FINGERS (Rolling Stones
Records 1971).
5
non-evidentiary hearing on the contempt motion, Arthur’s new counsel freely
conceded that Arthur’s actions were inappropriate. The propriety of Arthur’s
conduct, though, is not before us. Our inquiry is limited to whether the
challenged order violates the attorney-client privilege and Arthur’s privacy
rights. See Coffey-Garcia, 194 So. 3d at 536; Holland,
35 So. 3d at 955.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
“Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to
obtain legal assistance are privileged.” Lee v. Condell,
208 So. 3d 253, 257
(Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (quoting Fisher v. U.S.,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
Absent extraordinary circumstances delineated by section 90.502 of the
Florida Statutes – the statute that codifies the attorney-client privilege –
neither the lawyer nor the client can be compelled to disclose the content of
private communications protected by the privilege. R.L.R. v. State,
116 So.
3d 570, 573, n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
Section 90.502 provides that “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of
confidential communications when such other person learned of the
communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services
to client.” § 90.502(2), Fla. Stat. (2022). Any communication between a
lawyer and a client that is not intended to be disclosed to a third person is
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considered to be “confidential.” § 90.502(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022). Section
90.502 identifies only five statutory exceptions to attorney-client privilege:
(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under this section when:
(a) The services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable
or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client
knew was a crime or fraud.
(b) A communication is relevant to an issue between parties who
claim through the same deceased client.
(c) A communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by
the lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer, arising
from the lawyer-client relationship.
(d) A communication is relevant to an issue concerning the
intention or competence of a client executing an attested
document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness, or
concerning the execution or attestation of the document.
(e) A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest
between two or more clients, or their successors in interest, if
the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer
retained or consulted in common when offered in a civil action
between the clients or their successors in interest.
§ 90.502(4)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2022).
Although Schneider’s contempt motion did not argue that any of the
statutory exceptions to the privilege applied, at the hearing on the contempt
motion, Schneider’s counsel suggested, in conclusory fashion, that the
privilege did not apply because Arthur’s conduct “possibly is a crime” and,
therefore, “we need to know whether [Arthur’s] lawyers knew about this.”
7
Though not entirely clear, it appears that Schneider’s counsel was relying
upon section 90.502(4)(a), commonly referred to as the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege. 5
To trigger the applicability of section 90.502(4)(a), however, it is
incumbent upon the party seeking the disclosure of the privileged
communication to (i) “[f]irst, . . . allege that the communication was made as
part of an effort to perpetrate a crime or fraud, and the party must also specify
the crime or fraud,” and (ii) “[s]econd, . . . establish a prima facie case that
the party asserting the attorney-client privilege sought the attorney’s advice
in order to commit, or in an attempt to commit, a crime or fraud.” Butler,
Pappas, Weihmuller, Katz, Craig, LLP v. Coral Reef of Key Biscayne
Developers, Inc.,
873 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). If the proponent
fails to meet this threshold burden, the trial court cannot require that the
communications be produced to the trial court for an in camera review. See
First Union Nat’l Bank v. Turney,
824 So. 2d 172, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
(“Absent agreement otherwise, the trial judge should not examine written
communications between attorney and client, unless the party seeking to
establish the crime-fraud exception adduces competent evidence, apart from
5
We note that, in his briefing to this Court, Schneider seems to have
abandoned the argument made below that the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege applies here.
8
the disputed documents, that would lead a reasonable person to believe that
such an examination would reveal that the communications were part of an
effort to perpetrate some crime or fraud.” (citing United States v. Zolin,
491
U.S. 554, 572 (1989))).
Schneider failed to meet this threshold burden, and does not assert
that any other exception to the attorney-client privilege applies here; hence,
we are compelled to quash that portion of the order that requires the
production of communications between Arthur and his counsel. 6
B. Arthur’s Privacy Rights
At the non-evidentiary hearing on the contempt motion, sensing that
the trial court seemed skeptical of the averments in Arthur’s affidavit, Arthur’s
counsel offered to allow the trial court to question Arthur under oath. The trial
court declined this offer, and instead entered the challenged order requiring
Arthur to turn over to Schneider the electronic device that Arthur had used to
6
Arthur does not argue that the privilege applies here to any communications
solely between Arthur and his insurance carrier. Hence, except to the extent
that Arthur’s new counsel or insurance counsel was a party to such
communications, we do not quash that portion of the order that requires
Arthur to produce “all communications with [Arthur’s] . . . insurance carrier”
regarding Arthur’s ordering of the flowers. See United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v.
Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, P.A.,
233 So. 3d 1224, 1231 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017) (“[C]ommunications between an insurer and the lawyer hired by
the insurer to protect the insured’s interests are protected by the
attorney/client privilege because the insurer and insured share a common
interest in the outcome of the case.”).
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purchase the flowers. The order provided no restrictions on Schneider, other
than requiring Schneider to “take an image of the device [Arthur] used” so
that the trial court could conduct an in camera review of Arthur’s internet
searches.
It appears the trial court ordered Arthur to produce his electronic device
as a means of confirming the veracity of the averments in Arthur’s affidavit
regarding the steps Arthur took to purchase the flower arrangement.
Intrusive searching of an electronic device, though, should not be the first
means of obtaining relevant information. See Menke v. Broward Cnty. Sch.
Bd.,
916 So. 2d 8, 11-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Rather, before ordering Arthur
to turn his electronic device over to his litigation adversary, the trial court
should have first considered less intrusive means of obtaining the
information that the trial court deemed relevant to adjudicate the contempt
motion. Id.; Holland,
35 So. 3d at 955-56. “Where a need for electronically
stored information is demanded, such searching should first be done by
[Arthur] so as to protect confidential information, unless, of course, there is
evidence of data destruction designed to prevent the discovery of relevant
evidence in the particular case.” Menke,
916 So. 2d at 12. For example, the
trial court might have ordered Arthur to produce a printout of the electronic
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device’s internet search history for the particular time period in question, but
only as it related to the purchase of the flowers.
Moreover, to the extent a less intrusive method of obtaining the
information does not exist – a circumstance not shown here – the challenged
order is deficient because it fails to “define parameters of time and scope,
and . . . place sufficient access restrictions to prevent compromising . . .
confidentiality and to prevent harm to [the device].”
Id. at 11 (quoting Strasser
v. Yalamanchi,
669 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)); Holland,
35 So.
3d at 956 (“The unlimited breadth of the trial court’s order allows Respondent
to review, without limit or time frame, all of the information on Petitioner’s
computer and mobile phone SIM card without regard to her constitutional
right of privacy and the right against self-incrimination or privileges, including
attorney-client, work product.”).
Because the trial court failed to consider less intrusive means of
obtaining the requested information and because the challenged order
grants Schneider unfettered access to Arthur’s electronic device that
did not protect against disclosure of confidential and privileged information,
we conclude that the trial court’s order “depart[s] from the essential
requirements of law and would cause material injury to [Arthur] throughout
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the remainder of the proceeding below, effectively leaving no adequate
remedy on appeal.” Holland,
35 So. 3d at 956.
III. CONCLUSION
We therefore grant the petition and, subject to the qualification in
footnote 6, supra, we quash those portions of the challenged order that
require Arthur, prior to the show cause hearing, to: (i) produce to the trial
court for in camera review all communications between Arthur and his
counsel regarding Arthur’s ordering of the flowers; and (ii) permit Schneider
to take an image of the hard drive of the device Arthur used to order the
flowers so that the trial court could also review in camera Arthur’s “Google
searches and the results thereof.”
Petition granted.
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