DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
In the Interest of J.A.T., a child.
R.T.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
and GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
Appellees.
No. 2D22-393
September 21, 2022
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Manatee County; Gilbert A. Smith, Jr., Judge.
Linda A. Lorrier of Linda A. Lorrier, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant.
Meredith K. Hall, Children's Legal Services, Appellate Division,
Bradenton, for Appellee Department of Children and Families.
Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Krystle
Cacci, Certified Legal Intern, Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office,
Tallahassee, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem Program.
LABRIT, Judge.
R.T., the Father, appeals an order placing J.A.T., the Child, in
a permanent guardianship and terminating the Department of
Children and Families' supervision. Because the permanent
guardianship order does not fully comply with section 39.6221,
Florida Statutes (2021), we reverse and remand for entry of an
amended order.
The Father first argues that the trial court's decision to place
the Child in a permanent guardianship was not supported by
competent substantial evidence and that the order on review failed
to make specific findings of fact. We conclude that competent
substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision to place the
Child in a permanent guardianship. See A.C. v. Dep't of Child. &
Fam. Servs.,
136 So. 3d 720, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). However,
section 39.6221 requires that the written order "[l]ist the
circumstances or reasons why the child's parents are not fit to care
for the child and why reunification is not possible by referring to
specific findings of fact made in its order adjudicating the child
dependent or by making separate findings of fact." § 39.6221(2)(a)
(emphasis added). The permanent guardianship order generally
relies on "the circumstances from which the court previously based
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its finding that the Child is dependent in the order of adjudication."
See D.C. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.,
118 So. 3d 924, 925 (Fla.
2d DCA 2013). This is insufficient because it does not refer to
specific findings of fact from the order of adjudication of
dependency. See A.C.,
136 So. 3d at 721.
The Father next argues that the portion of the permanent
guardianship order addressing the frequency of his visitation is
insufficient. An order placing a child in a permanent guardianship
must "[s]pecify the frequency and nature of visitation or contact
between the child and his or her parents." § 39.6221(2)(c). The
plain language of the statute requires a court to set a specific
frequency of visitation. S. W-R. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.,
64
So. 3d 1283, 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
In D.C., this court addressed a similar visitation provision in a
permanent guardianship order. We explained:
Here, the trial court ordered visitation as to D.C. be
supervised at all times by the child's therapist, the
permanent guardian, or an adult approved by DCF. The
visitation "shall occur on a schedule agreed [to] by the
parties. . . . Once recommended by the therapist, the
visitation shall be supervised visitation at a minimum of
once a month for a minimum of one hour." This portion
of the order does not necessarily violate section
39.6221(2)(c).
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D.C., 118 So. 3d at 926.
Similar to the visitation provision in D.C., the permanent
guardianship order in this case provides that "[t]he frequency of the
visitation shall be determined with therapeutic input" and that
visitation "shall begin . . . when therapeutically recommended."
However, the order in this case differs from D.C. because it fails to
specify a frequency of visitation. While an increase in the frequency
of visitation can be determined with therapeutic input and the start
of visitation can be delayed until a time that is therapeutically
recommended, section 39.6221(2)(c) requires a permanent
guardianship order to set a specific minimum frequency of
visitation that is to be allowed once visitation begins. See, e.g.,
D.C.,
118 So. 3d at 926.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the entry of an
amended order that meets the requirements of section 39.6221(2)(a)
and (2)(c). We stress that on remand, the trial court need only
amend the order to add the specific findings of fact from the order
adjudicating the Child dependent upon which the court relied to
place the Child in a permanent guardianship and to set a minimum
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frequency of visitation once visitation is therapeutically
recommended. Because competent substantial evidence supports
placement of the Child in a permanent guardianship, the trial court
need not reconsider that decision.
Reversed and remanded.
BLACK and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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