Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 27, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-2005
Lower Tribunal No. F13-11975
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Anthony Sampson,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Teresa Mary Pooler, Judge.
Anthony Sampson, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, SCALES and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.
Anthony Sampson appeals the denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence under rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 Sampson
alleges that the trial court’s use of an incorrect sentencing scoresheet
resulted in his receiving a higher sentence than he would have received
under the appropriate sentencing guidelines at the time of the offenses. The
State concedes that the scoresheet was incorrect, but nonetheless contends
that the error is harmless because the sentence was within the statutory
maximum that the trial court could have imposed upon making findings to
justify an upward departure from the guidelines sentence. Because the court
did not make such findings, and because we cannot conclude from the
record that the trial court would have done so but for its reliance on the
improper scoresheet, we vacate the sentence and remand for a new
sentencing proceeding.
Sampson was convicted of second-degree murder, armed robbery,
and grand theft based on acts committed on May 12–13, 1997. During his
sentencing, the trial court calculated Sampson’s sentencing scoresheet
pursuant to the Florida Criminal Punishment Code guidelines and concluded
that the minimum permissible sentence was 379.35 months incarceration.
1
Our review is de novo. See, e.g., Jimenez v. State,
265 So. 3d 462, 476
n.10 (Fla. 2018).
2
Due to Sampson’s lengthy criminal history and the violent nature of the
offenses, the court sentenced him to life for the murder charge, 75 years for
the robbery, and 5 years for the grand theft, to run concurrently. This court
affirmed on direct appeal. Sampson v. State,
213 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA
2017).
Subsequently, Sampson brought a motion for postconviction relief,
arguing in pertinent part that his sentence was illegal due to the trial court’s
failure to properly impose the 1994 revised sentencing guidelines, which
would have resulted in a sentence range of 218.55 to 364.25 months
incarceration. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the
sentences were not illegal because they fell below the statutory maximum
for each charge. 2 This appeal followed.
Sampson correctly notes, and the State doesn’t dispute, that the trial
court should have applied the 1994 revised sentencing guidelines instead of
2
See § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1997) (classifying second-degree murder as
first-degree felony punishable by life when committed with the use of a
deadly weapon); § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) (enhancing first-degree
felonies in which firearm usage is not an essential element to life felonies
when firearm is used, carried, or threatened, except where otherwise
provided by law); § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) (classifying armed robbery
with a firearm as first-degree felony punishable by life); § 812.014(2)(c), Fla.
Stat. (1997) (classifying grand theft as third-degree felony); § 775.082(3),
Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing third-degree felonies punishable by up to five
years’ incarceration).
3
the Criminal Punishment Code for the offenses committed in 1997. See §
921.001(4)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (1997) (“The 1994 guidelines apply to sentencing
for all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after January 1,
1994.”); § 921.0022, Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that Criminal Punishment
Code scoresheet is “[e]ffective October 1, 1998”). The fact that Sampson’s
sentence fell below the statutory maximum doesn’t end the inquiry here.
See, e.g., Parks v. State,
697 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“Use of the
wrong scoresheet is akin to an incorrect scoresheet calculation which is
cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).”); Jackson v.
State,
983 So. 2d 562, 572 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing “that the scoresheet was
inaccurate” as a “sentencing error” for purposes of Rule 3.800).
While the trial court could legally impose the sentence given to
Sampson, it could do so only upon additional written findings. Under the
1994 guidelines, a trial court may only apply a sentence within 25% of the
median recommended guidelines range, absent written findings reasonably
justifying a departure from such a range. See § 921.001(5)–(6), Fla. Stat.
(1997) (requiring sentence under 1994 guidelines to be within guidelines
range “unless there is a departure sentence with written findings” that is
“based upon circumstances or factors which reasonably justify the
aggravation or mitigation of the sentence”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.703(d)(30)(B)
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(requiring written statement justifying departure sentence to be included in
the record); § 921.0014(2), Fla. Stat. (1997) (“The recommended sentence
length in state prison months may be increased by up to, and including, 25
percent . . . at the discretion of the court.”); § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (1997)
(allowing trial court to impose any sentence up to statutory maximum under
Criminal Punishment Code); see also Mays v. State,
717 So. 2d 515, 515–
16 (Fla. 1998) (explaining process of guidelines sentencing).
Sampson’s sentence of life plus 75 years exceeds the maximum of
364.25 months he could have received under the 1994 guidelines absent a
departure. Accordingly, the trial court was required to make written findings.
The State claims that the court’s failure to make such findings was harmless
here because the record is replete with evidence to support such a
departure. See Rubin v. State,
734 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
(“[W]here it is clear that the trial court would have imposed the departure
sentence notwithstanding the scoresheet error and there are valid reasons
for the departure sentence, we affirm.”). But Rubin arises from a different
factual posture. In Rubin, the court explained in detail that, notwithstanding
the error in the appellant’s point total, such effort was harmless based on the
record evidence cited by the trial court to justify its departure sentence.
Id.
at 1089–90. Here, we take no position on the ultimate merits of an upward
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departure. But, unlike Rubin, the lack of record evidence cited by the trial
court prevents us from finding harmless error. In a case more analogous to
the facts here, our sister court explained that absent a clear intent to impose
a sentence notwithstanding a scoresheet error (such as in Rubin), the proper
remedy requires remand to allow the trial court “to provide proof that the
sentencing guidelines scoresheet error did not affect [the defendant’s]
sentence or to re-sentence him with a corrected scoresheet.” Knowles v.
State,
791 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
The lack of specific findings from the trial court justifying the departure
of greater than 25% precludes us from finding harmless error under the
applicable sentencing guidelines. Thus, we vacate the sentence and
remand for a new sentencing hearing, resentencing, and further
proceedings. Sampson and his counsel shall be present at the new
sentencing hearing and the resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
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