Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 14, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-1073
Lower Tribunal No. F22-2053C
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Jasmine Martinez,
Petitioner,
vs.
Cassandra Jones, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
Law Office of Roderick D. Vereen, Esq., P.A., and Roderick D.
Vereen, for petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kseniya Smychkouskaya,
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent The State of Florida.
Before MILLER, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
GORDO, J.
Jasmine Deandra Martinez files this petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion for pretrial bond following a
three-day Arthur1 hearing. We deny the petition.
I.
Martinez is charged as a principal with first-degree premeditated
murder of LeShonte Jones, attempted murder of Jones’ three-year old child
and conspiracy to commit murder—with a firearm. Martinez filed a motion
for release on bond. The State filed a motion for pretrial detention pursuant
to section 907.041, Florida Statutes, and separately requested the case be
set for Arthur hearing.
After the three-day hearing, the trial court entered a detailed written
order chronicling its findings of fact and conclusions of law—the relevant
portion of which we quote below:
The Court concludes that – for purposes of
Martinez’s Arthur hearing – Javon Carter murdered
LeShonte Jones. The murder was a premeditated
hit. There was no interaction between Ms. Jones
and her killer and nothing was stolen; it was a cold-
blooded, intentional murder . . . . The State
introduced strong evidence that Martinez needed to
eliminate LeShonte Jones as a witness against
Kelly Nelson, one of Martinez’s boyfriends. Ms.
Jones testified during a deposition that Kelly Nelson
and his sister had robbed her and he appeared to
be in possession of a firearm at the time. As a
1
State v. Arthur,
390 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1980)
2
result, Kelly Nelson was being held without bond
pending trial and faced a mandatory life sentence
as a prison release reoffender if he were convicted.
Martinez spent months attempt[ing] to convince
and/or coerce Ms. Jones into dropping the charges
against Kelly Nelson. When her efforts failed,
Martinez decided that Ms. Jones had to be
eliminated. . . . The evidence introduced at the
Hearing supports the State’s contention that
Martinez premeditated, orchestrated, and funded
Ms. Jones’ murder in order to eliminate a witness
whose testimony threatened to put one of Martinez’
boyfriends in prison for life. If Martinez is willing to
go to such lengths for a boyfriend, she would
constitute and ongoing mortal threat to all of the
State’s witnesses in this case. The Court could
never fashion any conditions of release that would
reasonably protect the community from Martinez.
Furthermore, given the real possibility of spending
the remainder of her life incarcerated, Martinez has
little incentive not to flee the jurisdiction if released
on bond, especially in light of the strength of the
State’s case. The Court is not convinced it could
fashion conditions of release that would ensure
Martinez’s presence at trial.
II.
We review matters relating to the setting of bond and the conditions
attached to a defendant’s pre-trial release on bond under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Hernandez v. Roth,
890 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Fla.
3d DCA 2004). Pursuant to Arthur, “before release on bail pending trial
can ever be denied, the state must come forward with a showing that the
proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. The state’s burden, in
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order to foreclose bail as a matter of right, is to present some further
evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, would be
legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty.” Arthur,
390 So. 2d at
720.
Although Martinez argues that most of the evidence presented was
circumstantial, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that
the State met its burden under Arthur that Martinez ordered the hit on
Jones. The State presented a bevy of evidence demonstrating Martinez
hired Javon Carter to murder the victim to prevent her from testifying
against her boyfriend Kelly Nelson in Nelson’s trial for armed robbery. 2
III.
Pursuant to Arthur, after the State meets its burden the trial court has
discretion to grant or deny bail. When the trial court is determining this
question, “the burden is on the accused to demonstrate that release on bail
is appropriate. It is with regard to this question that consideration of the
likelihood that the accused will flee, regardless of the sureties required,
2
The state introduced numerous jail calls between Martinez, Nelson,
Romel Robinson and Javon Carter. In the calls, Martinez repeatedly stated
she wanted to “kill that hoe” (Jones) and that “she has to die.” The calls
detailed the plan and price of Jones’ murder. One call details Carter’s
objection to an attempt to negotiate the price down from $15,000. While
Martinez’s counsel argues these calls were made regarding a different
matter, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that
the calls demonstrated Martinez hired Carter to kill Jones.
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becomes appropriate.” Arthur,
390 So. 2d at 720. Here, the trial court
found Martinez was not entitled to release on bail under the circumstances.
Under Florida law a trial court’s order on bond is presumed to be
correct and a petitioner seeking to challenge a trial court’s determination on
bond must present evidence to overcome that presumption. See
Hernandez v. Roth,
890 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (“Because
trial judges are in a superior position to determine what conditions will be
required to ensure that the defendant will appear in future proceedings and
that the defendant is not a risk to the community, a defendant seeking a
writ of habeas corpus ‘must adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of correctness of the trial court’s order.’” (quoting State ex rel.
Smith v. Untreiner,
246 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971))).
Martinez fails to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial
court’s order. Further, we find no error in the trial court’s well-reasoned
order denying pre-trial release finding Martinez is a danger to the
community, to any potential witnesses in the case against her and there
are no conditions of release that would assure her presence at trial or
protect the safety of the community.
Denied.
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