PEOPLE'S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY v. ERROL A. POLANCO ( 2023 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    PEOPLE’S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    ERROL A. POLANCO,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D22-559
    [January 11, 2023]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE20-
    9475.
    Mark T. Tinker of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Tampa, and Brett Frankel
    and Jonathan Sabghir of People’s Trust Insurance Company, Deerfield
    Beach, for appellant.
    Lane Weinbaum of Weinbaum, P.A., Coconut Creek, for appellee.
    LEVINE, J.
    People’s Trust Insurance Company appeals an order granting Errol
    Polanco, the insured, attorney’s fees and costs associated with his suit for
    breach of insurance contract. Because the suit was not “a necessary
    catalyst to resolve the dispute,” nor was there a “breakdown in the claims-
    adjusting process,” we reverse.
    The insured filed a claim with his homeowner’s insurer, People’s Trust,
    for Hurricane Irma damage. People’s Trust sent the insured an estimate
    and coverage determination letter in which it elected to repair the property
    pursuant to a provision of the insured’s policy. The letter stated that there
    was, in fact, coverage for the insured’s claim. However, People’s Trust’s
    investigation determined that certain damages were not covered. People’s
    Trust denied coverage for the roof because the investigation concluded that
    Hurricane Irma was not the cause of the roof damage. People’s Trust also
    denied coverage for the interior water damage, because the investigation
    concluded that this damage was caused by age related “wear, tear, and
    deterioration,” which was not a covered loss under the insured’s policy.
    People’s Trust did admit coverage for damage to the insured’s soffit and
    fascia. However, since the cost of repair did not exceed the insured’s
    deductible, no repairs were commenced on the property.
    Significantly, the insured never informed People’s Trust that he
    disputed its estimate or coverage determination. The insured also did not
    send People’s Trust a competing estimate or a completed sworn proof of
    loss. Instead, over two years later, the insured filed a suit for breach of
    insurance contract. People’s Trust moved to compel appraisal. An
    appraisal award was eventually entered in favor of the insured for
    $55,724.72, which now included the cost to replace the insured’s roof and
    repair the interior water damage originally denied in the coverage
    determination letter. The insured moved for the trial court to confirm the
    appraisal award and for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section
    627.428. The trial court found that the insured was forced to file suit
    because People’s Trust wrongly denied coverage for the roof and that the
    appraisal award was a direct result of the insured’s lawsuit. The trial court
    then awarded the insured $10,500 in attorney’s fees and costs. This
    appeal follows.
    We review a trial court’s determination of entitlement to attorney’s fees
    based on interpretation of a statute de novo. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v.
    Silber, 
    72 So. 3d 286
    , 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
    The trial court erred in awarding the insured attorney’s fees because
    there was no dispute before the insured filed his breach of insurance
    contract suit. Section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (2021), states:
    Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the
    courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any
    named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a
    policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court or,
    in the event of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary
    prevails, the appellate court shall adjudge or decree against
    the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a
    reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured’s or
    beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the suit in which the
    recovery is had.
    An insured moving for attorney’s fees must prove that “the suit was
    filed for a legitimate purpose, and whether the filing acted as a necessary
    catalyst to resolve the dispute and force the insurer to satisfy its
    obligations under the insurance contract.” State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Lime
    Bay Condo., Inc., 
    187 So. 3d 932
    , 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). For attorney’s
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    fees to be awarded, there must have been “some dispute as to the amount
    owed by the insurer” before the insured filed suit. Lewis v. Universal Prop.
    & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    13 So. 3d 1079
    , 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
    In this case, there was no dispute as to the amount owed because the
    insured did not inform People’s Trust that he disputed its estimate or
    coverage determination letter. The insured did not send People’s Trust a
    competing estimate or complete a sworn proof of loss. The first indication
    of disagreement was when the insured filed the complaint. Because the
    insured did not afford People’s Trust an opportunity to compel appraisal
    before he filed suit, awarding attorney’s fees in his favor is not appropriate.
    Compare Jerkins v. USF & G Specialty Ins. Co., 
    982 So. 2d 15
    , 18 (Fla. 5th
    DCA 2008) (awarding the insured attorney’s fees where, following a “bona
    fide dispute” as to the amount of loss, the insured sued the insurer and
    the insurer thereafter participated in appraisal, leading to an award of
    attorney’s fees in favor of the insured), with Federated Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
    Esposito, 
    937 So. 2d 199
    , 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that an award
    of attorney’s fees to the insured was not appropriate where the insurer
    “timely participated in the appraisal and paid the award without the need
    for court intervention”), and Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Bobinski, 
    776 So. 2d 1047
    , 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding an award of attorney’s fees
    in favor of the insured was not appropriate where the insurer had
    participated in, completed, and paid the appraisal award before the
    insured filed suit seeking confirmation of the appraisal award).
    This court’s holding in People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Farinato, 
    315 So. 3d 724
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), is persuasive. The insurer in Farinato sent a
    similar coverage determination letter, stating that “the policy provided
    coverage for damages to the interior of the home,” but disclaimed coverage
    for the roof damage because it “‘stemmed from age-related wear and tear,’”
    which was not a covered loss under the policy. Id. at 726. The insured
    sent the insurer an estimate exceeding that provided by the insurer. Id.
    The insurer demanded appraisal, and a few hours later, the insured filed
    suit for breach of insurance contract. Id. at 726-27. The insurer moved
    to compel appraisal, and an appraisal award was subsequently entered
    including the cost to repair the roof. Id. at 727.
    This court held that awarding attorney’s fees to the insured was not
    appropriate because the dispute between the parties did not showcase “a
    breakdown in the claims-adjusting process.” Id. at 729. Thus, the lawsuit
    was not a “necessary catalyst” to resolving the insurance dispute, entitling
    the insured to attorney’s fees. Id. Similarly, in this case, there was no
    breakdown in the claims-adjusting process because the insurer was never
    informed of a potential dispute until suit was filed. The insured must show
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    that he “attempted to resolve any differences without resorting to formal
    legal action” for an award of attorney’s fees to be appropriate. Travelers
    Indem. Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Meadows MRI, LLP, 
    900 So. 2d 676
    , 679 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2005) (awarding attorney’s fees to an insured where parties actively
    disputed the coverage determination for nearly a year before suit was filed).
    The insured in this case made no effort to resolve the dispute without court
    intervention. Thus, he cannot recover attorney’s fees.
    The insured argues that suit was necessary for recovery, and that the
    instant case is distinguishable from Farinato, because People’s Trust did
    not compel appraisal until after the complaint was filed. We disagree.
    “[W]hether suit is filed before or after the invocation of the appraisal
    process is not determinative of the insured’s right to fees; rather, the right
    to fees turns upon whether the filing of the suit served a legitimate
    purpose.” Farinato, 315 So. 3d at 729 (citation omitted). Additionally,
    People’s Trust could not compel appraisal until after it was informed that
    a dispute existed. See People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Ortega, 
    306 So. 3d 280
    , 285
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“Triggering the appraisal provision requires the
    insured to timely comply with providing the insurance company
    information that substantiates the existence of a disagreement. For there
    to be a disagreement, the insurance company must be put on notice that
    the insured’s damages estimate is different from the insurer’s estimate and
    scope of repairs.”). Because the first indication of disagreement was the
    complaint, People’s Trust could not have compelled appraisal before the
    suit was filed. Thus, the fact that People’s Trust did not compel appraisal
    until after suit was filed would not entitle the insured to attorney’s fees in
    this case.
    Finally, the denial of coverage for the roof and interior water damage
    did not constitute a denial of the entire claim entitling the insured to file
    suit immediately. In this case, all the damage constituted a single claim,
    where all of the damage was contained in the same building and occurred,
    allegedly, from the same incident. See People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Tracey, 
    251 So. 3d 931
    , 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Because People’s Trust admitted
    coverage for the soffit and fascia, it did not “wholly deny” coverage. 
    Id.
    Thus, just like in Farinato where the insurer had denied coverage for the
    roof entirely, the insured still needed to address the discrepancy in the
    coverage determination before filing suit.
    Since there was no prior dispute as to the amount owed, we hold that
    the insured’s lawsuit was not a necessary catalyst to his recovery. Thus,
    we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the order granting the
    insured attorney’s fees.
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    Reversed and remanded with instructions.
    GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur.
    *       *           *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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