Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed January 4, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-1495
Lower Tribunal No. 18-39831
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GR OPCO, LLC, etc.,
Appellant,
vs.
Ana Paola Murillo,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, David C. Miller, Judge.
Kelley Legal, and Marissa D. Kelley and Dylan M. Fulop (Ft.
Lauderdale), for appellant.
Remer & Georges-Pierre, PLLC, and Peter M. Hoogerwoerd, for
appellee.
Before LOGUE, HENDON, and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Ana Paola Murillo filed a complaint against GR OPCO, LLC d/b/a
E11even, alleging claims for a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
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U.S.C. §§ 201, 216, breach of agreement, quantum meruit, and unjust
enrichment. GR OPCO moved to compel arbitration, claiming that Murillo
signed an agreement requiring the parties to arbitrate any and all claims
between them and attaching a copy of the agreement purportedly signed by
Murillo. Murillo countered with a declaration stating that she never signed
an arbitration agreement during her employment with GR OPCO, and
attesting that the signature and IP address on the electronically signed
agreement were not hers. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
the motion to compel arbitration. GR OPCO now appeals.
In reviewing a trial court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration,
our review of factual findings is limited to determining whether they are
supported by competent, substantial evidence. MetroPCS Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Porter,
273 So. 3d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). After careful review,
we conclude that GR OPCO has not demonstrated that the trial court erred
in denying its motion to compel arbitration because substantial competent
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Murillo did not
sign the arbitration agreement, and therefore, no valid written agreement to
arbitrate exists between the parties. Specifically, the trial court, who
observed the witnesses as they testified, based its ruling on a credibility
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determination, finding Murillo’s testimony that she did not sign the arbitration
agreement to be both credible and determinative on the issue. Given our
standard of review, we decline to disturb the trial court’s ruling that GR OPCO
is not entitled to arbitrate the dispute. See Cartelli v. Green,
331 So. 3d 839,
841 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“The test . . . is whether the judgment of the trial
court is supported by competent evidence. Subject to the appellate court’s
right to reject ‘inherently incredible and improbable testimony or evidence,’ it
is not the prerogative of an appellate court, upon a de novo consideration of
the record, to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” (quoting Shaw
v. Shaw,
334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976))); Demida Miami Gardens, LLC v.
Master Excavators, Inc.,
107 So. 3d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“On
this record, we could reverse only by re-weighing the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses—a function not ascribed to this court.” (quoting G
& G Fashion Design, Inc. v. Garcia,
870 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA
2004))); Adkins v. Adkins,
650 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“[I]t is for
the trial court who heard the testimony below, not this court, to evaluate and
weigh credibility of witness testimony and other evidence adduced.”).
We also discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the
parties’ joint motion for continuance of the evidentiary hearing. See Leal v.
Benitez,
275 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Affirmed.
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